If I Were Kripke … Attributive Names and the Necessary A Posteriori

This chapter discusses Saul Kripke’s treatment of the necessary a posteriori and concomitant distinction between epistemic and metaphysical possibility. It extracts the enduring lessons of his treatment of these matters and disentangles them from errors and confusions that mar some of his most important discussions. It argues that there are two Kripkean routes to the necessary a posteriori—one correct and philosophically far-reaching; the other incorrect, philosophically misleading, and the source of damaging errors that persist to this day. It connects two false principles involved in the second, unsuccessful, route to the necessary a posteriori with the plausible and potentially correct idea that believing a singular proposition that o is F always involves also believing a richer more descriptively informative proposition in which some further property plays a role in the agent’s thoughts about o. It explains why this idea will not save the failed second route to the necessary a posteriori and suggests that it may help reconcile Kripke’s insights with the lessons of Frege’s puzzle.

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Fragmentation and Singular Propositions

10.1093/oso/9780198850670.003.0008 ◽

2021 ◽

pp. 183-198

Author(s):

Robert Stalnaker

Keyword(s):

Possible Worlds ◽

Propositional Attitudes ◽

Phenomenal Experience ◽

A Posteriori ◽

Possible World ◽

Intentional States ◽

Singular Propositions ◽

Necessary A Posteriori

Two puzzles are described: a problem about necessary a posteriori truths and a problem about propositional attitudes with singular propositions as their contents. Two strategies for solving them are compared. The first is the diagonalization strategy, which distinguishes possible worlds that are compatible with what is actually expressed by a given sentential clause from possible worlds that are compatible with what would be expressed by the clause if that possible world were actual. The second strategy is the fragmentation strategy, which represents the intentional states described by sentential clauses as separate nonintegrated representational states. It is argued that these are complementary, not competing, strategies. Both play a role in the solutions to the problems. In conclusion, it is suggested that these strategies can also help to clarify a number of further problems—about self-locating attitudes, about the nature of computation, and about knowledge of phenomenal experience.

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The necessary a posteriori: A response to Tich�

Philosophical Studies ◽

10.1007/bf00355445 ◽

1984 ◽

Vol 45 (3) ◽

pp. 379-397

Author(s):

Curtis Brown

Keyword(s):

A Posteriori ◽

Necessary A Posteriori

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De Sousa On Kripke And Theoretical Identities

Canadian Journal of Philosophy ◽

10.1080/00455091.1975.10716102 ◽

1975 ◽

Vol 5 (1) ◽

pp. 137-141 ◽

Cited By ~ 1

Author(s):

R. M. Yoshida

Keyword(s):

Possible Worlds ◽

The Other ◽

Saul Kripke ◽

A Posteriori ◽

Rigid Designator ◽

Rigid Designators ◽

Necessary A Posteriori ◽

Other Hand ◽

Identity Statement ◽

Naming And Necessity

In the by now well known talks he gave at Princeton, Saul Kripke claimed that “[t]heoretical identities … are generally identities involving two rigid designators and therefore are examples of the necessary a posteriori.” (Published as “Naming and Necessity,” in G. Harmon and D. Davidson, eds., Semantics of Natural Language (Dordrecht, 1972) 253-355; (hereafter referred to as “NN”; this quote p. 331.) A rigid designator is an expression that designates the same object in all possible worlds when it is used. So Kripke is claiming that ‘Water is H20’ and ‘Heat is the motion of molecules’ are generally identities involving expressions like ‘water’ and ‘the motion of molecules’ which designate the same objects in all possible worlds. If the identity statement is true, both sides designate the same object rigidly, i.e., in all possible worlds, and therefore the statement is necessarily true. On the other hand, whether it is true is determined ultimately by appeal to experience. It follows that if true, the identity is necessary a posteriori.

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Plantinga's Necessary A Posteriori Truths

Canadian Journal of Philosophy ◽

10.1080/00455091.1978.10717054 ◽

1978 ◽

Vol 8 (2) ◽

pp. 323-327

Author(s):

Gregory W. Fitch

Keyword(s):

Actual World ◽

Possible Worlds ◽

A Priori ◽

The Other ◽

Traditional View ◽

Alvin Plantinga ◽

A Posteriori ◽

Necessary A Posteriori ◽

Necessary Truths

Alvin Plantinga has recently argued that there are certain propositions which are necessary but known only a posteriori. If Plantinga is correct then he has shown that the traditional view that all necessary truths are knowable a priori is false. Plantinga's examples deserve special attention because they differ in important respects from other proposed examples of necessary a posteriori truths. His examples depend on a certain conception of possible worlds and in particular on his conception of the actual world. It will be argued that these examples of necessary a posteriori propositions can be understood in two different ways. According to one way of understanding Plantinga, the propositions turn out to be contingent a posteriori truths, and according to the other way they turn out to be necessary a priori truths. The plausibility of Plantinga's position is due to a confusion between the two possible interpretations.

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Naming and necessity in a two-dimensional semantic framework

KÜLÖNBSÉG ◽

10.14232/kulonbseg.2010.10.1.5 ◽

2012 ◽

Vol 10 (1) ◽

Author(s):

János Kovács

Keyword(s):

Philosophy Of Language ◽

Causal Model ◽

A Priori ◽

Proper Names ◽

Two Dimensional ◽

A Posteriori ◽

Semantic Framework ◽

Contingent A Priori ◽

Necessary A Posteriori ◽

Naming And Necessity

This paper surveys the relevance of Kripke’s semantics of proper names. In his Naming and Necessity Kripke takes issue with Frege’s and Russell’s descriptive semantics of proper names. He proposes a new model called the causal model of proper names. Kripke’s model of the philosophy of language have challenged the relation of the metaphysical concepts necessity/contingency and the epistemological concepts apriority/a posteriority, respectively. Since Kant it has been accepted that all a priori truth is necessary, while all a posteriori truth is contingent. Kripke’s book has changed these tenets and nowadays it is accepted that the four concepts are independent of each other and that the complex concepts generated with them have instance. This paper investigates Kripke’s arguments on necessity and apriority in a two-dimensional semantic framework. The paper argues that the two-dimensional model is in harmony with Kripke’s model although Soames has been claiming the opposite in several publications. The paper claims that Soames’ theory of direct reference is unable to account for necessary a posteriori and contingent a priori statements.

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