Rawls’s theory of justice has been the centre-point of modern social contract theory over decades. Given the breadth and extent of Rawls’s work, there are many problems in treating the arguments in limited space. However, points of comparison with other contract theorists are interesting and his theory is treated as being a continuous, if evolving, whole. Rawls seeks to achieve deductive rigour—a moral geometry—in the presentation of his principles of justice, which cover both the political liberties and the distribution of economic resources. Rawls hold that a maximin form or reasoning underlies his two principles of justice. That form of reasoning is reconstructed and it is shown that it is not as decisive in giving the deductive rigour to his conclusions as he requires. The basic liberties and their priority can be defended in broadly Rawlsian terms, assuming that the contracting parties use the practical syllogism of deliberative rationality. However, that form of reasoning cannot deal with cases where the liberties conflict, despite Rawls’s attempt to avoid a balancing test. Rawls’s argument for the difference principle fails outside of a simply two-group economy, and its failure reflects a deeper tension in his thinking between individualism and collectivism. There is a way of reconstructing his account of rational choice so as to be consistent with his collectivism, but it involves abandoning the claim that the rationality of the contracting parties should be consistent with the axioms of utility theory.
A restatement of expected comparative utility theory: A new theory of rational choice under risk