scholarly journals How to explain the possibility of wholesale moral error: a reply to Akhlaghi

Ratio ◽  
2021 ◽  
Author(s):  
Daan Evers
Keyword(s):  
Moral Error

scholarly journals Mackie’s Conceptual Reform Moral Error Theory

2018 ◽  
Vol 53 (2) ◽  
pp. 175-191
Author(s):  
Wouter Floris Kalf
Keyword(s):  
Error Theory ◽  
Moral Error Theory ◽  
Moral Error

V-Moral Error Theory

2004 ◽  
Vol 104 (1) ◽  
pp. 95-111 ◽  
Author(s):  
Hallvard Lillehammer
Keyword(s):  
Error Theory ◽  
Moral Error Theory ◽  
Moral Error

scholarly journals Rhetorical Balance in Aristotle's Definition of the Tragic Agent: Poetics 13

1980 ◽  
Vol 30 (1) ◽  
pp. 62-71 ◽  
Author(s):  
David Armstrong ◽  
Charles W. Peterson
Keyword(s):  
Recent Attempt ◽  
Moral Error ◽  
Definition Of

The most recent attempt to explain Aristotle's use of in Poetics 13 is that of T. C. W. Stinton (CQ N.S. 25 (1975), 221–54). Stinton insists that must not be restricted to any one definition, but should be understood to include a ‘range of applications’ embracing both moral error and ‘ignorance of fact’ (p. 221).

scholarly journals Jonas Olson’s Evidence for Moral Error Theory

2016 ◽  
Vol 13 (4) ◽  
pp. 403-418
Author(s):  
Daan Evers
Keyword(s):  
Error Theory ◽  
Not Given ◽  
Moral Error Theory ◽  
Moral Error

Jonas Olson defends a moral error theory in 2014. I first argue that Olson is not justified in believing the error theory as opposed to moral nonnaturalism in his own opinion. I then argue that Olson is not justified in believing the error theory as opposed to moral contextualism either (although the latter is not a matter of his own opinion). I conclude that Olson has not given us quite enough evidence for moral error theory.

Conclusion

2019 ◽  
pp. 213-218
Author(s):  
Christopher Cowie
Keyword(s):  
Error Theory ◽  
Reasons For Action ◽  
Reasons For Belief ◽  
Moral Error Theory ◽  
Moral Error ◽  
Epistemic Consequentialism ◽  
Argument From Analogy ◽  
Moral Properties ◽  
Categorical Reasons

The views outlined in earlier chapters are systematically presented. These include: the truth of epistemic institutionalism and falsity of analogous institutionalist views in morality; the challenges facing categorical reasons for action that do not apply to categorial reasons for belief; the reducible nature of epistemic properties and relations—including the defensibility of this view in light of concerns with the normativity of probability and the falsity of both veritism and epistemic consequentialism—in contrast to the irreducible nature of moral properties and relations, and the possibility of ‘the puzzling combination’. It is concluded that the argument from analogy fails and that the moral error theory may yet be true, but that it would be illegitimate to conclude that it is true.

Against Internalism-Parity

2019 ◽  
pp. 79-95
Author(s):  
Christopher Cowie
Keyword(s):  
Reasons For Action ◽  
Reasons For Belief ◽  
Action Explanation ◽  
Moral Error ◽  
Categorical Reasons

An alternative argument is provided for rejecting internalism-parity. It is claimed that, from the perspective of internalism-based moral error theorists, categorical reasons for action are more problematic than categorical reasons for belief. This is because there are considerably stronger arguments for thinking that one’s reasons for action are constitutively dependent on one’s desires than for thinking that one’s reasons for belief are constitutively dependent on one’s desires. Three such arguments are considered: from action-explanation, from reasoning, and from paradigmatic-ascriptions. It is claimed that the first of these three arguments clearly does not apply to reasons for belief as to reasons for action. The applicability of the second and third arguments is harder to ascertain.

The Analogy

2019 ◽  
pp. 30-54
Author(s):  
Christopher Cowie
Keyword(s):  
Error Theory ◽  
Strong Case ◽  
Moral Error Theory ◽  
Moral Error ◽  
Argument From Analogy

The argument from analogy is presented in a favourable light in order to properly assess it. It is comprised of two premises. According to the parity premise, the arguments for a moral error theory would entail an epistemic error theory. According to the epistemic existence premise an epistemic error theory is false. It is argued that the parity premise can be given two readings. The first reading—internalism-parity—targets the internalism-based moral error theory. The second reading—irreducibility-parity—targets the irreducibility-based moral error theory. Both readings are motivated. It is claimed that they are plausible and that the argument from analogy represents a strong case against the moral error theory.

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