A PROBABILISTIC EPISTEMOLOGY OF PERCEPTUAL BELIEF

2018 ◽  
Vol 28 (1) ◽  
pp. 374-398 ◽  
Author(s):  
Ralph Wedgwood
Keyword(s):  
Perceptual Belief ◽  
Probabilistic Epistemology

Perceptual Entitlement, Reliabilism, and Scepticism

2012 ◽  
Vol 2 (1) ◽  
pp. 21-43 ◽  
Author(s):  
Frank Barel
Keyword(s):  
Perceptual Belief ◽  
Philosophical Theory ◽  
The Face ◽  
External Form ◽  
Sceptical Argument

This paper explores the bearing of Tyler Burge’s notion of perceptual entitlement on the problem of scepticism. Perceptual entitlement is an external form of warrant, connected with his perceptual anti-individualism. According to his view, an individual can be entitled to a perceptual belief without having reasons warranting the belief. On the face of it, this suggests that the view may have anti-sceptical resources. In short, the question is whether Burge’s notion of perceptual entitlement allows us to outright deny that we in our philosophical theory need a reason to reject the sceptical scenario. The answer to this question is ‘no’. However, as I go on to show, Burge’s position includes further resources that allow for an anti-sceptical argument.

A. J. Ayer on the Argument from Illusion

1973 ◽  
Vol 3 (2) ◽  
pp. 275-280
Author(s):  
P. L. McKee
Keyword(s):  
Perceptual Belief ◽  
Perceptual Error ◽  
Physical Surface

In his paper “Has Austin Refuted the Sense-Datum Theory?” A. J. Ayer contends that the argument from illusion calls attention to perspectival distortion, perceptual misidentification and elusive perceptual belief only in order to establish the possibility of perceptual error. Pointing to our occasional perceptual failures reminds us that perceptual error is always logically possible—that any particular perceptual belief to the effect that one is perceiving a physical surface could be mistaken. This in turn is thought by Ayer to show that the ordinary belief that we perceive physical surfaces requires qualification—along lines urged by sense-datum philosophers—to the effect that even in those situations properly described for non-philosophical purposes as perceptions of physical surfaces it cannot be physical surfaces that are literally present to one's senses. Ayer believes that this can be established, for any given case, by the possibility of perceptual error alone.

scholarly journals Skeptical appeal: the source-content bias

2020 ◽  
Author(s):  
John Turri
Keyword(s):  
Popular Culture ◽  
Perceptual Belief ◽  
Present Evidence ◽  
Radical Skepticism ◽  
Specific Combination ◽  
Two Factors ◽  
Content Bias

Radical skepticism is the view that we know nothing, or at least next to nothing. Nearly no one actually believes that skepticism is true. Yet it has remained a serious topic of discussion for millennia and it looms large in popular culture. What explains its persistent and widespread appeal? How does the skeptic get us to doubt what we ordinarily take ourselves to know? I present evidence from two experiments that classic skeptical arguments gain potency from an interaction between two factors. First, people evaluate inferential belief more harshly than perceptual belief. Second, people evaluate inferential belief more harshly when its content is negative (i.e. that something is not the case) than when it’s positive (i.e. that something is the case). It just so happens that potent skeptical arguments tend to focus our attention on negative inferential beliefs, and we are especially prone to doubt that such beliefs count as knowledge. That is, our cognitive evaluations are biased against this specific combination of source and content. The skeptic sows seeds of doubt by exploiting this feature of our psychology.

scholarly journals Perceptual Experience and Seeing-as

2015 ◽  
pp. 123 ◽  
Author(s):  
Daniel Enrique Kalpokas
Keyword(s):  
Perceptual Experience ◽  
Perceptual Belief ◽  
Main Thesis

According to Rorty, Davidson and Brandom, to have an experience is to be caused by our senses to hold a perceptual belief. This article argues that the phenomenon of seeing-as cannot be explained by such a conception of perceptual experience. First, the notion of experience defended by the aforementioned authors is reconstructed. Second, the main features of what Wittgenstein called “seeing aspects” are briefly presented. Finally, several arguments are developed in order to support the main thesis of the article: seeing-as cannot be explained by the conception of experience defended by Rorty, Davidson and Brandom.

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