Performance-Related Pay and the Crowding Out of Motivation in the Public Sector: A Randomized Field Experiment

2015 ◽  
Vol 75 (2) ◽  
pp. 230-241 ◽  
Author(s):  
Nicola Bellé
Keyword(s):  
Public Sector ◽  
Field Experiment ◽  
Crowding Out ◽  
The Public ◽  
Randomized Field Experiment

scholarly journals A field experiment on community policing and police legitimacy

2019 ◽  
Vol 116 (40) ◽  
pp. 19894-19898 ◽  
Author(s):  
Kyle Peyton ◽  
Michael Sierra-Arévalo ◽  
David G. Rand
Keyword(s):  
Field Experiment ◽  
Causal Effect ◽  
Public Attitudes ◽  
Police Legitimacy ◽  
Individual Level ◽  
The Public ◽  
Randomized Field Experiment ◽  
Attitudes Toward Police ◽  
The Individual ◽  
Attitudes Toward The Police

Despite decades of declining crime rates, longstanding tensions between police and the public continue to frustrate the formation of cooperative relationships necessary for the function of the police and the provision of public safety. In response, policy makers continue to promote community-oriented policing (COP) and its emphasis on positive, nonenforcement contact with the public as an effective strategy for enhancing public trust and police legitimacy. Prior research designs, however, have not leveraged the random assignment of police–public contact to identify the causal effect of such interactions on individual-level attitudes toward the police. Therefore, the question remains: Do positive, nonenforcement interactions with uniformed patrol officers actually cause meaningful improvements in attitudes toward the police? Here, we report on a randomized field experiment conducted in New Haven, CT, that sheds light on this question and identifies the individual-level consequences of positive, nonenforcement contact between police and the public. Findings indicate that a single instance of positive contact with a uniformed police officer can substantially improve public attitudes toward police, including legitimacy and willingness to cooperate. These effects persisted for up to 21 d and were not limited to individuals inclined to trust and cooperate with the police prior to the intervention. This study demonstrates that positive nonenforcement contact can improve public attitudes toward police and suggests that police departments would benefit from an increased focus on strategies that promote positive police–public interactions.

scholarly journals A Theory of Countercyclical Government Multiplier

2014 ◽  
Vol 6 (1) ◽  
pp. 190-217 ◽  
Author(s):  
Pascal Michaillat
Keyword(s):  
Labor Market ◽  
Public Sector ◽  
Labor Supply ◽  
Labor Demand ◽  
New Keynesian ◽  
Crowding Out ◽  
New Keynesian Model ◽  
Public Employment ◽  
The Public ◽  
Keynesian Model

I develop a New Keynesian model in which a type of government multiplier doubles when unemployment rises from 5 percent to 8 percent. This multiplier indicates the additional number of workers employed when one worker is hired in the public sector. Graphically, in equilibrium, an upward-sloping quasi-labor supply intersects a downward-sloping labor demand in a (employment, labor market tightness) plane. Increasing public employment stimulates labor demand, which increases tightness and therefore crowds out private employment. Critically, the quasi-labor supply is convex. Hence, when labor demand is depressed and unemployment is high, the increase in tightness and resulting crowding-out are small. (JEL E12, E24, E32, E62)

scholarly journals Crowding Out Intrinsic Motivation in the Public Sector

2010 ◽  
Vol 21 (3) ◽  
pp. 473-493 ◽  
Author(s):  
Y. Georgellis ◽  
E. Iossa ◽  
V. Tabvuma
Keyword(s):  
Public Sector ◽  
Intrinsic Motivation ◽  
Crowding Out ◽  
The Public

scholarly journals Moral Hazard, Monitoring and Punishment: Evidence from a Field Experiment

2019 ◽  
Vol 58 (2) ◽  
pp. 109-134
Author(s):  
Anwar Shah ◽  
Karim Khan ◽  
Muhammad Zubair
Keyword(s):  
Public Sector ◽  
Moral Hazard ◽  
Field Experiment ◽  
Electricity Consumption ◽  
Jel Classification ◽  
Monitoring Systems ◽  
Aggregate Level ◽  
The Public ◽  
Beneficial Effects ◽  
Punishment Mechanism

The existing literature establishes that there exists inefficiency in energy consumption in Pakistan. In particular, with regard to electricity consumption, the problem of moral hazard is prevalent in the public sector. In this study, we observe this aspect by focusing on the behaviour of consumers once they are held liable to monitoring with the associated punishment mechanism. By providing evidence from a field experiment, we make three conclusions. First, individuals respond to both the monetary and non-monetary punishments. Alternatively, with the introduction of punishments, they reduce moral hazard with respect to electricity consumption. Second, the habitual violators of rules reform their behaviour after they are made accountable for their actions. Third, if appropriate monitoring systems along with the associated punishment mechanism are introduced, we can have beneficial effects in terms of resolving the energy crisis on the aggregate level. JEL Classification: H83, D12, D00, D03, D04 Keywords: Moral Hazard, Monitoring, Punishment, Electricity Consumption, Public Sector

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