Appointee-Careerist Relations in the Presidential Transition of 2008-2009

2014 ◽  
Vol 44 (4) ◽  
pp. 697-723 ◽  
Author(s):  
William G. Resh
Author(s):  
David P. Auerswald ◽  
Stephen M. Saideman

This chapter focuses primarily on two presidential systems, those of the United States and France. In each country, an individual is empowered to make significant military decisions or delegate those decisions to subordinates. There are two particular elements that distinguish how the Americans ran their war compared to many of the other countries: agent selection and incentives. Because the United States led an ad hoc effort (Operation Enduring Freedom) and only later became the leader of the NATO effort, the primary means of control was leadership selection and termination. The chapter then turns to the French case, where there is a significant change in behavior on the ground that followed the presidential transition from Jacques Chirac to Nicolas Sarkozy. Chirac placed significant restrictions on where the French were deployed and with what capabilities. Sarkozy lifted those restrictions but still answered the phone when questions arose in the field. The chapter also briefly addresses the case of Poland.


2019 ◽  
Vol 17 (02) ◽  
pp. 433-452 ◽  
Author(s):  
Miles M. Evers ◽  
Aleksandr Fisher ◽  
Steven D. Schaaf

Does President Trump face domestic costs for foreign policy inconsistency? Will co-partisans and opposition-partisans equally punish Donald Trump for issuing flippant international threats and backing down? While the president said he could “stand in the middle of Fifth Avenue and shoot somebody” without losing voters, the literature consistently shows that individuals, regardless of partisanship, disapprove of leaders who jeopardize the country’s reputation for credibility and resolve. Given the atypical nature of the Trump presidency, and the severe partisan polarization surrounding it, we investigate whether the logic of audience costs still applies in the Trump era. Using a unique experiment fielded during the 2016 presidential transition, we show that Republicans and Democrats impose equal audience costs on President Trump. And by varying the leader’s identity, between Donald Trump, Barack Obama, and “The President,” we demonstrate that the public adheres to a non-partisan logic in punishing leaders who renege on threats. Yet we also find Presidents Trump and Obama can reduce the magnitude of audience costs by justifying backing down as being “in America’s interest.” Even Democrats, despite their doubts of Donald Trump’s credibility, accept such justifications. Our findings encourage further exploration of partisan cues, leader-level attributes, and leader-level reputations.


Subject Outlook for US policy engagement with Myanmar as the US presidential transition nears. Significance The White House is preparing to lift most remaining US sanctions on Myanmar, after President Barack Obama's September 14 announcement to this effect when he met Myanmar State Counsellor Aung San Suu Kyi. Washington will also restore Myanmar's access to the US Generalized System of Preferences (GSP) because of recent improvements in labour rights. Supporting Myanmar's democratic 'transition' has been a key Obama policy and the president is attempting to fix progress before his successor takes office in January 2017. Impacts Myanmar's government will deepen ties with Beijing, but not necessarily to the extent of eclipsing US ties. The Rohingya issue will still cause some friction in Myanmar-US ties. Policy gaps and delays on Myanmar between the US Congress and next president may expand.


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