Property Identity

2016 ◽  
Vol 11 (12) ◽  
pp. 829-840
Author(s):  
Paul Audi
Keyword(s):  
The Monist ◽  
2011 ◽  
Vol 94 (1) ◽  
pp. 3-18 ◽  
Author(s):  
Sydney Shoemaker ◽  
Keyword(s):  

Author(s):  
Theodore Sider

According to nomic (or causal, or dispositional) essentialists, the identity of a property is tied up with its nomic role, the role it plays in the laws of nature. Modally speaking this is straightforward: a property could not have obeyed different laws. But postmodally it is unclear what it means, since it is hard to see how to state the fundamental facts without mentioning particular properties. Various ideas are considered and criticized, such as that facts about property instantiations, or property existence, or property identity, are grounded in facts about laws; and that the laws are essential to properties. The latter, it is argued, is insufficiently metaphysically specific to count as an improvement on the modal formulation.


Analysis ◽  
1982 ◽  
Vol 42 (1) ◽  
pp. 52-55 ◽  
Author(s):  
M. Tye
Keyword(s):  

Author(s):  
Bart Streumer

This chapter gives a first version of the reduction argument against non-reductive realism. It explains the criterion of property identity that this argument appeals to, and argues that this criterion is correct. The chapter then argues that non-reductive realists cannot resist the reduction argument by appealing to Leibniz’s law, by claiming that irreducibly normative properties are indispensable to deliberation, or by rejecting the claim about supervenience that the argument appeals to. The chapter ends by discussing several objections to the descriptive predicate that this version of the reduction argument makes use of. It concludes that these objections fail to undermine the argument.


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