The Reasonable and the Relevant: Legal Standards of Proof

2019 ◽  
Vol 47 (3) ◽  
pp. 288-318 ◽  
Author(s):  
Georgi Gardiner
Keyword(s):  
Legal Standards ◽  
Standards Of Proof

scholarly journals Error Costs, Legal Standards of Proof, and Statistical Significance

2017 ◽  
Vol 25 (1) ◽  
pp. 1-57 ◽  
Author(s):  
Michelle M. Burtis ◽  
Jonah B. Gelbach ◽  
Bruce H. Kobayashi
Keyword(s):  
Statistical Significance ◽  
Legal Standards ◽  
Standards Of Proof ◽  
Error Costs

PUENTES ENTRE LOS HECHOS Y EL DERECHO APLICABLE EN LA VERIFICACIÓN PROBATORIA: ESTANDAR Y VALORACIÓN DE LA PRUEBA

2021 ◽  
Vol 29 (116) ◽  
pp. 1-25
Author(s):  
Álvaro Pérez Ragone
Keyword(s):  
Decision Makers ◽  
Legal Argumentation ◽  
Criminal Process ◽  
Standard Of Proof ◽  
Legal Standards ◽  
Standards Of Proof ◽  
The Subject ◽  
Per Se ◽  
Basic Minimum ◽  
Evidentiary Standard

The legal argumentation on controversial facts deals with the evidence that allows reaching a precise verdict on the facts. The evidence is necessary to support the factual assertions made by the parties and the conclusions of fact made by the decision makers. But the test per se does not yield verdicts. The evidence must be evaluated and whoever decides must consider whether or not it satisfies a basic minimum to consider a fact proven, if it meets a standard of proof. Much work has been done on the subject of legal standards of proof. Legal argumentation theorists, evidence scholars, civil and criminal process scholars, among others, have extensively addressed this issue. Some of them have made an analytical effort to clarify the idea of an evidentiary standard; others have done descriptive work to understand how the standards actually work; Others have done a kind of normative work in the hope of suggesting better or at least better defined standards; and the best contributions to the debate do more than one of these things at the same time.

German Flooding of the Pontine Marshes in World War II: Biological Warfare Or Total War Tactic?

2010 ◽  
Vol 29 (1) ◽  
pp. 2-23 ◽  
Author(s):  
Erhard Geissler ◽  
Jeanne Guillemin
Keyword(s):  
World War Ii ◽  
State Level ◽  
Historical Record ◽  
Biological Weapons ◽  
Biological Warfare ◽  
Land Mines ◽  
Total War ◽  
Legal Standards ◽  
Archival Documents ◽  
Standards Of Proof

The German army's 1943 flooding of the Pontine Marshes south of Rome, which later caused a sharp rise in malaria cases among Italian civilians, has recently been described by historian Frank Snowden as a unique instance of biological warfare and bioterrorism in the European theater of war and, consequently, as a violation of the 1925 Geneva Protocol prohibiting chemical and biological warfare. We argue that archival documents fail to support this allegation, on several counts. As a matter of historical record, Hitler prohibited German biological weapons (BW) development and consistently adhered to the Geneva Protocol. Rather than biological warfare against civilians, the Wehrmacht used flooding, land mines, and the destruction of vital infrastructure to obstruct the Allied advance. To protect its own troops in the area, the German army sought to contain the increased mosquito breeding likely to be caused by the flooding. Italians returning to the Pontine Marshes after the German retreat in 1944 suffered malaria as a result of environmental destruction, which was banned by the 1899 and 1907 Hague Conventions and by subsequent treaties. In contrast, a state's violation of the Geneva Protocol, whether past or present, involves the use of germ weapons and, by inference, a state-level capability. Any allegation of such a serious violation demands credible evidence that meets high scientific and legal standards of proof.

Knowledge and persons

2018 ◽  
Author(s):  
Sarah Moss
Keyword(s):  
Moral Philosophy ◽  
Statistical Evidence ◽  
Reasonable Doubt ◽  
Ordinary Objects ◽  
Legal Standards ◽  
Administrative Assistant ◽  
Probabilistic Knowledge ◽  
Standards Of Proof ◽  
Legal Proof

This chapter applies probabilistic knowledge to problems in legal and moral philosophy. It is argued that legal standards of proof require factfinders to know probabilistic contents. For instance, proof by a preponderance of the evidence requires knowledge that the defendant is at least .5 likely to be liable, whereas proof of guilt beyond a reasonable doubt requires knowledge of a significantly stronger content. The fact that legal proof requires knowledge explains why merely statistical evidence is insufficient to license a legal verdict of liability or guilt. In addition to explaining the limited value of statistical evidence, probabilistic knowledge is useful in spelling out norms violated by acts of racial and other profiling. It can be epistemically wrong to infer from statistics that a woman is probably an administrative assistant, for instance, even when inferring facts about ordinary objects from similar statistics is perfectly okay.

