Unilateral Orders as Constituency Outreach: Executive Orders, Proclamations, and the Public Presidency

2015 ◽  
Vol 45 (2) ◽  
pp. 289-309 ◽  
Author(s):  
Brandon Rottinghaus ◽  
Adam L. Warber
Keyword(s):  
Executive Orders ◽  
The Public ◽  
Public Presidency

The Public Presidency

1991 ◽  
pp. 83-98
Author(s):  
Theodore Otto Windt
Keyword(s):  
The Public ◽  
Public Presidency

Eisenhower’s executive privilege and the public interest

2019 ◽  
pp. 54-84
Author(s):  
Kevin M. Baron
Keyword(s):  
Public Interest ◽  
Attorney General ◽  
Executive Branch ◽  
Executive Power ◽  
Freedom Of Information ◽  
Government Information ◽  
Executive Orders ◽  
White House ◽  
The Public ◽  
The Creation

This chapter delves into the depths of one of the most important developments within modern American politics, the creation and institutionalization of executive privilege. In facing a fervent Congress in the grips of McCarthyism, Eisenhower issued a letter denying testimony to the Senate for the Army-McCarthy hearings. His letter included a memo from Attorney General Brownell that claimed the president had an inherent constitutional privilege to deny information to Congress or the public if it was in the public interest and for national security. This action institutionalized the Cold War Paradigm in the executive branch and created an extra-constitutional power for the president. Eisenhower issued several executive orders concerning classification and public dissemination of government information, along with the creation of the Office of Strategic Information (OSI) within the Commerce Department to oversee these policies. Eisenhower claimed historic precedent to justify his inherent constitutional power, regardless, it showed a learned response that changed executive power. Congress would respond in 1955 by creating the Special Subcommittee on Government Information chaired by Rep. John Moss, given jurisdiction for oversight on all executive branch information policies and practices. With the issue of freedom of information institutionalized in Congress, a 12-year legislative power struggle would unfold between Congress and the White House ending with the passage of the Freedom of Information Act in 1966.

What Predicts Trends in the White House Mail?

2011 ◽  
Vol 40 (2) ◽  
pp. 205-231
Author(s):  
Brandon Rottinghaus
Keyword(s):  
External Validation ◽  
Chief Executive ◽  
Mixed Effects ◽  
Letter Writing ◽  
Elected Officials ◽  
White House ◽  
The Public ◽  
Public Approval ◽  
Public Presidency

There is voluminous survey evidence identifying which, when, and how individuals contact elected officials, but there is less evidence by way of external validation. The goal in this exploratory article is to investigate and extend the empirical trends in letter writing to the chief executive to validate the causes of political letter writing. Using a longitudinal series of heretofore unutilized data spanning 1953 to 1984 collected at individual presidential archives from President Eisenhower to President Reagan, the author tests competing theories about the causes of political letter writing during the modern presidential era. The findings reveal that exogenous events have the strongest effect, followed by presidential mobilization through speeches. Public approval has mixed effects but is strongest when those individuals most likely to participate approve of the president. These findings can help inform us about trends in participation and the evolving role of the public presidency.

Lower Court Checks on Supreme Court Power

1959 ◽  
Vol 53 (4) ◽  
pp. 1017-1031 ◽  
Author(s):  
Walter F. Murphy
Keyword(s):  
Presidential Power ◽  
Department Heads ◽  
Lower Court ◽  
Executive Orders ◽  
White House ◽  
The Public ◽  
Political Rivalry ◽  
Merit System ◽  
Political Groups ◽  
Special Competence

Practicing politicians as well as students of politics have long recognized the check on presidential power imposed by the federal administrative machinery. High policy must be interpreted; it can sometimes be changed or even frustrated by the bureaucrats who apply laws and executive orders. Officials down the line have interests, loyalties, and ambitions which go beyond and often clash with the allegiance accorded a given tenant of the White House. Each bureaucrat has his own ideas about proper public policy, particularly in his field of special competence. If a career civil servant, he may identify only partially, if at all, the good of the governmental service, not to say the good of the public, with the ends sought by the Administration. And if he owes his appointment or promotion to other sources than the merit system, he may find a positive conflict between his loyalties to the President and to other politicians or political groups.This conflict can occur at all administrative levels. Cabinet members may make up the President's official family, but some of them are at times his chief rivals for power within his own political party, or, more often, representatives of those rivals. Or the department heads may be so split with sibling political rivalry among themselves that common loyalty to their nominal leader may be subordinated to other values. An observer has lately written: “The conditions which a system of fragmented power sets for the success and the survival of a Cabinet officer encourage him to consolidate his own nexus of power and compel him to operate with a degree of independence from the President.”

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