Theorizing the radical right: Directions for social movements research on the right-wing social movements

2017 ◽  
Vol 11 (5) ◽  
pp. e12469 ◽  
Author(s):  
John D. Kincaid
Author(s):  
Ljupcho Stevkovski

It is a fact that in the European Union there is a strengthening of right-wing extremism, radical right movement, populism and nationalism. The consequences of the economic crisis, such as a decline in living standards, losing of jobs, rising unemployment especially among young people, undoubtedly goes in favor of strengthening the right-wing extremism. In the research, forms of manifestation will be covered of this dangerous phenomenon and response of the institutions. Western Balkan countries, as a result of right-wing extremism, are especially sensitive region on possible consequences that might occur, since there are several unresolved political problems, which can very easily turn into a new cycle of conflicts, if European integration processes get delayed indefinitely.


2020 ◽  
Vol 47 (4) ◽  
pp. 96-111
Author(s):  
Leandro Gamallo

An analysis of the evolution of social conflicts in Argentina between 1989 and 2017 in terms of three aspects of collective action—the actors in contention, their main demands, and their chosen forms of struggle—reveals important changes since the country’s return to democracy. Collective action has extended to multiple actors, channeled weightier demands, and expanded its forms. With the emergence of progovernment and conservative social movements, it has become apparent that not all movement participation in the state implies weakness, subordination, or co-optation and that social movement action does not necessarily mean democratization or expansion of rights. The right-wing government of 2015 opened up a new field of confrontation in which old divisions and alliances are being reconfigured. Un análisis de la evolución de los conflictos sociales en Argentina entre 1989 y 2017 realizado a partir de tres grandes dimensiones de la acción colectiva (los actores contenciosos, las demandas principales que enuncian y las formas de lucha que emplean) revela cambios importantes. La acción colectiva se ha extendido a más actores, ha canalizado demandas más amplias y se ha expresado de maneras más heterogéneas. Con el surgimiento de movimientos sociales oficialistas y opositores de índole conservador, se ha hecho evidente que la participación de las organizaciones sociales en el estado no siempre significa debilidad, subordinación o cooptación por parte del estado y que la movilización social no necesariamente implica procesos de democratización o expansión de derechos. La llegada de una alianza de derecha en 2015 abrió un nuevo campo de confrontaciones que redefinió antiguas alianzas y divisiones.


Author(s):  
Ruta Kazlauskaite ◽  
Niko Pyrhonen ◽  
Gwenaelle Bauvois

This article adopts a comparative qualitative approach to studying the rhetoric of injured pride in the coverage of Independence Day celebrations by the right-wing countermedia in Poland (wPolityce.pl) and the US (Breitbart News) from 2012 to 2018. In both countries, the number of countermedia articles on Independence Day proliferated in the aftermath of the election of the Law and Justice party (2015) and Donald Trump (2016). Based on the analysis of the narrative strategy for affective polarisation, we argue that the countermedia mobilise support from an electorate of ‘the disenfranchised’ by strategically invoking emotions of shame and pride. By positioning the radical right as a political force that shields ‘patriots’ from the leftist ‘pedagogy of shame’, the outlets instrumentalise the mobilising potential of shame by transforming it into righteous anger and pride. This strategy results in a mediated ‘emotional regime’ that offers guidelines for an acceptable emotional repertoire for the members of the nationally bound in-group.


Author(s):  
Naoto Higuchi

Japan has witnessed the rise of nativist demonstrations and hate crimes since the late 2000s, leading the Diet to enact the country’s first anti-racism law in 2016. The aim of this chapter is to examine the pro-establishment nature of Japan’s nativist movement. The movement often criticizes the ruling right-wing establishment but should be regarded as a detachment force of the establishment in two ways. First, Japanese nativism is a variant of historical revisionism and the emergence of nativist violence is a ‘by-product’ of the rise of historical revisionism among the right-wing establishment in post-Cold War Japan. Although the nativist movement and the right-wing establishment are not directly associated with each other, the former took full advantage of the discursive opportunity opened by the latter. Second, the general public favours the nativist movement as part of the conservative establishment.


