Rethinking Loyalty and Competence in Presidential Appointments

2020 ◽  
Vol 80 (5) ◽  
pp. 717-732 ◽  
Author(s):  
Richard W. Waterman ◽  
Yu Ouyang
Author(s):  
CHRISTINA M. KINANE

Scholarship on separation of powers assumes executives are constrained by legislative approval when placing agents in top policy-making positions. But presidents frequently fill vacancies in agency leadership with unconfirmed, temporary officials or leave them empty entirely. I develop a novel dataset of vacancies across 15 executive departments from 1977 to 2016 and reevaluate the conventional perspective that appointment power operates only through formal channels. I argue that presidents’ nomination strategies include leaving positions empty and making interim appointments, and this choice reflects presidents’ priorities and the character of vacant positions. The evidence indicates that interim appointees are more likely when positions have a substantial capacity to act on presidential expansion priorities and suggest that presidents can capitalize on their first-mover advantage to evade Senate confirmation. The results further suggest that separation of powers models may need to consider how deliberate inaction and sidestepping of formal powers influence political control and policy-making strategies.


2018 ◽  
Vol 39 (5) ◽  
pp. 616-633 ◽  
Author(s):  
Björn Dressel ◽  
Tomoo Inoue

To what extent do informal networks shape the decisions of the Supreme Court of the Philippines? Though often raised in the Philippines, this question has never been studied empirically. To answer it, we constructed a set of social network variables to assess how informal ties, based on university connections and work affiliations, may have influenced the court’s decisions between 1986 and 2015 in 47 politically high-profile cases. Providing statistically significant evidence for the effects of political influence (presidential appointments) and hierarchical pressure (the vote of the Chief Justice) on related networks, our analysis suggests a continuing tension on the Supreme Court bench between professionalism and informality. Because the findings advance both theoretical and empirical understanding of larger issues at the intersection of courts and society throughout the region, we recommend more attention to the role of judicial networks, external to the courts as well as within them.


2005 ◽  
Vol 30 (4) ◽  
pp. 987-1009
Author(s):  
George M. Sullivan

In two consecutive national elections a conservative, Ronald Reagan, was elected President of the United States. When Justice Lewis Powell announced his retirement during the late months of the Reagan administration, it was apparent that the President's last appointment could shift the ideology of the Court to conservatism for the first time since the presidency of Dwight Eisenhower. President Reagan's prior appointments, Sandra Day O'Connor and Antonin Scalia, had joined William Rehnquist, an appointee of President Nixon and Bryon White, an appointee of President Kennedy to comprise a vociferous minority of four in many instances, especially cases involving civil rights. The unexpected opportunity for the appointment of a conservative jurist caused great anxiety in the media and in the U.S. Senate, the later having confirmation power over presidential appointments to the Supreme Court. This article examines the consequences of the Senate's confirmation of Justice Anthony Kennedy to the Supreme Court. The impact, which was immediate and dramatic, indicates that conservative ideology will predominate on major civil rights issues for the remainder of this century.


Author(s):  
Paul C. Light

Chapter 3 explores the pressures that encourage government dependence on contract and grant employees. The chapter begins by reviewing Eisenhower’s call for a “proper meshing” between the military and industry. The chapter then explains the time, bureaucratic, and political pressures that increase the temptation to use contract and grant employees in lieu of federal employees. The time pressures stem from the federal government’s (1) sluggish hiring process, (2) aging workforce, (3) high promotion speed, (4) inflated performance appraisals, and (5) and changing mission. The bureaucratic pressures stem from (1) skill gaps in mission-critical occupations, (2) the barriers to federal employee engagement, (3) disagreements on how much federal and private employees cost, (4) weak oversight, and (5) a sluggish presidential appointments process. Finally, the political pressures arise from (1) the thickening of the leadership hierarchy, (2) the need to protect government achievements and fix breakdowns, (3) public trust and distrust toward government, (4) high levels of political polarization, and (5) cabal, intrigue, and corruption.


2014 ◽  
Vol 1 (1) ◽  
pp. 125-164 ◽  
Author(s):  
Lucia Dalla Pellegrina ◽  
Laarni Escresa ◽  
Nuno Garoupa

AbstractThis paper extends the empirical analysis on the determinants of judicial behaviour by measuring the ideal points for the Justices of the Philippine Supreme Court for 1986−2010. The Philippines is an interesting case given the US influence in designing the Supreme Court while the political and social context differs significantly. The estimated ideal points allow us to focus on political coalitions based on presidential appointments. We find strong evidence to support the existence of such coalitions along a government-opposition policy space. Implications for comparative judicial politics are discussed.


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