Reliabilism, the Generality Problem, and the Basing Relation

Theoria ◽  
2019 ◽  
Vol 85 (2) ◽  
pp. 119-144
Author(s):  
Erhan Demircioglu
2002 ◽  
Vol 65 (1) ◽  
pp. 87-97 ◽  
Author(s):  
Jonathan Adler ◽  
Michael Levin
Keyword(s):  

2002 ◽  
Vol 32 (4) ◽  
pp. 543-559 ◽  
Author(s):  
Daniel M. Mittag

If one is to believe that p justifiably, then one must believe p for, or because of, one's evidence or reasons in support of p. The basing relation is exactly this relation that obtains between one's belief and one's reasons for believing. Keith Allen Korcz, in a recent article published in this Journal, has argued that two conditions are each sufficient and are jointly necessary to establish basing relations between beliefs and reasons. One condition is formulated to account for basing relations that can obtain in virtue of causal relations between one's belief and reasons, and the other condition is supposed to account for basing relations which can be established independently of the instantiation of any such causal relation.


Diogenes ◽  
2019 ◽  
Vol 27 (2) ◽  
Author(s):  
Anna Ivanova ◽  
◽  
◽  

The article analyses the conflicting views of reliabilism and evidentialism on the following question – What is the leading condition in ascribing justification to beliefs: reliability or evaluation through evidence. The evidentialist view is defended by arguments, derived from the linguistic practices of ascribing justification in complex conditions. The generality problem is interpreted as an exemplification of the complexity of cognitive situations and it is argued that complexity requires reference to the mental states as a means for ascribing justification. Reliability is also recognized as a factor for ascribing justification to some beliefs when it serves as a type of evidence.


2006 ◽  
Vol 73 (1) ◽  
pp. 133-144 ◽  
Author(s):  
Anthony Robert Booth

In this paper I consider whether there can be such things as epistemic reasons for action. I consider three arguments to the contrary and argue that none are successful, being either somewhat question-begging or too strong by ruling out what most epistemologists think is a necessary feature of epistemic justification, namely the epistemic basing relation. I end by suggesting a "non-cognitivist" model of epistemic reasons that makes room for there being epistemic reasons for action and suggest that this model may support moral realism.


2016 ◽  
Vol 7 (3) ◽  
pp. 345-350 ◽  
Author(s):  
Kevin Wallbridge ◽  
Keyword(s):  

2009 ◽  
Vol 78 (1) ◽  
pp. 231-250
Author(s):  
Hamid VAHID
Keyword(s):  

2020 ◽  
Vol 129 (2) ◽  
pp. 251-298 ◽  
Author(s):  
Zoe Jenkin

According to a traditional picture, perception and belief have starkly different epistemic roles. Beliefs have epistemic statuses as justified or unjustified, depending on how they are formed and maintained. In contrast, perceptions are “unjustified justifiers.” Core cognition is a set of mental systems that stand at the border of perception and belief, and has been extensively studied in developmental psychology. Core cognition's borderline states do not fit neatly into the traditional epistemic picture. What is the epistemic role of these states? Focusing on the core object system, the author argues that core object representations have epistemic statuses like beliefs do, despite their many prototypically perceptual features. First, the author argues that it is a sufficient condition on a mental state's having an epistemic status as justified or unjustified that the state is based on reasons. Then the author argues that core object representations are based on reasons, through an examination of both experimental results and key markers of the basing relation. The scope of mental states that are subject to epistemic evaluation as justified or unjustified is not restricted to beliefs.


2019 ◽  
Vol 128 (2) ◽  
pp. 179-217 ◽  
Author(s):  
Ram Neta
Keyword(s):  

2000 ◽  
Vol 30 (4) ◽  
pp. 525-550 ◽  
Author(s):  
Keith Allen Korcz

The epistemic basing relation is the relation which must hold between a person's belief and the adequate reasons for holding that belief if the belief is to be epistemically justified by those reasons. Although the basing relation is a fundamental component of any adequate theory of epistemic justification, it has received scant attention in the literature. In this paper, I propose a novel causal analysis of the basing relation, one which helps to characterize an intemalist element which, I shall argue, is required of any successful account of epistemic justification, and which confirms current trends away from coherentist and reliabilist theories of justification.


Sign in / Sign up

Export Citation Format

Share Document