scholarly journals Structural Injustice and Labour Migration – From Individual Responsibility to Collective Action

Theoria ◽  
2021 ◽  
Author(s):  
Magnus Skytterholm Egan
Keyword(s):  
Collective Action ◽  
Individual Responsibility ◽  
Labour Migration ◽  
Structural Injustice

On the Relation Between Collective Responsibility and Collective Duties

Philosophy ◽  
2020 ◽  
Vol 96 (1) ◽  
pp. 99-131
Author(s):  
Niels de Haan
Keyword(s):  
Collective Action ◽  
Moral Responsibility ◽  
Good Reason ◽  
Collective Responsibility ◽  
The Other ◽  
Individual Responsibility ◽  
Type Symmetry ◽  
Moral Demands

AbstractThere is good reason to think that moral responsibility as accountability is tied to the violation of moral demands. This lends intuitive support to Type-Symmetry in the collective realm: A type of responsibility entails the violation or unfulfillment of the same type of all-things-considered duty. For example, collective responsibility necessarily entails the violation of a collective duty. But Type-Symmetry is false. In this paper I argue that a non-agential group can be collectively responsible without thereby violating a collective duty. To show this I distinguish between four types of responsibility and duty in collective contexts: corporate, distributed, collective, shared. I set out two cases: one involves a non-reductive collective action that constitutes irreducible wrongdoing, the other involves a non-divisible consequence. I show that the violation of individual or shared duties both can lead to irreducible wrongdoing for which only the group is responsible. Finally, I explain why this conclusion does not upset any work on individual responsibility.

scholarly journals Personal Failure Makes Society seem Fonder: An Inquiry into the Roots of Social Interdependence

2018 ◽  
Author(s):  
Edward Orehek ◽  
Arie W. Kruglanski
Keyword(s):  
Collective Action ◽  
Direct Evidence ◽  
Individual Responsibility ◽  
Social Constraints ◽  
Social Interdependence

A universal consideration among people concerns the relative premium placed on social interdependence relative to self-reliant independence. While interdependence requires submission to social constraints, it also offers empowerment through coalition. While independence fosters freedom, it also imposes individual responsibility for attained outcomes whether good or bad. In four studies we obtain the first direct evidence that failure prompts a shift toward interdependence. Implications are discussed for conditions under which people are driven to collective action.

Communication and Collective Actions: A Survey Experiment on Motivating Energy Conservation in the U.S.

2014 ◽  
Vol 1 (1) ◽  
pp. 24-38 ◽  
Author(s):  
Toby Bolsen ◽  
James N. Druckman ◽  
Fay Lomax Cook
Keyword(s):  
Collective Action ◽  
Energy Conservation ◽  
Environmental Sustainability ◽  
Environmental Benefits ◽  
Individual Responsibility ◽  
Survey Experiment ◽  
Collective Actions ◽  
The Public ◽  
The Impact ◽  
Do So

AbstractWhen do citizens take action to benefit the public good, even when individual benefits are scant or non-existent? We address this question with a focus on an area of critical importance when it comes to environmental sustainability—specifically, we examine citizens' actions in the domain of energy conservation. We do so by using a survey experiment to evaluate the impact of exposure to communications posited to shape collective action behavior. We find that communications shape behavior depending on two primary factors not previously studied in concert: to whom responsibility is attributed for collective outcomes; and, what effects, or consequences, are associated with one's actions. We find that communications emphasizing individual responsibility and collective environmental benefits can stimulate collective action.

scholarly journals Who should fight domination? Individual responsibility and structural injustice

2021 ◽  
pp. 1470594X2110033
Author(s):  
Dorothea Gädeke
Keyword(s):  
Moral Responsibility ◽  
Individual Responsibility ◽  
Power Dynamics ◽  
Social Connection ◽  
Political Responsibility ◽  
Structural Dimension ◽  
Structural Injustice ◽  
The Social ◽  
In Virtue Of

