Unobservable Risks in Mortgage Contract Choice

2013 ◽  
Vol 41 (4) ◽  
pp. 958-985 ◽  
Author(s):  
Bo Liu ◽  
Tien Foo Sing
Keyword(s):  
Contract Choice ◽  
Mortgage Contract

scholarly journals Mortgage Contract Choice in Subprime Mortgage Markets

2010 ◽  
Vol 2010 (53) ◽  
pp. 1-50 ◽  
Author(s):  
Gregory E. Elliehausen ◽  
◽  
Min Hwang
Keyword(s):  
Mortgage Markets ◽  
Subprime Mortgage ◽  
Contract Choice ◽  
Mortgage Contract

scholarly journals Does Mandatory Loan Review Affect Mortgage Contract Choice and Performance?

2011 ◽  
Author(s):  
Sumit Agarwal ◽  
Gene Amromin ◽  
Itzhak Ben-David ◽  
Souphala Chomsisengphet ◽  
Douglas D. Evanoff
Keyword(s):  
Contract Choice ◽  
And Performance ◽  
Mortgage Contract

scholarly journals Sorting into Contests: Evidence from Production Contracts

2019 ◽  
Vol 19 (1) ◽  
Author(s):  
Zhen Wang ◽  
Tomislav Vukina
Keyword(s):  
Fixed Effects ◽  
Random Utility Model ◽  
Random Utility ◽  
Utility Model ◽  
Fixed Effects Model ◽  
Empirical Results ◽  
Production Contracts ◽  
Contract Choice ◽  
Lower Ability ◽  
Profit Maximizing

Abstract In this paper, we investigate sorting patterns among chicken producers who are offered a menu of contracts to choose from. We show that the sorting equilibrium reveals a positive sorting where higher ability producers self-select themselves into contracts to grow larger chickens and lower ability types self-select themselves into contracts to grow smaller birds. We also show that eliciting this type of sorting behavior is profit maximizing for the principal. In the empirical part of the paper, we first estimate growers’ abilities using a two-way fixed effects model and subsequently use these estimated abilities to estimate a random utility model of contract choice. Our empirical results are supportive of the developed theory.

Sign in / Sign up

Export Citation Format

Share Document