scholarly journals Contingent identity and counterpart theory*

2016 ◽  
Vol 30 (1) ◽  
pp. 7-20 ◽  
Author(s):  
Ralf M. Bader
Keyword(s):  
Counterpart Theory ◽  
Contingent Identity

Contingent identity in counterpart theory

Analysis ◽  
1990 ◽  
Vol 50 (3) ◽  
pp. 163-166 ◽  
Author(s):  
M. Ramachandran
Keyword(s):  
Counterpart Theory ◽  
Contingent Identity

scholarly journals Grounding Personal Persistence

2021 ◽  
Vol 0 (0) ◽  
Author(s):  
Harriet E. Baber
Keyword(s):  
Counterpart Theory ◽  
Possible World ◽  
Ordinary Objects ◽  
Plausible Account ◽  
Temporal Properties ◽  
What Matters In Survival ◽  
What Matters

Abstract Modal counterpart theory identifies a thing’s possibly being F with its having a counterpart that is F at another possible world; temporal counterpart theory identifies a thing’s having been F or going to be F, with its having a counterpart that is F at another time. Benovsky, J. 2015. “Alethic Modalities, Temporal Modalities, and Representation.” Kriterion: Journal of Philosophy 29: 18–34 in this journal endorses modal counterpart theory but holds that temporal counterpart theory is untenable because it does not license the ascription of the intuitively correct temporal properties to ordinary objects, and hence that we should understand ordinary objects, including persons, as transtemporal ‘worms’. I argue that the worm theory is problematic when it comes to accounting for what matters in survival and that temporal counterpart theory provides a plausible account of personal persistence.

Leading a Double Life: Statues and Pieces of Clay

Metaphysica ◽  
2020 ◽  
Vol 21 (2) ◽  
pp. 273-277
Author(s):  
John Biro
Keyword(s):  
Contingent Identity ◽  
Independent Reason

AbstractSome philosophers think that two distinct things can occupy exactly the same region of space, as with a statue and a piece of clay. Others think that the statue and the piece of clay are identical, but not necessarily so. I argue that Alan Gibbard’s well-known story of Goliath and Lumpl does not support either of these claims. Not the first, as there is independent reason to think that it cannot be true. Not the second, because there is no need to invoke the dubiously intelligible notion of contingent identity to account for the facts of the story.

scholarly journals Asymmetric Personal Identity

2018 ◽  
Vol 4 (2) ◽  
pp. 127-146 ◽  
Author(s):  
THEODORE SIDER
Keyword(s):  
Quantum Mechanics ◽  
Personal Identity ◽  
Counterpart Theory

AbstractPersonal identity is not always symmetric: even if I will not be a later person, the later person may have been me. What makes this possible is that the relations that are criterial of personal identity—such as memory and anticipation—are asymmetric and ‘count in favor of personal identity from one side only’. Asymmetric personal identity can be accommodated by temporal counterpart theory but not by Lewisian overlapping aggregates of person stages. The question of uncertainty in cases of personal fission (and in Everettian quantum mechanics) is also discussed.

Contingent identity and vague identity

Analysis ◽  
1995 ◽  
Vol 55 (3) ◽  
pp. 183-190 ◽  
Author(s):  
R. Keefe
Keyword(s):  
Contingent Identity ◽  
Vague Identity

scholarly journals C. S. Peirce on the dynamic object of a sign: From ontology to semiotics and back

2015 ◽  
Vol 43 (4) ◽  
pp. 419-437
Author(s):  
Helmut Pape
Keyword(s):  
Object Oriented ◽  
The Other ◽  
Dynamic Object ◽  
Contingent Identity ◽  
Process Ontology ◽  
Relational Properties ◽  
Other Hand ◽  
Structural Account ◽  
Real Objects ◽  
Normative Role

That reality, and in particular the (dynamic) objects of signs, are independent of our thoughts or other representations is a crucial thesis of Peirce’s realism. On the other hand, his semiotics implies the claim that all reality and all real objects are real for us only because of the signs we use. Do these two claims contradict, even exclude, each other? I will argue that both Peirce’s metaphysics and his semiotics provide a natural via media: a structural account of the openness of processes, featuring transitive relations, connects process ontology implicit in his evolutionary metaphysics and the relational, quasi-inferential features embodied in interpretational sequences of signs. It is shown that Peirce’s notion of a sign, its normative role and his account of the directional force of objects implies a sort of logical causality that supports the unity of objects. In this way sign sequences are able to relate flexibly sign use with contextually specified independent objects. That is to say, relational properties of object-oriented chains of interpretations provide sign users with a flexible, fallibilistic instrument able to capture by contingent identity relations (teridentity) of the identity of objects in changing situations.Includes: Comment by Francesco Bellucci (pp. 433–437).

scholarly journals Counterpart theories for everyone

Synthese ◽  
2020 ◽  
Vol 197 (11) ◽  
pp. 4691-4715
Author(s):  
Achille C. Varzi
Keyword(s):  
Modal Logic ◽  
Semantic Theory ◽  
Counterpart Theory ◽  
Philosophical Significance ◽  
Special Cases ◽  
Identity Based

Abstract David Lewis’s counterpart theory (CT) is often seen as involving a radical departure from the standard, Kripke-style semantics for modal logic (ML), suggesting that we are dealing with deeply divergent accounts of our modal talk. However, CT captures but one version of the relevant semantic intuition, and does so on the basis of metaphysical assumptions (all worlds are equally real, individuals are world-bound) that are ostensibly discretionary. Just as ML can be translated into a language that quantifies explicitly over worlds, CT may be formulated as a semantic theory in which world quantification is purely metalinguistic. And just as Kripke-style semantics is formally compatible with the doctrine of world-boundedness, a counterpart-based semantics may in principle allow for cases of trans-world identity. In fact, one may welcome a framework that is general enough to include both Lewis’s counterpart-based account and Kripke’s identity-based account as distinguished special cases. There are several ways of doing so. The purpose of this paper is to outline a fully general option and to illustrate its philosophical significance, showing how the large variety of intermediate relations that lie between Lewisian counterparthood and Kripkean identity yield a corresponding variety of modal theories that would otherwise remain uncharted.

Propositions and counterpart theory

Analysis ◽  
2005 ◽  
Vol 65 (3) ◽  
pp. 210-218 ◽  
Author(s):  
C. Dorr
Keyword(s):  
Counterpart Theory
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