Doing No Harm? Donor Policies and Power Asymmetry in Israeli/Palestinian Peacebuilding

2016 ◽  
Vol 41 (3) ◽  
pp. 386-397 ◽  
Author(s):  
Michelle I. Gawerc ◽  
Ned Lazarus
Keyword(s):  
Power Asymmetry ◽  
Donor Policies

SUPPLIER-RETAILER POWER ASYMMETRY; AN AUSTRALIAN PERSPECTIVE

2014 ◽  
Author(s):  
Catherine Sutton-Brady ◽  
◽  
Patty Kamvounias ◽  
Tom Taylor
Keyword(s):  
Power Asymmetry

Conclusion

2018 ◽  
Author(s):  
Javier Corrales
Keyword(s):  
Institutional Change ◽  
Executive Branch ◽  
Potential Threat ◽  
Power Asymmetry ◽  
Large Power ◽  
Power Differential ◽  
Constitution Making

The chapter presents a summary of main findings and discusses their implications. The book’s main finding is that extreme power asymmetry on behalf of the Incumbent creates the conditions for institutional change that empowers mostly the executive branch. A large power differential between the Incumbent and the Opposition encourages the Incumbent to seize the advantage to initiate bold, self-serving institutional change, sometimes even a constitutional overhaul. If the latter gets underway, and power asymmetry stays pro-Incumbent, chances are the new constitution will expand the powers of the Executive branch. This outcome, in turn, can spread discontent across Opposition forces and sometimes encourage the Incumbent to govern more unilaterally. This presents a potential threat to democracy. The chapter concludes by discussing the implications of this finding for different literatures: democratization, constitution-making, presidential powers, and government-Opposition relations.

The Argument

2018 ◽  
Author(s):  
Javier Corrales
Keyword(s):  
Bargaining Theory ◽  
Main Argument ◽  
Power Asymmetry ◽  
Regime Formation ◽  
Power Asymmetries

Chapter 2 lays out the book’s main argument on the importance of power asymmetry. It draws from three strands in the literature. From the literature on democratization, this chapter borrows the notion of constitutions as pact-making. From bargaining theory is borrowed the notion of self-dealing: Incumbents will seek to advance the powers of the office that they hold. And from the literature on elite theories of regime formation, the chapter develops the argument that power asymmetries among elite actors are the fundamental drivers of balanced constitutions. This book also seeks to explain the origins of an important institution: constitutions. It takes seriously the insight from institutionalists that institutions emerge from actors’ de facto power and bargaining outcomes. Yet, this book does not assume that actors’ preferences are exogenous, or exclusively ideological, and partisan; rather, those who negotiate a constitution have preferences that depend on whether they are Incumbents or Opposition forces, often regardless of their ideologies and partisan orientation.

Partisanship and Autocratization: Polarization, Power Asymmetry, and Partisan Social Identities in Turkey

2020 ◽  
Vol 54 (2) ◽  
pp. 245-279 ◽  
Author(s):  
Melis G. Laebens ◽  
Aykut Öztürk
Keyword(s):  
Survey Data ◽  
Political Action ◽  
Political Attitudes ◽  
Well Being ◽  
Social Identities ◽  
The Political ◽  
Power Asymmetry ◽  
Partisan Identity ◽  
Political Divide ◽  
Ruling Party

Although theories of partisanship were developed for the democratic context, partisanship can be important in electoral autocracies as well. We use survey data to analyze partisanship in an electoral autocracy, Turkey, and find that partisanship is pervasive, strong, and consequential. Using the Partisan Identity Scale to measure partisanship, we show that, like in democracies, partisanship strength is associated with political attitudes and action. Unlike in democracies, however, the ruling party’s superior ability to mobilize supporters through clientelistic linkages makes the association between partisanship and political action weaker for ruling party partisans. We find that partisan identities are tightly connected to the perception that other parties may threaten one’s well-being, and that such fears are widespread on both sides of the political divide. We interpret our findings in light of the autocratization process Turkey went through. Our contribution highlights the potential of integrating regime dynamics in studies of partisanship.

More than carrots and sticks: Economic statecraft and coercion in China–Taiwan relations from 2000 to 2019

Politics ◽  
2021 ◽  
pp. 026339572096265
Author(s):  
Christina Lai
Keyword(s):  
Public Awareness ◽  
Theoretical Development ◽  
Future Research ◽  
Asian Countries ◽  
Power Asymmetry ◽  
Economic Statecraft ◽  
Trading Partners ◽  
Economic Coercion ◽  
Chinese Group ◽  
Level Analysis

China has become one of the most important trading partners for many Asian countries, and Taiwan is at the forefront of China’s economic coercion. It also leads to the following empirical puzzle: When can Beijing’s economic sanctions and incentives achieve their desired outcomes? Why and how do they often fail? Given the power asymmetry between China and Taiwan, how Taiwan resists China’s coercive measures contributes significantly to theoretical development in international relations. Taiwan has responded to Chinese economic pressure by diversifying its trade with and investment in Southeast Asian and South Asian countries to lessen dependence on China. It also securitizes China–Taiwan relations by raising public awareness about over-reliance on China’s market. Taiwan is not only a target of China’s coercion, but an active actor in its own right as well. This article re-evaluates the literature on East Asian politics and economic statecraft. First, it highlights the salience of power asymmetry to the field of economic statecraft. Second, it offers a three-level analysis of when and how China exercised economic coercion and incentives towards Taiwan. Third, it examines how Taiwan addressed Beijing’s sanctions on Chinese group tourists starting in 2016. The final section discusses some conclusions that can be drawn and suggests some avenues for future research.

From Ebola to COVID-19: what explains institutionalized manias and the ultimate preference for non-optimal solutions in global health governance?

2021 ◽  
Vol ahead-of-print (ahead-of-print) ◽  
Author(s):  
Frederick Ahen
Keyword(s):  
Global Health ◽  
Health Inequalities ◽  
Developing Economies ◽  
Global Health Governance ◽  
Strategic Choices ◽  
Health Governance ◽  
Power Asymmetry ◽  
Content Type ◽  
Historical Perspectives ◽  
Multidisciplinary Study

Purpose The purpose of this paper is to investigate how “manias” in global health governance lead to health inequalities even before, during and in the aftermath of acute health crises such as the COVID-19 pandemic. “Manias” as used here refer to obsessive ir/rational behaviors, misguided policy/strategic choices and the exercise of power that benefit the major global health actors at the expense of stakeholders. Design/methodology/approach From post-colonial and historical perspectives, this study delineates how the major global health actors influence outcomes in global health governance and international business when they interact at the national–global level using an illustration from an emerging economy. Findings Power asymmetry in global health governance is constructed around the centralization of economic influence, medico-techno-scientific innovation and the geopolitical hegemony of a conglomerate of super-rich/powerful actors. They cluster these powers and resources in the core region (industrialized economies) and use them to influence the periphery (developing economies) through international NGOs, hybrid organizations, MNCs and multilateral/bilateral agreements. The power of actors to maintain manias lies in not only how they influence the periphery but also the consequences of the periphery’s “passivity” and “voluntary” renunciation of sovereignty in medical innovations and global health policies/politics. Social implications As a quintessential feature of manias, power asymmetry makes it harder for weaker actors to actually change the institutional conditions that produce structural inequalities in global health. Originality/value This timely and multidisciplinary study calls for a novel architecture of global health governance. Thus, democratizing global health governance with sufficiently foresighted investments that prioritize equitable access by and the inclusiveness of vulnerable stakeholders will help dismantle institutionalized manias while decreasing health inequalities.

Sign in / Sign up

Export Citation Format

Share Document