The political side of public utilities: How opportunistic behaviour and yardstick competition shape water prices in Austria

2014 ◽  
Vol 94 (4) ◽  
pp. 869-890 ◽  
Author(s):  
Michael Klien
1999 ◽  
Vol 32 (2) ◽  
pp. 273-292 ◽  
Author(s):  
François Petry ◽  
Louis M. Imbeau ◽  
Jean Crête ◽  
Michel Clavet

AbstractThis study tests explanations of the growth of Canadian provincial governments that draw from the political budget cycle approach. The approach assumes that governments jointly respond to electoral and partisan goals. When the next election is not expected soon, the government uses its discretionary power to pursue its ideological target. When the next election is near, politicians in government, fearing electoral defeat, deviate from their normal behaviour and engage in a re-election effort by undertaking an expansionary policy. This study suggests that provincial governments behave in the opportunistic fashion described by the model. Moreover, there is no sign that this opportunistic behaviour has been affected by government cutbacks in the 1990s.


Author(s):  
Pierre Salmon

When the existence of several jurisdictions (countries, regions, or cities) is acknowledged, the possibility arises that citizens compare what obtains in their own jurisdiction to what obtains in others. These cross-jurisdiction or yardstick comparisons can have an effect on citizens’ support of incumbents (yardstick voting) and, as a consequence, an effect on governments’ decisions, making them interact (political yardstick competition proper). Both effects have been mainly studied in the context of federalism and decentralization, with the policy variables concerned being mostly fiscal (taxes and expenditures). In that relatively simple setting, the two effects have been confirmed empirically. This book aims to document and analyze that achievement and also to extend the analysis to broader settings in terms of jurisdictions and policy domains. It is mostly in that broader context, especially when national governments are involved, that the systemic implications of yardstick competition come to the fore. With regard to electoral or downward accountability, the mechanism tends to re-empower citizens by mitigating the disabling effects of information asymmetry. With regard to policy-making, yardstick competition represents a force, latent or actual, that constrains or influences the decisions of governments. The mechanism is simple but the political settings in which it operates, crucial for its understanding, are definitely complex. A methodological justification of how the matter is treated is placed at the end of the book.


1995 ◽  
Vol 6 (1) ◽  
pp. 23-53 ◽  
Author(s):  
Dean Garratt

The paper analyses the principal four model types that comprise the political business cycle literature. Political business cycle models can be classified according to the political motivations of opportunism and ideology as well as by the nature of the expectations that individuals are assumed to hold. Using this classification we pay particular attention to the underlying assumptions of the models. The paper concludes that a satisfactory model while incorporating the possibility of both ideological and opportunistic behaviour must also consider the appropriate indicator to which government reacts. Any errors within the article are wholly mine and should be addressed as should all welcome comments to myself at the Public Sector Economics Research Centre, University of Leicester, University Road, Leicester LE1 7RH, U.K.


2021 ◽  
Vol 0 (0) ◽  
Author(s):  
Massimiliano Ferraresi

Abstract This paper exploits the political cycle of Italian municipalities to test for the presence of strategic interactions in the collection of local taxation. The revenue from the personal income tax surcharge—a tax tool of low salience—is (positively) plagued by political manipulation and is found to be a strategic complement, but only when mayors run for re-election, a finding consistent with the yardstick competition hypothesis. More salient fiscal tools, such as property tax and user fees and charges, are also (negatively) affected by budget cycles, but they do not appear to be spatially correlated.


2016 ◽  
Vol 63 (s1) ◽  
pp. 51-69
Author(s):  
Constantin-Marius Apostoaie

Abstract An instrument that political parties use to inform the electorate with regard to their policy preference (including preference towards the environment) is the electoral manifest. This paper analyses some important drivers that push political parties towards adopting pro-environmental attitudes by analysing the content included in their electoral manifestos (using the Comparative Manifesto Dataset). As explanatory factors we consider various socio-economic, ideological and international related variables, but our main focus is on environmental related determinants. We proceed as such because the paper aims to test the validity of ‘the ecological approach’ given that the current literature overlooks this issue or doesn’t succeed in providing strong evidence of its existence. Our dataset covers 49 countries worldwide and a total of 190 national electoral years, occurring between 2000 and 2015. The resulting evidence, which might confirm the validity of ‘the ecological approach’, is rather weak, but there is nonetheless strong evidence to prove the existence of an opportunistic behaviour of the political parties (confirming the validity of the ‘opportunistic political cycle’).


1993 ◽  
Vol 41 (4) ◽  
pp. 707-730 ◽  
Author(s):  
Theo Nichols ◽  
Julia O'Connell Davidson

Both academic and political debate about the effects of privatisation upon employees in privatised companies has taken place in something of an empirical vacuum. In particular, there is a lack of systematic enquiries into the major privatised utilities. Despite the lack of evidence, a number of claims have been advanced, both about the impact of privatisation upon the political attitudes of employees, and about its effects on working conditions, worker motivation and behaviour. This paper presents the results of a survey of 442 employees in two privatised public utilities. It is divided into two parts, looking first at the more general social and political attitudes of these employees, then presenting their views on the impact of privatisation on the company they work for, and on their working lives. The findings reported here lend little support either to new right claims about privatisation's transformative powers or to the view that ‘for most people … privatisation will make very little difference at all’ (Saunders and Harris, 1990).


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