Who is responsible for fighting domination? Answering this question, I argue, requires taking the structural dimension of domination seriously to avoid unwillingly reproducing domination in the name of justice. Having cast domination as a structural injustice that refers to structurally constituted positions of power and disempowerment, I show that the outcome-based, the capacity-based and the social connection model suggested in literature on responsibility, fail to fully meet this challenge. Drawing on insights from all of them, I propose an account that proves more sensitive towards the power dynamics at play in fighting domination. It is based on a fundamental duty of justice, which gives rise to two kinds of responsibility. Dominators, dominated and peripheral agents share political responsibility for domination in virtue of reproducing domination by occupying a position within structures of dominating power; they are required to acknowledge and undermine their position of power or disempowerment rather than simply using and thus tacitly reaffirming it. Political responsibility for domination is distinct from moral responsibility for acting within contexts of domination; in fact, ignoring this difference risks reproducing rather than transforming relations of domination. Bystanders who are not implicated in reproducing domination bear limited remedial responsibility to support this struggle.

scholarly journals Injustice and Collectivization in World Politics

2019 ◽  
Vol 11 (2) ◽  
pp. 29-50
Author(s):  
Elizabeth Kahn
Keyword(s):  
Collective Action ◽  
World Politics ◽  
Future Contribution ◽  
Structural Injustice ◽  
The Future ◽  
Attribution Of Blame ◽  
Forward Looking

In Justice and Reconciliation in World Politics Catherine Lu endorses the idea that those who contribute to the reproduction of structural injustice have responsibilities to address that injustice (Lu, 2017). However, in the book, Lu does not explore the grounds and justification for recognising such a responsibility. In order to address this deficit, this paper proposes that those likely to contribute to the reproduction of structural injustice, in the future, have precautionary duties, in the present, that require them to take action aimed at preventing their future contribution. It is proposed that these ‘collectivization duties’ (Collins, 2013) require them to act responsively with a view to forming a collective that can end the structural injustice in question. This account recommends a collective-action solution alongside recognising that each socially connected agent is obliged to act. However, it does not entail that amorphous groups bear responsibilities and is appropriate in its attribution of blame, thus avoiding both Nussbaum’s (2011) critique of perpetually forward-looking accounts and the ‘agency objection’ (Wringe, 2010).

Why Participate in Pro-Environmental Action? Individual Responsibility in Unstructured Collectives

2014 ◽  
Vol 36 (2) ◽  
Author(s):  
Anton Leist
Keyword(s):  
Collective Action ◽  
Public Goods ◽  
Natural Resources ◽  
Public Good ◽  
Free Riding ◽  
Individual Responsibility ◽  
Moral Duty ◽  
Environmental Action ◽  
Individual Contributions ◽  
Moral Arguments

AbstractThe degradation of natural resources in the environment is, technically speaking, a form of depleting a public good. Public goods are notorious for free-riding among egoists, but the marginality of individual contributions provides no less an obstacle, both to moral duty and motivation. This article discusses the problems of minimized and missing causal involvement on the empirical side; and, in the applicability of classical moral arguments, on the ethical side. It. suggests that individual responsibility is derived on the basis of implicit advantage-taking from participation in collective action.

scholarly journals Bias, Structure, and Injustice: A Reply to Haslanger

2018 ◽  
Vol 4 (1) ◽  
Author(s):  
Robin Zheng
Keyword(s):  
Social Structure ◽  
Social Inequalities ◽  
Implicit Bias ◽  
Alternative Conception ◽  
Social Structures ◽  
Individual Responsibility ◽  
Structural Injustice ◽  
Implicit Biases

Sally Haslanger has recently argued that philosophical focus on implicit bias is overly individualist, since social inequalities are best explained in terms of social structures rather than the actions and attitudes of individuals. I argue that questions of individual responsibility and implicit bias, properly understood, do constitute an important part of addressing structural injustice, and I propose an alternative conception of social structure according to which implicit biases are themselves best understood as a special type of structure.

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