Pragmatic encroachment and legal proof

2021 ◽  
Author(s):  
Sarah Moss
Keyword(s):  
Pragmatic Encroachment ◽  
Legal Proof

PENERAPAN PROSEDUR MEDIASI DALAM PENYELESAIAN SENGKETA WAKAF DI PENGADILAN AGAMA

2018 ◽  
Vol 1 (1) ◽  
pp. 21-36
Author(s):  
Syufaat Syufaat
Keyword(s):  
Social Dimension ◽  
Mediation Process ◽  
Mutual Trust ◽  
Mediation Model ◽  
The Public ◽  
Spiritual Dimension ◽  
The People ◽  
The Social ◽  
Legal Proof ◽  
Religious Courts

Waqf has two dimensional meaning; the spiritual dimension that is taqarrub to Allah and the social dimension as the source of Islamic financial for the welfare of the people. Waqf disputes can be caused by several reasons; waqf land is not accompanied with a pledge; waqf is done on the basis of mutual trust so it has no legal proof and ownership. Currently, the choice to use the court is less effective in resolving disputes. Hence, the public ultimately chooses non-litigation efforts as a way to resolve the disputes. Mediation process is preferred by many as it is viewed to be the fairest way where none of the two parties wins or loses (win-win solution). It is also fast and cheap. This study is intended to examine how to solve waqf dispute with mediation model according to the waqf law, and how the application of mediation in the Religious Courts system

TIME CONSTRAINTS AND PRAGMATIC ENCROACHMENT ON KNOWLEDGE

Episteme ◽  
2014 ◽  
Vol 11 (2) ◽  
pp. 157-180 ◽  
Author(s):  
Joseph Shin
Keyword(s):  
Time Constraints ◽  
Pragmatic Encroachment ◽  
Knowledge Ascriptions ◽  
Ordinary Knowledge ◽  
Experimental Findings ◽  
The Way

AbstractCiting some recent experimental findings, I argue for the surprising claim that in some cases the less time you have the more you know. More specifically, I present some evidence to suggest that our ordinary knowledge ascriptions are sometimes sensitive to facts about an epistemic subject's truth-irrelevant time constraints such that less (time) is more (knowledge). If knowledge ascriptions are sensitive in this manner, then this is some evidence of pragmatic encroachment. Along the way, I consider comments made by Jonathan Schaffer (2006) and Jennifer Nagel (2008, 2010) to construe a purist contextualist and a strict invariantist explanation of the data respectively, before giving reasons to resist them in favor of an account that indicates pragmatic encroachment. If successful, this may suggest a new way to argue for the controversial thesis that there is pragmatic encroachment on knowledge.

Pragmatic Encroachment and Belief-Desire Psychology

2012 ◽  
Vol 53 (4) ◽  
pp. 327-343 ◽  
Author(s):  
Jonathan Jenkins Ichikawa ◽  
Benjamin Jarvis ◽  
Katherine Rubin
Keyword(s):  
Pragmatic Encroachment

RATIONAL STABILITY UNDER PRAGMATIC ENCROACHMENT

Episteme ◽  
2018 ◽  
Vol 15 (3) ◽  
pp. 297-312 ◽  
Author(s):  
Mark Schroeder
Keyword(s):  
Pragmatic Encroachment ◽  
The Right ◽  
The Relationship

ABSTRACTIn this paper I will be concerned with the relationship between pragmatic encroachment and the rational instability of belief. I will be concerned to make five points: first, that some defenders of pragmatic encroachment are indeed committed to predictable rational instability of belief; second, that rational instability is indeed troublesome – particularly when it is predictable; third, that the bare thesis of pragmatic encroachment is not committed to rational instability of belief at all; fourth, that the view that Jake Ross and I have called the ‘reasoning disposition’ account of belief has the right structure to predict limited and stable pragmatic encroachment on the rationality of belief; and fifth and finally, that the very best cases for pragmatic encroachment are rationally stable in the right ways.

scholarly journals ARE INTELLECTUAL VIRTUES TRUTH-RELEVANT?

Episteme ◽  
2017 ◽  
Vol 14 (3) ◽  
pp. 381-392
Author(s):  
Blake Roeber
Keyword(s):  
Virtue Epistemology ◽  
True Belief ◽  
Intellectual Virtue ◽  
Narrow Sense ◽  
Pragmatic Encroachment ◽  
Intellectual Virtues ◽  
Ernest Sosa ◽  
Value Of Knowledge ◽  
Wide Range

ABSTRACTAccording to attributor virtue epistemology (the view defended by Ernest Sosa, John Greco, and others), S knows that p only if her true belief that p is attributable to some intellectual virtue, competence, or ability that she possesses. Attributor virtue epistemology captures a wide range of our intuitions about the nature and value of knowledge, and it has many able defenders. Unfortunately, it has an unrecognized consequence that many epistemologists will think is sufficient for rejecting it: namely, it makes knowledge depend on factors that aren't truth-relevant, even in the broadest sense of this term, and it also makes knowledge depend in counterintuitive ways on factors that are truth-relevant in the more common narrow sense of this term. As I show in this paper, the primary objection to interest-relative views in the pragmatic encroachment debate can be raised even more effectively against attributor virtue epistemology.

scholarly journals A Politics of Prosecution: The Conviction of Wonnerwerry and the Exoneration of Jerry Durack in Western Australia 1898

2018 ◽  
Vol 33 (1) ◽  
Author(s):  
Mark Finnane
Keyword(s):  
Western Australia ◽  
Criminal Law ◽  
Historical Reconstruction ◽  
Colonial Society ◽  
Subsequent Trial ◽  
Australian History ◽  
Legal Proof

In 1901 one of the pioneering Durack family was killed on the verandah of his cattle station homestead in the East Kimberley region of Western Australia. In a subsequent trial two young Aboriginal men were tried for his murder. Three years earlier the murdered man had himself been charged, though never tried, with the murder of an Aboriginal man. Connecting these two homicides was work best avoided when writing the pioneer legend of Australian history, but is inescapable when seeking to appreciate the ambition and limits of criminal law in a colonial society, the task of this article. At the same time, the evidentiary demands of historical reconstruction prove as challenging as those of legal proof when faced with the task of understanding what was in the minds of those actors, settlers and Indigenous, more than a century ago.

LEGAL PROOF AND FACT FINDERS' BELIEFS

Legal Theory ◽  
2006 ◽  
Vol 12 (4) ◽  
pp. 293-314 ◽  
Author(s):  
Jordi Ferrer Beltrán
Keyword(s):  
Theoretical Analysis ◽  
Mental States ◽  
Procedural Law ◽  
Legal Proof ◽  
Joint Assessment

In procedural-law scholarship as well as in the theoretical analysis of the notion of proof as a result of the joint assessment of all items of evidence introduced in a trial, reference is frequently made to notions such as the conviction, belief, or certainty of a judge or a jury member about what happened. All these notions underscore the mental states involved in the process of determining the facts on the part of a judge or a jury. In this analysis, I look at the links between beliefs and the justification in the findings of fact provided by the judge or jury in her or its verdict.

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