Separate, Unequal, and Ignored? Interjurisdictional Competition and the Budgetary Choices of Poor and Affluent Municipalities

2014 ◽  
Vol 74 (2) ◽  
pp. 246-257 ◽  
Author(s):  
Benedict S. Jimenez
Keyword(s):  
Interjurisdictional Competition

Progressive and Regressive Equilibria in a Tax Competition Game

2015 ◽  
Vol 45 (3) ◽  
pp. 307-333
Author(s):  
James Green-Armytage
Keyword(s):  
Relative Risk ◽  
Risk Aversion ◽  
Tax Competition ◽  
Continuous Distribution ◽  
Relative Risk Aversion ◽  
Interjurisdictional Competition ◽  
Benchmark Model ◽  
Optimal Policies ◽  
Risk Aversion Coefficient ◽  
Tax Structures

This article models interjurisdictional competition over nonlinear taxes on the incomes of mobile individuals. Each individual has exogenous wealth and a location preference that is drawn from a continuous distribution. We find that more concave utility of consumption functions lead to more progressive tax structures, as richer people place less value on marginal consumption relative to location. In the benchmark model, a relative risk aversion coefficient of one is the boundary between progressivity and regressivity. The exercise helps us to understand which types of jurisdictions are more likely to have progressive taxes as their optimal policies.

Interjurisdictional Competition and Intracity Fiscal Disparity across Chinese Prefectural Cities

Governance ◽  
2016 ◽  
Vol 30 (3) ◽  
pp. 365-385 ◽  
Author(s):  
Huiping Li ◽  
Qingfang Wang ◽  
Chunrong Zheng
Keyword(s):  
Interjurisdictional Competition
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