Knowing What an Experience Is Like and the Reductive Theory of Knowledge‐ wh

2019 ◽  
Vol 61 (3) ◽  
pp. 252-275
Author(s):  
Kevin Lynch
Keyword(s):  
Theory Of Knowledge ◽  
Reductive Theory

50 Years of Gettier: A New Direction in Religious Epistemology?

2015 ◽  
Vol 3 ◽  
pp. 147-171 ◽  
Author(s):  
Ian Michael Church
Keyword(s):  
Theory Of Knowledge ◽  
Religious Epistemology ◽  
Gettier Problem ◽  
The Future ◽  
Reductive Theory ◽  
The Gettier Problem

In this paper, I lend credence to the move toward non-reductive religious epistemology by highlighting the systematic failings of Alvin Plantinga’s seminal, religious epistemology when it comes to surmounting the Gettier Problem.  Taking Plantinga’s account as archetypal, I argue that we have systematic reasons to believe that no reductive theory of knowledge (religious or otherwise) can viably surmount the Gettier Problem, that the future of religious epistemology lies in non-reductive models of knowledge. 

When Is True Belief Knowledge?

2012 ◽  
Author(s):  
Richard Foley
Keyword(s):  
True Belief ◽  
Theory Of Knowledge ◽  
Central Problem ◽  
Significant Aspect ◽  
Coming To Know ◽  
Contemporary Epistemology ◽  
What Matters

A woman glances at a broken clock and comes to believe it is a quarter past seven. Yet, despite the broken clock, it really does happen to be a quarter past seven. Her belief is true, but it isn't knowledge. This is a classic illustration of a central problem in epistemology: determining what knowledge requires in addition to true belief. This book finds a new solution to the problem in the observation that whenever someone has a true belief but not knowledge, there is some significant aspect of the situation about which she lacks true beliefs—something important that she doesn't quite “get.” This may seem a modest point but, as the book shows, it has the potential to reorient the theory of knowledge. Whether a true belief counts as knowledge depends on the importance of the information one does or doesn't have. This means that questions of knowledge cannot be separated from questions about human concerns and values. It also means that, contrary to what is often thought, there is no privileged way of coming to know. Knowledge is a mutt. Proper pedigree is not required. What matters is that one doesn't lack important nearby information. Challenging some of the central assumptions of contemporary epistemology, this is an original and important account of knowledge.

Geocartographic thinking in modern science

2020 ◽  
Vol 961 (7) ◽  
pp. 27-36
Author(s):  
A.K. Cherkashin
Keyword(s):  
Differential Geometry ◽  
Fiber Bundle ◽  
Modern Science ◽  
The State ◽  
Theory Of Knowledge ◽  
Knowledge Map ◽  
Knowledge Based ◽  
Geographical Environment ◽  
New Knowledge ◽  
Thematic Layer

The purpose of the study is to show how the features of geocartographic way of thinking are manifested in the meta-theory of knowledge based on mathematical formalisms. General cartographic concepts and regularities are considered in the view of metatheoretic analysis using cognitive procedures of fiber bundle from differential geometry. On levels of metainformation generalization, the geocartographic metatheoretic approach to the study of reality is higher than the system-theoretical one. It regulates the type of equations, models, and methods of each intertheory expressed in its own system terms. There is a balance between the state of any system and its geographical environment; therefore the observed phenomena are only explained theoretically in a metatheoretic projection on the corresponding system-thematic layer of the knowledge map. Metatheoretic research enables passing from the systematization of already known patterns to the formation of new knowledge through the scientific stratification of reality. General methods of metatheoretic analysis are mathematically distinguished

Knowledge, Benign Falsehoods, and the Gettier Problem

2017 ◽  
Author(s):  
Claudio de Almeida
Keyword(s):  
Theory Of Knowledge ◽  
False Beliefs ◽  
Gettier Problem ◽  
Inferential Knowledge ◽  
The Gettier Problem

Contrary to millennial thought, inferential knowledge does seem to arise in certain cases of reasoning to which false premises are evidentially essential. The phenomenon refutes all of the well-known epistemologies that account for inferential knowledge. I offer an explanation of the phenomenon based on a fairly conservative revision to the defeasibility theory of knowledge, and explain why Peter Klein’s proposed solution fails. The explanation put forward here aims at giving us these two highly desirable results: (a) something we have never had and may not have noticed we needed, a defeasibility theory that is compatible with epistemological fallibilism, and, (b) within this revised, fallibilistic version of the defeasibility theory, an explanation of the benign/malignant distinction for false beliefs that completes the defeasibilist resolution of the Gettier Problem.

Belief

2018 ◽  
Author(s):  
Alex Byrne
Keyword(s):  
Theory Of Knowledge ◽  
Satisfactory Explanation

This chapter attempts to solve the puzzle of transparency for belief. The notion of an epistemic rule is introduced, and the proposed solution is that knowledge of one’s beliefs may be (and typically is) obtained by following the epistemic rule: BEL If p, believe that you believe that p. This is an inferential theory of knowledge of what we believe; it can be extended to an inferential theory of knowledge of what we know. The theory is also economical and detectivist, and is argued to give a satisfactory explanation of both privileged and peculiar access. The chapter concludes by examining a variety of objections.

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