scholarly journals Why de dicto desires are fetishistic

Ratio ◽  
2021 ◽  
Author(s):  
Xiao Zhang
Keyword(s):  
De Dicto

scholarly journals Moral Appraisal for Everyone: Neurodiversity, Epistemic Limitations, and Responding to the Right Reasons

2021 ◽  
Author(s):  
Claire Field
Keyword(s):  
Moral Reasons ◽  
Alternative Account ◽  
De Re ◽  
Moral Appraisal ◽  
De Dicto ◽  
The Right

AbstractDe Re Significance accounts of moral appraisal consider an agent’s responsiveness to a particular kind of reason, normative moral reasons de re, to be of central significance for moral appraisal. Here, I argue that such accounts find it difficult to accommodate some neuroatypical agents. I offer an alternative account of how an agent’s responsiveness to normative moral reasons affects moral appraisal – the Reasonable Expectations Account. According to this account, what is significant for appraisal is not the content of the reasons an agent is responsive to (de re or de dicto), but rather whether she is responsive to the reasons it is reasonable to expect her to be responsive to, irrespective of their content. I argue that this account does a better job of dealing with neuroatypical agents, while agreeing with the De Re Significance accounts on more ordinary cases.

Hare on De Dicto Betterness and Prospective Parents

Ethics ◽  
2008 ◽  
Vol 118 (3) ◽  
pp. 529-535 ◽  
Author(s):  
David Wasserman
Keyword(s):  
De Dicto ◽  
Prospective Parents

scholarly journals On the Difference between the Two Barbaras

Problemos ◽  
2018 ◽  
Vol 93 ◽  
pp. 90-101
Author(s):  
Živilė Pabijutaitė
Keyword(s):  
Full Article ◽  
Major Premise ◽  
English Only ◽  
Modal Operators ◽  
De Dicto ◽  
Modal Syllogistic ◽  
The Difference ◽  
Article Abstract

[full article, abstract in English; only abstract in Lithuanian] The paper deals with the problem of the “two Barbaras” in the Aristotelian modal syllogistic. The problem consists in Aristotle’s differing views on two at a first sight similar in nature syllogisms of mixed assertoric (X) and necessary (L) premises: Barbara LXL and Barbara XLL. The fact that Aristotle believed the first syllogism to be valid and the second one – not, has been received either 1) negatively, because both Barbaras have been held to be invalid, or 2) negatively, because both Barbaras have been held to be valid, or 3) positively, by giving a reason why the two Barbaras differ. We commit ourselves to the position (3) by proving that modal propositions for Aristotle have their modalities de dicto and that Aristotelian modal operators act according to their own separate rules where only the type of the modality of a major premise is relevant for the modal status of the conclusion.

scholarly journals De Re MEDIJI : POLITIKA MEDIJA

2019 ◽  
pp. 9-28 ◽  
Author(s):  
Misko Suvakovic
Keyword(s):  
De Re ◽  
De Dicto

Namera mi je da dijagramski postavim jednu moguću potencijalnu teoriju De-Re medija lociranu u savremenosti globalnih ekoloških, ekonomskih, ratnih i, svakako, klasnih kriza. Razmatrana je piosebna situacija transformacije slike sveta u događaj sveta, drugim rečima, načinjen je obrt od prikazivanja sveta do izvođenja sveta ili izvođenja u svetu. Postavljena je rasprava o sredstvima medijskog rada, proizvodnje i delovanja, tj. o instrumentima i njihovim konstruktivnim funkcijama. Analiziran je kontekst medijskog rada, proizvodnje i delovanja posredstvom modela dispozitiva/aparatusa. Reinterpretirana je iz agrarne nauke i ratne terminologije teorija rojeva te primenjna na novi pojam medijuma/medija. Preuzeta je i primenjena tradicionalna i moderna rasprava razlike De Dicto i De Re sudova. Postavljena je teorija De Re medija u odnosu na koncepte medijuma i medija, postmedijuma i postmedija, digitalnih i postdigitalnih medija.

Metaphysics

2017 ◽  
Author(s):  
Colin McGinn
Keyword(s):  
Conceptual Analysis ◽  
Possible Worlds ◽  
A Priori ◽  
A Posteriori ◽  
De Re ◽  
Necessary Truth ◽  
Possible Worlds Theory ◽  
De Dicto

This chapter explores philosophical issues in metaphysics. It begins by distinguishing between de re and de dicto necessity. All necessity is uniformly de re; there is simply no such thing as de dicto necessity. Indeed, in the glory days of positivism, all necessity was understood as uniformly the same: a necessary truth was always an a priori truth, while contingent truths were always a posteriori. The chapter then assesses the concept of antirealism. Antirealism is always an error theory: there is some sort of mistake or distortion or sloppiness embedded in the usual discourse. The chapter also considers paradoxes, causation, conceptual analysis, scientific mysteries, the possible worlds theory of modality, the concept of a person, the nature of existence, and logic and propositions.

The Problem of de re Modality

2020 ◽  
pp. 234-246
Author(s):  
Bob Hale
Keyword(s):  
Kit Fine ◽  
Singular Terms ◽  
De Re ◽  
Modal Operators ◽  
Free Variables ◽  
De Re Modality ◽  
Basic Argument ◽  
De Dicto

The problem of de re modality is how, if at all, one can make sense of it. Most who have discussed this problem have assumed that modality de dicto is relatively unproblematic. It is, rather, the interpretation of sentences involving, within the scope of modal operators, singular terms or free variables which is thought to give rise to grave—and in the view of some, insuperable—difficulties. Quine has two arguments against the intelligibility of de re modality: a “logical” and a “metaphysical” one. That the “logical” argument is central to Quine’s attack is surely indisputable. But my claim that it is his basic argument is, in effect, denied by Kit Fine. I can (and do) agree with Fine that there are some significant differences between the two arguments. The most important question, for my purposes, is whether he is right to claim that the two arguments have force independently of one another.

Cumulation Across Attitudes and Plural Projection

2020 ◽  
Vol 37 (4) ◽  
pp. 557-609
Author(s):  
Viola Schmitt
Keyword(s):  
Alternative Analysis ◽  
Individual Concepts ◽  
Part Structure ◽  
De Dicto ◽  
Embedded Clause ◽  
Collective Belief

Abstract This paper investigates cumulative readings of sentences in which some, but not all of the plural expressions have a de dicto reading, i.e. sentences where the lower plural is interpreted in the scope of an attitude verb like believe. I argue that such cases represent a problem for existing accounts of cumulativity, because the required cumulative relation cannot be formed. I then motivate and propose an alternative analysis where all plural expressions are interpreted in situ: I expand the ‘plural projection’ framework put forth by Haslinger & Schmitt (2018, 2019), Schmitt (2019), where embedded pluralities ‘project’ to the denotations of higher nodes in the sense that the latter reflect the part-structure of the former and where cumulativity is derived via a compositional rule in a step-by-step fashion. I show that if the denotations of the plurals with the de dicto construal are analyzed as pluralities of individual concepts, which project in the afore-mentioned sense to pluralities of propositions, the data can be explained straightforwardly. This proposal differs from treatments in terms of collective belief that don’t appeal to pluralities of propositions ( Pasternak 2018a, b), in that it (i) arguably generalizes to a larger number of examples and (ii) links grammatical plurality in the embedded clause to the availability of cumulative readings.

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