Rigidity, symmetry and defeasibility: On Weisberg's puzzle for perceptual justification

2020 ◽  
Vol 30 (1) ◽  
pp. 54-70
Author(s):  
Juan Comesaña
Keyword(s):  
Perceptual Justification

The Evidence of the Senses is no Evidence from the Senses

2013 ◽  
Vol 16 (1) ◽  
pp. 174-191
Author(s):  
Tommaso Piazza
Keyword(s):  
Logical Investigation ◽  
Perceptual Justification ◽  
The Senses ◽  
Recent Interpretation

In the first part of this paper I suggest that Dogmatism about perceptual justification – the view that in the most basic cases, perceptual justification is immediate – commits to rejecting Evidentialism, as it commits, specifically, to accounting for the mechanics of perceptual justification otherwise than by maintaining that perceptual experiences justify by providing evidence. In the second part of the paper, by following W. Hopp’s recent interpretation of Husserl’s Sixth Logical Investigation, I suggest that Husserl’s theory of fulfilment provides the basis of the non-evidential account of the mechanics of perceptual justification needed to vindicate Dogmatism.

Phenomenal Explanationism’s Global Ambitions

2021 ◽  
pp. 115-136
Author(s):  
Kevin McCain ◽  
Luca Moretti
Keyword(s):  
Epistemic Justification ◽  
A Priori ◽  
Perceptual Justification ◽  
A Priori Justification ◽  
Comprehensive Account ◽  
Multiple Domains ◽  
The Way

This chapter further elucidates PE by explaining how it applies to multiple domains. Though the preceding chapter already touches upon some of these, here it is cashed out how PE can account for perceptual justification, memorial justification, testimonial justification, introspective justification, and a priori justification. Exploring the contours of PE in this way reveals just how powerful and unified the theory is. Along the way, it is argued that Declan Smithies’ forceful objections to PC fail to impugn PE. Additionally, it is shown that PE has the resources to respond to each of the challenges that Smithies claims are faced by any internalist theory with “global ambitions”––any theory that purports to be a comprehensive account of epistemic justification. (These challenges for instance include the problem of forgotten evidence and the problem of stored beliefs.) The discussion in this chapter makes it clear that PE is a comprehensive account of epistemic justification that achieves its global ambitions.

scholarly journals Entitlement, Epistemic Risk, and Scepticism

Episteme ◽  
2019 ◽  
pp. 1-11
Author(s):  
Luca Moretti
Keyword(s):  
Probabilistic Reasoning ◽  
Perceptual Justification ◽  
Crispin Wright ◽  
Epistemic Risk

AbstractCrispin Wright maintains that the architecture of perceptual justification is such that we can acquire justification for our perceptual beliefs only if we have antecedent justification for ruling out any sceptical alternative. Wright contends that this principle doesn't elicit scepticism, for we are non-evidentially entitled to accept the negation of any sceptical alternative. Sebastiano Moruzzi has challenged Wright's contention by arguing that since our non-evidential entitlements don't remove the epistemic risk of our perceptual beliefs, they don't actually enable us to acquire justification for these beliefs. In this paper I show that Wright's responses to Moruzzi are ineffective and that Moruzzi's argument is validated by probabilistic reasoning. I also suggest that Wright couldn't answer Moruzzi's challenge without weakening the support available for his conception of the architecture of perceptual justification.

Replies to Commentators

2017 ◽  
Vol 7 (4) ◽  
pp. 281-295 ◽  
Author(s):  
Annalisa Coliva
Keyword(s):  
Perceptual Justification ◽  
Epistemic Relativism ◽  
Hinge Epistemology

The paper contains the replies to the comments made by Alan Millar, Yuval Avnur, Giorgio Volpe, and Maria Baghramian on my Extended Rationality: A Hinge Epistemology. It addresses, in particular, the nature of perceptual justification, the truth of hinges, my response to Humean skepticism and the issue of epistemic relativism.

Deontological Conservatism and Perceptual Justification

Theoria ◽  
2017 ◽  
Vol 83 (3) ◽  
pp. 206-224 ◽  
Author(s):  
Hamid Vahid
Keyword(s):  
Perceptual Justification

Well-Founded Belief and Perceptual Justification

2016 ◽  
Vol 116 (3) ◽  
pp. 367-377 ◽  
Author(s):  
Fernando Broncano-Berrocal
Keyword(s):  
Perceptual Justification
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