The Problem With Modal Conceivability Arguments

2019 ◽  
Vol 50 (1) ◽  
pp. 135-146
Author(s):  
Shuyi Feng
Keyword(s):  
Conceivability Arguments

The Medieval Origins of Conceivability Arguments

2011 ◽  
Vol 42 (5) ◽  
pp. 617-641 ◽  
Author(s):  
Stephen Boulter
Keyword(s):  
Conceivability Arguments

Conceivability arguments for haecceitism

Synthese ◽  
2016 ◽  
Vol 194 (10) ◽  
pp. 4171-4190 ◽  
Author(s):  
Sam Cowling
Keyword(s):  
Conceivability Arguments

Conceivability Arguments, Properties, and Powers: A New Defense of Dispositionalism

2018 ◽  
Vol 4 (3) ◽  
pp. 352-370
Author(s):  
ROBERT SCHROER
Keyword(s):  
General Strategy ◽  
Phenomenal Concepts ◽  
Conceivability Arguments

ABSTRACTDispositionalists maintain that the essence of a property is determined by the powers it confers upon its bearers and, as a result, that there is a necessary connection between properties and their powers. Contingentists, in contrast, maintain that the connection is contingent. The ability to conceive of a property as failing to confer some of its powers is often cited as an objection against dispositionalism. The standard dispositionalist response to this objection is to redescribe the imagined scenario so that it no longer serves as a threat. Using the literature on phenomenal concepts as inspiration, I develop a new defense of dispositionalism that echoes Brian Loar's (1990) response to conceivability arguments against physicalism. Not only can Loar's general strategy be usefully applied to this new context, there is a sense in which that strategy works better here than it does in the original context in which Loar deployed it.

Hume’s Conceivability Arguments Reconsidered

Axiomathes ◽  
2019 ◽  
Vol 29 (5) ◽  
pp. 541-559
Author(s):  
Bo Chen ◽  
Jingxian Liu
Keyword(s):  
Conceivability Arguments

scholarly journals Consciousness regained? Philosophical arguments for and against reductive physicalism

2012 ◽  
Vol 14 (1) ◽  
pp. 55-63
Keyword(s):  
Body Problem ◽  
Explanatory Gap ◽  
Multiple Realizability ◽  
Ongoing Research ◽  
Reductive Physicalism ◽  
Mind Body Problem ◽  
Conceivability Arguments ◽  
The Mind ◽  
The Explanatory Gap ◽  
Methodological Reflection

This paper is an overview of recent discussions concerning the mind-body problem, which is being addressed at the interface between philosophy and neuroscience. It focuses on phenomenal features of consciousness or "qualia," which are distinguished from various related issues. Then follows a discussion of various influential skeptical arguments that question the possibility of reductive explanations of qualia in physicalist terms: knowledge arguments, conceivability arguments, the argument of multiple realizability, and the explanatory gap argument. None of the arguments is found to be very convincing. It does not necessarily follow that reductive physicalism is the only option, but it is defensible. However, constant conceptual and methodological reflection is required, alongside ongoing research, to keep such a view free from dogmatism and naivety.

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