Supporting the development of empathy: The role of theory of mind and fantasy orientation

2017 ◽  
Vol 26 (4) ◽  
pp. 951-964 ◽  
Author(s):  
Melissa McInnis Brown ◽  
Rachel B. Thibodeau ◽  
Jillian M. Pierucci ◽  
Ansley Tullos Gilpin
Keyword(s):  
Theory Of Mind ◽  
Fantasy Orientation

scholarly journals The role of executive functions in older adults’ affective theory of mind

2021 ◽  
pp. 104513
Author(s):  
Yuki Otsuka ◽  
Miho Shizawa ◽  
Ayumi Sato ◽  
Shoji Itakura
Keyword(s):  
Older Adults ◽  
Theory Of Mind ◽  
Executive Functions

The role of illness burden in theory of mind performance among older adults

2018 ◽  
Vol 44 (5) ◽  
pp. 427-442 ◽  
Author(s):  
Laura C. Walzak ◽  
Wendy Loken Thornton
Keyword(s):  
Older Adults ◽  
Theory Of Mind ◽  
Illness Burden

scholarly journals Designing good deception: Recursive theory of mind in lying and lie detection

2019 ◽  
Author(s):  
Lauren A. Oey ◽  
Adena Schachner ◽  
Edward Vul
Keyword(s):  
Theory Of Mind ◽  
Stochastic Game ◽  
Lie Detection ◽  
Ground Truth ◽  
New Paradigm ◽  
Human Ability ◽  
Formal Framework ◽  
Recursive Theory ◽  
Better Than

The human ability to deceive others and detect deception has long been tied to theory of mind. We make a stronger argument: in order to be adept liars – to balance gain (i.e. maximizing their own reward) and plausibility (i.e. maintaining a realistic lie) – humans calibrate their lies under the assumption that their partner is a rational, utility-maximizing agent. We develop an adversarial recursive Bayesian model that aims to formalize the behaviors of liars and lie detectors. We compare this model to (1) a model that does not perform theory of mind computations and (2) a model that has perfect knowledge of the opponent’s behavior. To test these models, we introduce a novel dyadic, stochastic game, allowing for quantitative measures of lies and lie detection. In a second experiment, we vary the ground truth probability. We find that our rational models qualitatively predict human lying and lie detecting behavior better than the non-rational model. Our findings suggest that humans control for the extremeness of their lies in a manner reflective of rational social inference. These findings provide a new paradigm and formal framework for nuanced quantitative analysis of the role of rationality and theory of mind in lying and lie detecting behavior.

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