Long Run Canadian Wealth Inequality in International Context

Author(s):  
James B. Davies ◽  
Livio Di Matteo
2016 ◽  
Vol 20 (6) ◽  
pp. 1413-1431 ◽  
Author(s):  
Joydeep Bhattacharya ◽  
Xue Qiao ◽  
Min Wang

This paper studies the evolution of wealth inequality in an economy with endogenous borrowing constraints. In the model economy, young agents need to borrow to finance human capital investments but cannot commit to repaying their loans. Creditors can punish defaulters by banishing them permanently from the credit market. At equilibrium, loan default is prevented by imposing a borrowing limit tied to the borrower's inheritance. The heterogeneity in inheritances translates into heterogeneity in borrowing limits: endogenously, some borrowers face a zero borrowing limit, and some are partly constrained, whereas others are unconstrained. Depending on the initial distribution of inheritances, it is possible that all lineages are attracted either to the zero-borrowing-limit steady state or to the unconstrained-borrowing steady state—long-run equality. It is also possible that some lineages end up in one steady state and the rest in the other—complete polarization.


2021 ◽  
Author(s):  
Catherine Guirkinger ◽  
Gani Aldashev ◽  
Alisher Aldashev ◽  
Mate Fodor

Abstract We study the long-run persistence of relative economic well-being under adverse government policies using a combination of historical and contemporaneous data from Kyrgyzstan. After controlling for unobservable local effects, the economic well-being of Kyrgyz households in the 2010s correlates with the early 20th-century average wealth of their tribes. Inequality at the tribe level in the 2010s correlates with wealth inequality in the early 20th century. The likely channels of persistence are the inter-generational transmission of human capital, relative status, political power, and cultural traits. Transmission of material wealth, differences in natural endowments, or geographic sorting cannot explain persistence.


2020 ◽  
Vol 33 ◽  
pp. 341-353 ◽  
Author(s):  
Walter Scheidel

In 2013, Barack Obama called rising inequality “the defining challenge of our time”. Since the Financial Crisis and Great Recession of 2007-9, the gap between the haves and have-nots has attracted unprecedented attention in politics, the media and academia.1 Students of the more distant past have also begun to embrace this trend. Economists are once again looking back in time, inspired in no small measure by the broad impact of the work of Thomas Piketty.2 Historians are laboring hard to unearth and publish relevant data. Thanks to their efforts, we are now able to glimpse the contours of changes in the concentration of income and wealth over the very long run, at least in some parts of the world.3 Archaeologists have been joining the fray, gathering and analyzing plausible proxies of inequality such as house sizes.4


2002 ◽  
Author(s):  
James Edward Curtis Jr
Keyword(s):  

2015 ◽  
Vol 105 (5) ◽  
pp. 48-53 ◽  
Author(s):  
Thomas Piketty

In this article, I present three key facts about income and wealth inequality in the long run emerging from my book Capital in the Twenty-First Century and seek to sharpen and refocus the discussion about those trends. In particular, I clarify the role played by r > g in my analysis of wealth inequality. I also discuss some of the implications for optimal taxation, and the relation between capital-income ratios and capital shares.


Author(s):  
Atanu Ghoshray ◽  
Issam Malki ◽  
Javier Ordóñez

AbstractWe analyse top income and wealth shares data, by conducting a robust estimation of trends, tests for structural breaks, and tests for determining persistence. We include Anglo-Saxon countries, continental Europe and Asian countries, grouped under different percentiles and deciles, spanning a period that is at least close to a century. We find that the top income shares for almost all countries are characterised by broken trends, or level shifts. The preponderance of trend breaks appears in the 1970s and 1980s where after a negative trend changes in magnitude or direction. Finally, shocks to the top income share data are not transitory, which have consequences for policy such as advocating redistributive measures.


2018 ◽  
Vol 2 (2) ◽  
pp. 1
Author(s):  
James Edward Curtis Jr.

One approach to analyzing inequality is to compare average economic choices from a classical theoretical framework. Another approach considers the impact of the formation of society, through statutes and institutions, on average economic outcomes. This paper studies the effects of slavery on black-white wealth inequality upon the emancipation of slaves in the US using historical data. The purpose of wealth has varied from over time. From an economics perspective, wealth is the accumulation of resources that have market value and can be liquidated for present and future consumption. This study proceeds based on the most measurable assumption: households reside in a country with a mixed economy of markets and social planning, such that they have an incentive to accumulate material wealth for intertemporal household consumption and social influence. Becker (1957) and Arrow (1972) developed the most general theories of wage discrimination and favoritism. Oaxaca (1973) and Blinder (1973) have mechanized their theories for empirical analysis. While their findings are insightful, they cannot be directly applied to studying wealth differences since wealth is a complex combination of wages and other variables. Finally, since unexplained differences in states that abolished slavery after the Civil War were 10 percent higher than unexplained effects in states that abolished slavery well before the Civil War and the magnitudes of the unexplained effects were similar over the long-run, we cannot reject the existence of a negatively bounded correlation between the duration of time from enslavement and the magnitude of unexplained differences in wealth. This research was funded in part by the National Science Foundation under Grant SES 0096414. I would like to thank John Ham, Richard Steckel, Randall Olsen, Bruce Weinberg, Audrey Light, Nori Hashimoto, James Peck, Patricia Reagan, Charles Kirwin, Rebecca Blank, Charles Betsey, Alvin Thornton, Leibert Morris, Maude Toussaint-Comeau, Simone Wegge, James Wilbanks, Thomas Maloney, and William Collins for their insightful comments. I would also like to thank participants in workshops and seminars at the Ohio State University, Howard University, University of Michigan, American Economic Association Summer Program and Pipeline Conferences, Western Economics Association International meetings, and Social Science History Association meetings. I would also like to thank James Curtis Sr, K D Curtis, Karen Curtis (deceased), Lariece Grant-Brown, Barbara Broadnax, Dwayne Broadnax, Rudy Broadnax, Zee Curtis-Grant, Raymond Tillery, Chris Cooper, Dr. K A Troy, Dr. H. Beecher Hicks, Reverend Charles Lewis, Reverend Cornelius Wheeler, Reverend James Lewis, Elder David Treadwell, Dr. Stephen Tucker and Roberta Tucker, Minister Charles Webb, Minister David Surles, and Elder Gregory Strong for their support. This draft is a revision of a November 2010 paper and August 2001 paper. 


2018 ◽  
Vol 43 (5) ◽  
pp. 1333-1352 ◽  
Author(s):  
Lance Taylor ◽  
Duncan K Foley ◽  
Armon Rezai

Abstract A demand-driven alternative to the conventional Solow–Swan growth model is analysed. Its medium run is built around Marx–Goodwin cycles of demand and distribution. Long-run income and wealth distributions follow rules of accumulation stated by Pasinetti in combination with a technical progress function for labour productivity growth incorporating a Kaldor effect and induced innovation. An explicit steady state solution is presented along with analysis of dynamics. When wage income of capitalist households is introduced, the Samuelson–Modigliani steady state ‘dual’ to Pasinetti’s cannot be stable. Numerical simulation loosely based on US data suggests that the long-run growth rate is around 2% per year and that the capitalist share of wealth may rise from about 40 to 70% due to positive medium-term feedback of higher wealth inequality into its own growth.


2021 ◽  
Author(s):  
Guido Alfani ◽  
Sonia Schifano
Keyword(s):  

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