Using Advance Purchase Discount Contracts under Uncertain Information Acquisition Cost

2017 ◽  
Vol 26 (8) ◽  
pp. 1553-1567 ◽  
Author(s):  
Wenjie Tang ◽  
Karan Girotra
Keyword(s):  
Acquisition Cost ◽  
Information Acquisition ◽  
Uncertain Information

scholarly journals Information Acquisition in a War of Attrition

2014 ◽  
Vol 6 (2) ◽  
pp. 37-78 ◽  
Author(s):  
Kyungmin Kim ◽  
Frances Zhiyun Xu Lee
Keyword(s):  
Acquisition Cost ◽  
Information Acquisition ◽  
Symmetric Equilibrium ◽  
War Of Attrition ◽  
Expected Payoffs

We consider a war of attrition where the players can learn about a state that determines their payoffs at stochastic deadline. We study how the incentives to acquire information depend on the (un) verifiability of information and its implications for efficiency. Unverifiability creates distortions (strategic delay in concession or duplication in information acquisition), but encourages information acquisition. In our model, provided that the information acquisition cost is small, these two effects cancel each other out and the players' expected payoffs in symmetric equilibrium are identical whether information is verifiable or not. We also show that shortening deadlines may prolong the conflict. (JEL C72, D82, D83)

Orchestrating Information Acquisition

2021 ◽  
Vol 13 (4) ◽  
pp. 420-465
Author(s):  
Jingfeng Lu ◽  
Lixin Ye ◽  
Xin Feng
Keyword(s):  
Acquisition Cost ◽  
Information Acquisition ◽  
Second Stage ◽  
Private Values

We study how to orchestrate information acquisition in an environment where bidders endowed with original estimates (“types”) about their private values can acquire further information by incurring a cost. We consider both single-round and fully sequential short-listing rules. The optimal single-round shortlisting rule admits the set of most efficient bidders that maximizes expected virtual surplus adjusted by the second-stage signal and information acquisition cost. When shortlisting is fully sequential, at each round, the most efficient remaining bidder is admitted provided that her conditional expected contribution to the virtual surplus is positive. (JEL D44, D82, D83)

scholarly journals Divide and Inform: Rationing Information to Facilitate Persuasion

2017 ◽  
Vol 92 (5) ◽  
pp. 167-199 ◽  
Author(s):  
Beatrice Michaeli
Keyword(s):  
Acquisition Cost ◽  
Information Acquisition ◽  
Common Belief ◽  
Access To Information ◽  
Precise Information ◽  
Delayed Choice ◽  
Aggregate Information ◽  
Unrestricted Access ◽  
The Common ◽  
To Receive

ABSTRACT This paper develops a Bayesian persuasion model that examines a manager's incentives to gather information when the manager can disseminate this information selectively to interested parties (“users”) and when the objectives of the manager and the users are not perfectly aligned. The model predicts that if the manager can choose the subset of users to receive the information, then the manager may gather more precise information. The paper identifies conditions under which a regime that allows managers to grant access to information selectively maximizes aggregate information. Strikingly, this happens when the objectives of managers and users are sufficiently misaligned. This finding is robust to variations of the model, such as information acquisition cost, unobservable precision, sequential noisy actions taken by the users, and delayed choice of the subset of users in “the know.” These results call into doubt the common belief that forcing managers to provide unrestricted access to information to all potential users is always beneficial.

The choice of optimum cross section for overhead line by economic intervals' method

2011 ◽  
Vol 28 (1) ◽  
pp. 37-42 ◽  
Author(s):  
Svetlana Guseva ◽  
Lubov Petrichenko
Keyword(s):  
Cross Section ◽  
Current Density ◽  
Uncertain Information ◽  
Overhead Line ◽  
Market Conditions ◽  
Overhead Lines ◽  
Mathcad Software

The choice of optimum cross section for overhead line by economic intervals' methodIn this paper an approach to choosing the optimum cross section for overhead line in conditions of incomplete and uncertain information is considered. The two methods of such choice are presented: method of economic current density and economic intervals' method. The correction of the economic intervals method is offered under market conditions of costs. As example 20 kV and 110 kV overhead lines with aluminum, copper and ferroaluminum wires are selected. Universal nomograms with different standard cross section are calculated and constructed. The graphics using Mathcad software are offered.

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