Peter Geach and “The Frege Point”

2015 ◽  
Vol 38 (1-2) ◽  
pp. 133-149 ◽  
Author(s):  
Roger M. White
Keyword(s):  
Peter Geach

scholarly journals Peter Geach, Mental Acts: Their Content and Their Objects

1962 ◽  
Vol 8 (8) ◽  
pp. 328
Author(s):  
Alejandro Rossi
Keyword(s):  
Mental Acts ◽  
Peter Geach

Peter Geach, Mental Acts: Their Content and Their Objects

scholarly journals Peter Geach on ascriptivism

2017 ◽  
pp. 286-296
Author(s):  
Vitaly V. Ogleznev ◽  
◽  
Valeriy A. Surovtsev
Keyword(s):  
Peter Geach

The Cloud or the Raindrops?

2019 ◽  
pp. 73-94
Author(s):  
Palle Yourgrau
Keyword(s):  
Thomas Aquinas ◽  
The Subject ◽  
Peter Geach

The birth and death of a person constitute (existential) changes in that individual. This idea is challenged, however, by Thomas Aquinas—supported by Peter Geach—who believes that no change can involve the very existence of the subject of that change. It is argued, however, that Aquinas’s position is indefensible, since it involves denying that before Socrates existed, it was a fact that he didn’t exist. Another challenge, however, arises from the thesis of C. S. Peirce—supported by A. N. Prior—that before Socrates was born, there was not even the possibility of his existence, since possibility is always general, individuality arising only from existence itself. An argument is presented, however, that Peirce’s thesis cannot be accepted. More generally, attention is drawn to the importance of the commonsense notion of individuals.

Who is almighty?

2019 ◽  
pp. 1-16
Author(s):  
DANIEL KODAJ
Keyword(s):  
Maximal Power ◽  
Theoretical Virtues ◽  
Peter Geach

AbstractPeter Geach recommended conceiving of God as almighty, not as omnipotent. I argue that Geach's heuristic explanation of almightiness does not provide a workable definition, and I propose one on his behalf. The resulting notion turns out to have precisely those theoretical virtues that Geach advertised: it is immune to the logical puzzles that bedevil omnipotence, and it is better suited to religious contexts than the notion of maximal power that informs typical definitions of omnipotence.

Relative Identity and Cardinality

1999 ◽  
Vol 29 (2) ◽  
pp. 205-223 ◽  
Author(s):  
Patricia Blanchette
Keyword(s):  
Relative Identity ◽  
William Alston ◽  
Persuasive Argument ◽  
Absolute Identity ◽  
The Individual ◽  
Peter Geach

Peter Geach famously holds that there is no such thing as absolute identity. There are rather, as Geach sees it, a variety of relative identity relations, each essentially connected with a particular monadic predicate. Though we can strictly and meaningfully say that an individual a is the same man as the individual b, or that a is the same statue as b, we cannot, on this view, strictly and meaningfully say that the individual a simply is b.It is difficult to find anything like a persuasive argument for this doctrine in Geach’s work. But one claim made by Geach is that his account of identity is the account most naturally aligned with Frege's widely admired treatment of cardinality. And though this claim of an affinity between Frege's and Geach's doctrines has been challenged, the challenge has been resisted. William Alston and Jonathan Bennett, indeed, go further than Geach to argue that Frege's doctrine implies Geach's.

The Socinian Connection – Further Thoughts on the Religion of Hobbes

1986 ◽  
Vol 22 (2) ◽  
pp. 277-280
Author(s):  
C. A. J. Coady
Keyword(s):  
Thomas Hobbes ◽  
Religious Studies ◽  
Joseph Priestley ◽  
Peter Geach

Peter Geach supports his case (Religious Studies, December, 1981) that the religion of Thomas Hobbes was both genuine and a version of Socinianism principally by comparing the theological and scriptural sections of Leviathan with the main doctrines of Socinianism and its latter-day developments in Unitarianism and Christadelphianism. He pays particular attention to comparisons with the Racovian Catechism, the theological writings of Joseph Priestley and the Christadelphian document Christendom Astray by Robert Roberts.

Geach on Generalization

Dialogue ◽  
2002 ◽  
Vol 41 (2) ◽  
pp. 221-240
Author(s):  
Charles Sayward
Keyword(s):  
Il Y A ◽  
Peter Geach

RÉSUMÉIl y a des objections plausibles contre une approche substitutionnelle de la généralisation, dont certaines peuvent être contrées par un appel à une version de l'approche substitutionnelle qui a été proposée par Peter Geach il y a presque quarante ans. Il n'est pas clair que la conception substitutionnelle de Geach vaille pour tous les phénomènes de généralisation, mais on s'emploie ici à montrer que c'est une conception qui est tout à fait digne de considération et qu'elle donne bel et bien lieu à une compréhension correcte de la généralisation pour un éventail important de cas.

Sign in / Sign up

Export Citation Format

Share Document