scholarly journals IS THERE A RELIABILITY CHALLENGE FOR LOGIC?

2018 ◽  
Vol 28 (1) ◽  
pp. 325-347 ◽  
Author(s):  
Joshua Schechter
Author(s):  
Yong Cheng Choi ◽  
Siong Chin Teck ◽  
Low Teck Poh ◽  
Ho Poh Hoon ◽  
Shirley Diong

Computer ◽  
2011 ◽  
Vol 44 (2) ◽  
pp. 46-53 ◽  
Author(s):  
Wenjing Rao ◽  
Chengmo Yang ◽  
Ramesh Karri ◽  
Alex Orailoglu

1978 ◽  
Author(s):  
Freeman B. Nelson ◽  
Charles F. Farrell

2011 ◽  
Vol 4 (2) ◽  
pp. 1475-1484 ◽  
Author(s):  
Florian Moliere ◽  
Alain Bravaix ◽  
Bruno Louis Foucher ◽  
Philippe Perdu

Synthese ◽  
2020 ◽  
Author(s):  
Daniel Dohrn

Abstract I present an exemplary Humean modal epistemology. My version takes inspiration from but incurs no commitment to both Hume’s historical position and Lewis’s Humeanism. Modal epistemology should meet two challenges: the Integration challenge of integrating metaphysics and epistemology and the Reliability challenge of giving an account of how our epistemic capacities can be reliable in detecting modal truth. According to Lewis, modal reasoning starts from certain Humean principles: there is only the vast mosaic of spatiotemporally distributed local matters of fact. The facts can be arbitarily recombined. These principles cannot be taken for granted. I suggest a bottom-up approach instead: Humean principles of recombining the mosaic of facts can be retrieved from the evolutionarily instilled and empirically informed use of imagination in exploring everyday circumstantial possibilities. This use of imagination conforms to a primitive conception of matter as freely recombinable. The modal beliefs that can be obtained from generalizing the more elementary exercise of imagination have to be corrected. Recombination is limited by sortal criteria of identity. Moreover, the overall picture of a recombinable spatiotemporal mosaic must be weighed against the results of science.


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