Modes of Foreign Direct Investment and Intellectual Property Rights Protection: Wholly-owned or Joint Venture? Firm-level Evidence from Taiwanese Multinational Manufacturing Enterprises

2013 ◽  
Vol 21 (3) ◽  
pp. 549-561 ◽  
Author(s):  
Po-Lu Chen
Keyword(s):  
Foreign Direct Investment ◽  
Intellectual Property ◽  
Intellectual Property Rights ◽  
Direct Investment ◽  
Joint Venture ◽  
Firm Level ◽  
Manufacturing Enterprises ◽  
Rights Protection ◽  
Intellectual Property Rights Protection ◽  
Property Rights Protection

scholarly journals The Effect of Intellectual Property Rights Protection in Host Economies on The Sustainable Development of China’s Outward Foreign Direct Investment—Evidence from a Cross-Country Sample

2019 ◽  
Vol 11 (7) ◽  
pp. 2100 ◽  
Author(s):  
Hong Fang ◽  
Bo Peng ◽  
Xu Wang ◽  
Siran Fang
Keyword(s):  
Foreign Direct Investment ◽  
Intellectual Property ◽  
Property Rights ◽  
Intellectual Property Rights ◽  
Host Country ◽  
Direct Investment ◽  
Outward Foreign Direct Investment ◽  
Rights Protection ◽  
Intellectual Property Rights Protection ◽  
Property Rights Protection

Intellectual property rights protection (IPRP) has caused great concern in China, especially since the introduction of the Belt and Road (B&R) initiative. The Chinese government has increased investments to the countries along the B&R, most of which are developing countries with high investment risks. Using the panel data of China’s outward foreign direct investment (OFDI) in 121 countries from 2003 to 2017, the sustainable relationships between the IPRP of host countries and China’s OFDI has been analyzed. The results of this paper show that, from the worldwide perspective, the stronger the IPRP of the host country, the greater attraction to China’s OFDI. While the IPRP of the countries along the B&R has a nonlinear U-shaped effect on China’s OFDI, which is related to the complex environments of the countries. When the IPRP of the B&R countries is within a certain range, China’s OFDI is biased toward a country with lower IPRP, and when the IPRP exceeds a certain range, China’s OFDI is biased toward a country with higher IPRP. Moreover, the market size, natural resources endowment and political environment of the host country are influential upon China’s OFDI as well. What deserves our attention is that China’s OFDI is more biased towards countries with poor political conditions, which can be related to the enterprise type and that most of the large multinational enterprises in China are state-controlled, resulting in investment decisions largely reflected by the national political goals rather than simple market targets.

scholarly journals Complex Dynamical Behaviors of a Mixed Duopoly Game Based on Intellectual Property Rights Protection

Complexity ◽  
2020 ◽  
Vol 2020 ◽  
pp. 1-11
Author(s):  
Tong Chu ◽  
Yu Yu ◽  
Xiaoxue Wang
Keyword(s):  
Intellectual Property ◽  
Property Rights ◽  
Intellectual Property Rights ◽  
Mixed Duopoly ◽  
Fractal Structures ◽  
Rights Protection ◽  
Intellectual Property Rights Protection ◽  
Dynamical Behaviors ◽  
Property Rights Protection ◽  
Coexistence Of Attractors

Based on the oligopoly game theory and the intellectual property rights protection policy, we investigate the complex dynamical behaviors of a mixed duopoly game with quadratic cost. In the new system, a few parameters are improved by considering intellectual property rights protection and the stability conditions of the Nash equilibrium point are discussed in detail. A set of the two-dimensional bifurcation diagrams is demonstrated by using numerical modeling, and these diagrams show abundant complex dynamical behaviors, such as coexistence of attractors, different bifurcation, and fractal structures. These dynamical properties can present the long-run effects of strengthening intellectual property protection.

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