scholarly journals Feminist Philosophy of Disability: A Genealogical Intervention

2019 ◽  
Vol 57 (1) ◽  
pp. 132-158 ◽  
Author(s):  
Shelley L. Tremain
2015 ◽  
pp. 7-42 ◽  
Author(s):  
Shelley Tremain

With this article, I advance a historicist and relativist feminist philosophy of disability. I argue that Foucault’s insights offer the most astute tools with which to engage in this intellectual enterprise. Genealogy, the technique of investigation that Friedrich Nietzsche famously introduced and that Foucault took up and adapted in his own work, demonstrates that Foucault’s historicist approach has greater explanatory power and transgressive potential for analyses of disability than his critics in disability studies have thus far recognized. I show how a feminist philosophy of disability that employs Foucault’s technique of genealogy avoids ahistorical, teleological, and transcultural assumptions that beleaguer much work in disability studies. The article also situates feminist philosophical work on disability squarely in age-old debates in (Eurocentric) Western philosophy about universalism vs. relativism, materialism vs. idealism, realism vs. nominalism, and freewill vs. determinism, as well as contributes to ongoing discussions in (Western) feminist philosophy and theory about (among other things) essentialism vs. constructivism, identity, race, sexuality, agency, and experience. 


2013 ◽  
Vol 33 (4) ◽  
Author(s):  
Kelly Fritsch

<p>Critical theorist Theodor Adorno is rarely considered as a philosopher of the body. The body which leaks, desires, rages, and lusts is seemingly disjointed from the dry and dense writings that often characterize Adorno's work. As bleak as this description of Adorno&rsquo;s writings may be, however, the body is both central to his critique of modernity and the site of hope and desire against the total domination and suffering that capitalism imposes. This paper highlights some of the ways in which feminist philosophy of disability and disability studies, more generally, would benefit by thinking in constellation with Adorno's negative dialectic to interrogate the ways in which meanings get made about bodies and, furthermore, use the margins of difference, in relation with others, to challenge what Adorno calls the "wrong state of things." I argue that the transfigured crip to come is central to this fight against the "wrong state of things."<strong></strong></p><p class="Body">Keywords: Adorno; negative dialectics; suffering; disability; crip</p>


Author(s):  
Licia Carlson

This chapter maps out connections between feminist and disability theories to bring into relief the multiple ways that feminist philosophers are partaking in these conversations. It begins with a discussion of what is distinctive about feminist approaches to disability, while recognizing that there is not a single, univocal “feminist philosophy of disability.” It then turns to specific areas of philosophical inquiry in which feminist philosophers address disability, including ontological, epistemological, political, ethical, and bioethical considerations. The final section highlights a number of themes central to work in feminist philosophy and disability: embodiment, identity, intersectionality, and the generative and positive dimensions of disability. The chapter concludes by pointing to more recent directions in feminist philosophy of disability. These include disability aesthetics, explorations of disability in the context of technoscience and ecofeminism, and the problem of ableism in philosophy and the academy more broadly.


2015 ◽  
Vol 49 ◽  
pp. 227-240
Author(s):  
Joel Michael Reynolds ◽  

While Heidegger decried ethics as a distinct area of philosophical inquiry, a steady stream of secondary literature over the last three decades has mined his corpus for ethical insights. This literature tends to draw on his early or middle work and contrast his views with canonical normative theories. I bring Heidegger into conversation with philosophy of disability and feminist philosophy by focusing on the role of relationality and ability expectations. In section one, I provide a schematic of the dominant concept of ability in modernity: ability as personal power. Through the Bremen lectures, I then develop a Heideggerian concept of ability: ability as access. I conclude by discussing the stakes—ethical, philosophical, and political—of interpreting the question of the meaning of being as a question of ability as access to meaning.


2020 ◽  
Vol 9 (3) ◽  
Author(s):  
Andrea J. Pitts

Shelley L. Tremain’s Foucault and Feminist Philosophy of Disability (2017) builds on the author’s over twenty years of professional labour and scholarly interventions within philosophy to provide a compelling and careful examination of a range of timely issues for researchers and students in disability studies.


2013 ◽  
Vol 33 (4) ◽  
Author(s):  
Ashley Taylor

<p>A growing body of work in feminist philosophy of disability, in particular, and philosophy of cognitive disability, more generally, demonstrates the discursive constitution of norms of intelligence and cognitive ability in order to undermine both the false assumptions about human ability and the gendered and racialized norms of rationality, independence, and competence that inform philosophical and bioethical theories about moral status. Many of these philosophical accounts of disability seem designed to&mdash;implicitly or explicitly&mdash;prove that, given some newly-valued norms, &nbsp;certain persons do indeed have these capabilities, rather than to transform the social conditions that create such demarcations in the first place. In this paper, I argue that feminist philosophy of disability and moral philosophy more broadly would benefit if they were to consider the social conditions of possibility in which these qualifications for moral status arise, rather than continue to focus on the qualifications themselves. In order to argue in this way, I consider how assessments of moral status and human life simultaneously foreclose possible expressions of "lives worth living." I suggest, furthermore, that feminist philosophers of disability in particular and feminist philosophers in general would benefit if they were to consider the risks that this normative theorizing involves. In turn, I propose a way in which feminist philosophers ought to orient themselves in order to create the conditions of possibility for the emergence of divergent expressions of human well-being and moral potential.&nbsp;</p><p>Keywords: personhood; intellectual disability; social justice; normative violence; feminist philosophy</p>


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