Collective harm and the inefficacy problem

This chapter sets out the normative foundations on which the book is based. It starts by defending the case for the ‘pervasiveness’ of morality: no social sphere is ‘beyond’ morality, even if there is some degree of institutional ‘division of labour’. Next, it states and explains the moral norms this study is based on: the norm to respect all individuals as moral equals, and norms about the avoidance of individual harm, and about avoiding contributing to collective harm. These norms lie within an ‘overlapping consensus’ of different moral theories and worldviews. In pluralist societies, we should focus on such a consensus—even if it may sometimes be hard to delineate—when reflecting on the moral dimensions of organizations.

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Supernumerary Pregnancy, Collective Harm, and Two Forms of the Nonidentity Problem

The Journal of Law Medicine & Ethics ◽

10.1111/j.1748-720x.2006.00098.x ◽

2006 ◽

Vol 34 (4) ◽

pp. 776-792 ◽

Cited By ~ 4

Author(s):

M. A. Roberts

Keyword(s):

Collective Harm

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Antimicrobial Footprints, Fairness, and Collective Harm

Ethics and Drug Resistance: Collective Responsibility for Global Public Health - Public Health Ethics Analysis ◽

10.1007/978-3-030-27874-8_23 ◽

2020 ◽

pp. 377-387

Author(s):

Anne Schwenkenbecher

Keyword(s):

Antimicrobial Resistance ◽

Collective Action ◽

Carbon Footprint ◽

Moral Obligation ◽

Real Difference ◽

Collective Action Problem ◽

Individual Behaviour ◽

Individual Contributions ◽

Collective Harm ◽

Discernible Difference

Abstract This chapter explores the question of whether or not individual agents are under a moral obligation to reduce their ‘antimicrobial footprint’. An agent’s antimicrobial footprint measures the extent to which her actions are causally linked to the use of antibiotics. As such, it is not necessarily a measure of her contribution to antimicrobial resistance. Talking about people’s antimicrobial footprint in a way we talk about our carbon footprint may be helpful for drawing attention to the global effects of individual behaviour and for highlighting that our choices can collectively make a real difference. But can we be morally obligated to make a contribution to resolving a collective action problem when our individual contributions by themselves make no discernible difference? I will focus on two lines of argument in favour of such obligations: whether a failure to reduce one’s antimicrobial footprint is unfair and whether it constitutes wrongdoing because it is harmful. I conclude by suggesting that the argument from collective harm is ultimately more successful.

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