Do you see what I know? On reasons, perceptual evidence, and epistemic status

Using two examples of ethical choice, Philippa Foot’s snake and the traffic roundabout, this paper offers an account of normative induction that characterizes particularism and generalism as stages of normative inquiry, rather than rival accounts of moral knowledge and motivation. Ethical particularism holds that the evaluative cannot be “cashed out” in propositional form, and that it is descriptively “shapeless.” Drawing on examples from law, this paper claims that, while individual normative inquiry may be viewed as encountering a shapeless particularist context of seem-ingly unlimited nonmoral properties, normativity is driven by repe-tition of similar situations toward shared practices and descriptive predication. Rather than retention of epistemic status by defeated reasons, this illustrates retirement of relevant properties and ac-companying reasons, transformation of the reasons environment, and a pluralist normative ontology.

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Expressing the Self

10.1093/oso/9780198786658.001.0001 ◽

2018 ◽

Cited By ~ 1

Keyword(s):

Philosophy Of Mind ◽

The Self ◽

Epistemic Status ◽

First Person ◽

Semantic Categories ◽

Wide Range ◽

Person Reference ◽

De Se ◽

Novel Method ◽

Cultural Pragmatics

This book addresses different linguistic and philosophical aspects of referring to the self in a wide range of languages from different language families, including Amharic, English, French, Japanese, Korean, Mandarin, Newari (Sino-Tibetan), Polish, Tariana (Arawak), and Thai. In the domain of speaking about oneself, languages use a myriad of expressions that cut across grammatical and semantic categories, as well as a wide variety of constructions. Languages of Southeast and East Asia famously employ a great number of terms for first-person reference to signal honorification. The number and mixed properties of these terms make them debatable candidates for pronounhood, with many grammar-driven classifications opting to classify them with nouns. Some languages make use of egophors or logophors, and many exhibit an interaction between expressing the self and expressing evidentiality qua the epistemic status of information held from the ego perspective. The volume’s focus on expressing the self, however, is not directly motivated by an interest in the grammar or lexicon, but instead stems from philosophical discussions of the special status of thoughts about oneself, known as de se thoughts. It is this interdisciplinary understanding of expressing the self that underlies this volume, comprising philosophy of mind at one end of the spectrum and cross-cultural pragmatics of self-expression at the other. This unprecedented juxtaposition results in a novel method of approaching de se and de se expressions, in which research methods from linguistics and philosophy inform each other. The importance of this interdisciplinary perspective on expressing the self cannot be overemphasized. Crucially, the volume also demonstrates that linguistic research on first-person reference makes a valuable contribution to research on the self tout court, by exploring the ways in which the self is expressed, and thereby adding to the insights gained through philosophy, psychology, and cognitive science.

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Locke and Malebranche

10.1093/oso/9780198815037.003.0013 ◽

2018 ◽

Cited By ~ 2

Author(s):

Nicholas Jolley

Keyword(s):

Epistemic Status ◽

Theory Of Ideas ◽

Human Understanding ◽

Empiricist Theory

This chapter addresses the issue of whether Locke’s own empiricist theory of ideas offers, as Locke often suggested, a more intelligible way of explaining human understanding than Malebranche’s doctrine of Vision in God. Drawing on Locke’s statements about the corpuscularian hypothesis, it argues that although the empiricist theory may satisfy some criteria of intelligibility, it is forced to recognize the existence of processes that are ‘incomprehensible’; to that extent, Locke’s theory of ideas runs parallel with his mature philosophy of matter. The epistemic status of the empiricist theory of ideas is thus more problematic than it is often taken to be.

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Agency and the Successive Structure of Time-Consciousness

Erkenntnis ◽

10.1007/s10670-021-00440-7 ◽

2021 ◽

Author(s):

Camden Alexander McKenna

Keyword(s):

Temporal Structure ◽

Basic Structure ◽

The Self ◽

Necessary Condition ◽

Epistemic Status ◽

Mental Attitude ◽

Time Consciousness ◽

Possibility Space ◽

The Right ◽

Wrong Sort

AbstractI argue for constraining the nomological possibility space of temporal experiences and endorsing the Succession Requirement for agents. The Succession Requirement holds that the basic structure of temporal experience must be successive for agentive subjects, at least in worlds that are law-like in the same way as ours. I aim to establish the Succession Requirement by showing non-successively experiencing agents are not possible for three main reasons, namely that they (1) fail to stand in the right sort of causal relationship to the outcomes of their actions, (2) exhibit the wrong sort of epistemic status for agency, and (3) lack the requisite agentive mental attitude of intentionality. I conclude that agency is incompatible with non-successive experience and therefore we should view the successive temporal structure of experience as a necessary condition for agency. I also suggest that the Succession Requirement may actually extend beyond my main focus on agency, offering preliminary considerations in favor of seeing successive experience as a precondition for selfhood as well. The consequences of the Succession Requirement are wide-ranging, and I discuss various implications for our understanding of agency, the self, time consciousness, and theology, among other things.

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The aerodynamic puzzle of nasalized fricatives: Aerodynamic and perceptual evidence from Scottish Gaelic

Laboratory Phonology Journal of the Association for Laboratory Phonology ◽

10.1515/lp-2015-0007 ◽

2015 ◽

Vol 6 (2) ◽

Cited By ~ 4

Author(s):

Natasha Warner ◽

Daniel Brenner ◽

Jessamyn Schertz ◽

Andrew Carnie ◽

Muriel Fisher ◽

...

Keyword(s):

Scottish Gaelic ◽

Trade Off ◽

Instrumental Data ◽

The World ◽

Perceptual Evidence ◽

Better Than ◽

Do So

AbstractScottish Gaelic is sometimes described as having nasalized fricatives (/ṽ/ distinctively, and [f̃, x̃, h̃], etc. through assimilation). However, there are claims that it is not aerodynamically possible to open the velum for nasalization while maintaining frication noise. We present aerodynamic data from 14 native Scottish Gaelic speakers to determine how the posited nasalized fricatives in this language are realized. Most tokens demonstrate loss of nasalization, but nasalization does occur in some contexts without aerodynamic conflict, e.g., nasalization with the consonant realized as an approximant, nasalization of [h̃], nasalization on the preceding vowel, or sequential frication and nasalization. Furthermore, a very few tokens do contain simultaneous nasalization and frication with a trade-off in airflow. We also present perceptual evidence showing that Gaelic listeners can hear this distinction slightly better than chance. Thus, instrumental data from one of the few languages in the world described as having nasalized fricatives confirms that the claimed sounds are not made by producing strong nasalization concurrently with clear frication noise. Furthermore, although speakers most often neutralize the nasalization, when they maintain it, they do so through a variety of phonetic mechanisms, even within a single language.

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