Author(s):  
Melanie Mierzejewski-Voznyak

During much of Ukraine’s post-Soviet history, the radical right has remained on the political periphery, wielding little influence over national politics. However, from 2009 to 2014, Ukraine saw a radical right-wing party, Svoboda, enter parliament, and from 2014 to 2016 there was an increased social role played by the right-wing radical groups Pravyi Sektor and Azov. Thus, the political impact of the far right in Ukraine extends beyond electoral performance and to the activities of extra-parliamentary groups that are beginning to penetrate political life and state institutions. The radical right in Ukraine is intertwined, but not identical, with ethnic Ukrainian nationalism. The direction and development of the Ukrainian far right have thus been a result of both the historical legacy and cultural context of a nation that was ruled over by others for centuries and is home to competing ethnic nationalisms and geopolitical orientations.


Rusin ◽  
2021 ◽  
pp. 205-222
Author(s):  
A.A. Chemakin ◽  

Historian K.K. Fedevich, author of the book For Faith, Tsar and Kobzar. The Little Russian Monarchists and Ukrainian National Movement (1905–1917) put forward a revisionist concept whereby the Little Russian monarchists and the black-hundredists (primarily, the Pochaev Division of the Union of the Russian People) were the right wing of the Ukrainian national movement. In an effort to prove his theory, Fedevich focuses on the “Ukrainian national terminology” and “Ukrainian discourse” in the black-hundredists’ newspapers, misrepresenting the historical-political and social-economic analysis of such specific phenomen as the Volhynian Black Hundred. His thesis that after 1917 many Little Russian black-hundredists joined the Ukrainian camp is correct; however, its substantiation does not stand up to scrutiny. Fedevich thinks that the reason to this transfer was the “Ukrainian” campaign of the Black-Hundred. The author of the article argues that the “Ukrainization” of former mebers of the Union of the Russian People was based on the desire of peasants to get land, and thus qualifies the Little Russian Black Hundred as a radical peasant movement akin to social movements of the Middle Ages. Furthermore, the article brings forward materials about the participation of the former black-hundredists in the Ukrainian movement during the Civil War and pogroms in 1919 as well as focuses on Fedevich’s glaring errors. The author concludes that in spite of a number of interesting findings, Fedevich’s concept is of tendentious nature.


2019 ◽  
Vol 6 (2) ◽  
pp. 205316801985168 ◽  
Author(s):  
Stuart J. Turnbull-Dugarte

The 2018 regional elections in Andalucía marked the end of Spain’s exceptional status as a country with a party system free from the radical right. The electoral success of the radical right-wing challenger, Vox, who gained 11% of the vote and 12 seats in the regional parliament, brought this exceptionalism to an end. This paper analyses the individual-level determinants that explain the electoral success of Vox and the emergence of the radical right within the Spanish party system. The results indicate that concerns over devolution, likely engendered by the Catalan separatist crisis, predominantly explain voters’ preferences for the right-wing challenger. This is true both amongst the general electorate as well as amongst the former voters of other right-wing parties. Significantly, against popular assumptions and empirical observations explaining the rise of radical right-wing parties across much of Western Europe, the results display no empirical link between immigration and electoral support for Vox.


1998 ◽  
Vol 16 (3) ◽  
pp. 1-23 ◽  
Author(s):  
Michael Minkenberg

International comparisons of new radical right-wing parties usuallyfocus on differences in electoral fortunes, party organizations, andleadership styles and conclude that Germany stands out as a specialcase of successful marginalization of the new radical right. Explanationsfor this German anomaly point at the combined effects of Germanhistory and institutional arrangements of the Federal Republicof Germany, of ideological dilemmas and strategic failures of thevarious parties of the new radical right, and the efforts of the establishedpolitical parties to prevent the rise of new parties to the rightof them. By implication, this means that, whereas in countries likeFrance or Austria the new radical right plays a significant role in politicsto the point of changing the political systems themselves, theGerman counterpart has a negligible impact and has little or noeffects on politics and polity.


Sign in / Sign up

Export Citation Format

Share Document