In Defence of Cornell Realism: a Reply to Elizabeth Tropman

Theoria ◽  
2013 ◽  
Vol 80 (2) ◽  
pp. 174-183 ◽  
Author(s):  
Joseph Long
Keyword(s):  
Cornell Realism

scholarly journals Moral Explanations, Thick and Thin

2017 ◽  
Vol 9 (2) ◽  
pp. 1-21 ◽  
Author(s):  
Brendan Cline
Keyword(s):  
Recent Work ◽  
Thick Concepts ◽  
Moral Explanations ◽  
Moral Properties ◽  
Cornell Realism ◽  
In Virtue Of

Cornell realists maintain that irreducible moral properties have earned a place in our ontology in virtue of the indispensable role they play in a variety of explanations. These explanations can be divided into two groups: those that employ thin ethical concepts and those that employ thick ethical concepts. Recent work on thick concepts suggests that they are not inherently evaluative in their meaning. If correct, this creates problems for the moral explanations of Cornell realists, since the most persuasive moral explanations are those that employ thick concepts. If thick concepts are not inherently evaluative, then the most plausible explanations on offer cannot support Cornell realism. Moral explanations employing thin concepts, however, are too flimsy to support the view. Unless proponents can develop a compelling story about thick concepts or thin explanations, Cornell realism is in trouble.

scholarly journals Cornell Realism, Explanation, and Natural Properties

2017 ◽  
Vol 25 (4) ◽  
pp. 1021-1038
Author(s):  
Luis R.G. Oliveira ◽  
Timothy Perrine
Keyword(s):  
Natural Properties ◽  
Cornell Realism
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