Reliabilism, the Generality Problem, and the Basing Relation

Theoria ◽  
2019 ◽  
Vol 85 (2) ◽  
pp. 119-144
Author(s):  
Erhan Demircioglu
Keyword(s):  
Generality Problem ◽  
Basing Relation

Is the Generality Problem too General?

2002 ◽  
Vol 65 (1) ◽  
pp. 87-97 ◽  
Author(s):  
Jonathan Adler ◽  
Michael Levin
Keyword(s):  
Generality Problem

On the Causal-Doxastic Theory of the Basing Relation

2002 ◽  
Vol 32 (4) ◽  
pp. 543-559 ◽  
Author(s):  
Daniel M. Mittag
Keyword(s):  
Recent Article ◽  
Causal Relation ◽  
The Other ◽  
Causal Relations ◽  
Basing Relation ◽  
In Virtue Of

If one is to believe that p justifiably, then one must believe p for, or because of, one's evidence or reasons in support of p. The basing relation is exactly this relation that obtains between one's belief and one's reasons for believing. Keith Allen Korcz, in a recent article published in this Journal, has argued that two conditions are each sufficient and are jointly necessary to establish basing relations between beliefs and reasons. One condition is formulated to account for basing relations that can obtain in virtue of causal relations between one's belief and reasons, and the other condition is supposed to account for basing relations which can be established independently of the instantiation of any such causal relation.

Is the Use of Evidence Necessary for the Justification of Beliefs?

Diogenes ◽  
2019 ◽  
Vol 27 (2) ◽  
Author(s):  
Anna Ivanova ◽  
◽  
◽  
Keyword(s):  
Mental States ◽  
Generality Problem ◽  
Linguistic Practices

The article analyses the conflicting views of reliabilism and evidentialism on the following question – What is the leading condition in ascribing justification to beliefs: reliability or evaluation through evidence. The evidentialist view is defended by arguments, derived from the linguistic practices of ascribing justification in complex conditions. The generality problem is interpreted as an exemplification of the complexity of cognitive situations and it is argued that complexity requires reference to the mental states as a means for ascribing justification. Reliability is also recognized as a factor for ascribing justification to some beliefs when it serves as a type of evidence.

Can there Be Epistemic Reasons for Action?

2006 ◽  
Vol 73 (1) ◽  
pp. 133-144 ◽  
Author(s):  
Anthony Robert Booth
Keyword(s):  
Moral Realism ◽  
Epistemic Justification ◽  
Epistemic Reasons ◽  
Reasons For Action ◽  
Basing Relation

In this paper I consider whether there can be such things as epistemic reasons for action. I consider three arguments to the contrary and argue that none are successful, being either somewhat question-begging or too strong by ruling out what most epistemologists think is a necessary feature of epistemic justification, namely the epistemic basing relation. I end by suggesting a "non-cognitivist" model of epistemic reasons that makes room for there being epistemic reasons for action and suggest that this model may support moral realism.

scholarly journals Solving the Current Generality Problem

2016 ◽  
Vol 7 (3) ◽  
pp. 345-350 ◽  
Author(s):  
Kevin Wallbridge ◽  
Keyword(s):  
Generality Problem

TRIANGULATION, CONTENT AND THE BASING RELATION

2009 ◽  
Vol 78 (1) ◽  
pp. 231-250
Author(s):  
Hamid VAHID
Keyword(s):  
Basing Relation

The Epistemic Role of Core Cognition

2020 ◽  
Vol 129 (2) ◽  
pp. 251-298 ◽  
Author(s):  
Zoe Jenkin
Keyword(s):  
Developmental Psychology ◽  
Mental States ◽  
Picture Perception ◽  
Epistemic Status ◽  
Object Representations ◽  
Basing Relation ◽  
The Core ◽  
Core Cognition ◽  
Epistemic Role

According to a traditional picture, perception and belief have starkly different epistemic roles. Beliefs have epistemic statuses as justified or unjustified, depending on how they are formed and maintained. In contrast, perceptions are “unjustified justifiers.” Core cognition is a set of mental systems that stand at the border of perception and belief, and has been extensively studied in developmental psychology. Core cognition's borderline states do not fit neatly into the traditional epistemic picture. What is the epistemic role of these states? Focusing on the core object system, the author argues that core object representations have epistemic statuses like beliefs do, despite their many prototypically perceptual features. First, the author argues that it is a sufficient condition on a mental state's having an epistemic status as justified or unjustified that the state is based on reasons. Then the author argues that core object representations are based on reasons, through an examination of both experimental results and key markers of the basing relation. The scope of mental states that are subject to epistemic evaluation as justified or unjustified is not restricted to beliefs.

The Basing Relation

2019 ◽  
Vol 128 (2) ◽  
pp. 179-217 ◽  
Author(s):  
Ram Neta
Keyword(s):  
Basing Relation

The Causal-Doxastic Theory of the Basing Relation

2000 ◽  
Vol 30 (4) ◽  
pp. 525-550 ◽  
Author(s):  
Keith Allen Korcz
Keyword(s):  
Epistemic Justification ◽  
Causal Analysis ◽  
Basing Relation ◽  
Fundamental Component ◽  
Adequate Theory ◽  
Current Trends ◽  
Scant Attention

The epistemic basing relation is the relation which must hold between a person's belief and the adequate reasons for holding that belief if the belief is to be epistemically justified by those reasons. Although the basing relation is a fundamental component of any adequate theory of epistemic justification, it has received scant attention in the literature. In this paper, I propose a novel causal analysis of the basing relation, one which helps to characterize an intemalist element which, I shall argue, is required of any successful account of epistemic justification, and which confirms current trends away from coherentist and reliabilist theories of justification.

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