Legal Epistemology

Philosophy ◽  
2019 ◽  
Author(s):  
Georgi Gardiner
Keyword(s):  
Narrative Structure ◽  
Reasonable Doubt ◽  
Epistemic Virtue ◽  
Legal Practice ◽  
Legal Standards ◽  
Reasonable Person Standard ◽  
Character Evidence ◽  
Standards Of Proof ◽  
Practical Factors ◽  
Legal Epistemology

Legal practice is up to its neck in epistemology. Legal practice involves proof, evidence, doubt, testimony, arguments, witnesses, experts, and so on. The epistemology of legal practice, often referred to as legal epistemology, examines epistemological questions raised by legal practice. It can also apply legal insights to illuminating perennial epistemological problems. Legal epistemology investigates whether standards of proof, such as “beyond reasonable doubt” or “preponderance of evidence,” are best understood as credences, statistical likelihoods, or as qualitative standards. It asks what, if anything, legitimates these standards and in what ways legal standards of proof should be sensitive to practical factors. Legal epistemology examines when and why evidence has a probative value; that is, it investigates how evidence makes a litigated claim more likely. It illuminates what reasons—moral, political, economic, practical, epistemic—justify excluding probative evidence. It questions whether particular kinds of evidence are apt to mislead factfinders. Perhaps some kinds of character evidence, for example, are prejudicial. Legal epistemology asks whether particular aspects of evidence law contribute to epistemic injustice, including hermeneutical injustice, and illuminates sources of legal injustice. It investigates the normativity of profiling. Legal epistemology questions the epistemic and legal values of epistemic properties such as safety, sensitivity, reliability, coherence, intelligibility, knowledge, justification, explanation, narrative structure, epistemic virtue, and truth. Legal epistemology asks whether and how juries and judges can form collective beliefs; it examines features of effective deliberation and judgment aggregation, and studies the effect of disagreement and dissent on legal judgments. Legal phenomena such as expert testimony raise distinctive epistemological questions, such as how to adjudicate and manage expertise in the courtroom. Legal epistemology studies the legal posit of reasonableness, which arises in the reasonable person standard, reasonable doubt standard, and various other areas of legal practice. Legal epistemology can also illuminate the role of knowledge and ignorance in culpability: How should we understand the epistemic criteria for recklessness and negligence, for example, and what precisely is mens rea? Law varies by jurisdiction; different legal systems create and resolve epistemological challenges in different ways. This is evident in topics such as the admissibility of character evidence or hearsay evidence, the permissibility of inferences from silence, or the exclusion of improperly obtained evidence. Legal epistemology is deeply interdisciplinary. In addition to law and philosophy, it involves research in psychology, forensic science, sociology, anthropology, criminology, history, theology, politics, economics (particularly behavioral economics), artificial intelligence, computing, and statistics.

Best Evidence: The Role of Information in Domestic Judicial Enforcement of International Human Rights Agreements

2013 ◽  
Vol 67 (3) ◽  
pp. 469-503 ◽  
Author(s):  
Yonatan Lupu
Keyword(s):  
Human Rights ◽  
Civil Rights ◽  
Production Costs ◽  
Personal Integrity ◽  
International Human Rights ◽  
Legal Standards ◽  
Domestic Courts ◽  
Standards Of Proof ◽  
International Human ◽  
Personal Integrity Rights

AbstractIndependent domestic courts play important roles in enforcing international human rights agreements, thereby providing a mechanism by which international institutions can affect government policy. Yet this enforcement power is constrained not only by independence but also by the courts' ability to overcome information problems. Domestic courts' enforcement power depends on information in two ways: the costs of producing legally admissible evidence of abuses and the applicable legal standards of proof. When countries ratify international agreements, judicial enforcement can improve government practices when evidence-production costs and standards of proof are low, but not otherwise. With respect to personal integrity rights violations, evidence is especially difficult to obtain, and standards of proof are high, meaning that the courts will not be able to constrain government practices. By contrast, evidence-production costs and standards of proof are lower for other civil rights violations, so courts will be able to prosecute offenders and bring governments into line with their international commitments. Consistent with this theory, I find that commitments to the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR) have significantly improved governments' respect for the freedoms of speech, association, assembly, and religion. With respect to personal integrity rights, however, I find that commitments to the ICCPR have not improved government practices.

scholarly journals Precautionary principle, its interpretation and application by the Indian judiciary: ‘When I use a word it means just what I choose it to mean-neither more nor less’ Humpty Dumpty

2019 ◽  
Vol 21 (4) ◽  
pp. 292-308
Author(s):  
Gitanjali Nain Gill
Keyword(s):  
Precautionary Principle ◽  
Environmental Governance ◽  
Empirical Studies ◽  
Scientific Uncertainty ◽  
The Precautionary Principle ◽  
Legal Standards ◽  
Scientific Certainty ◽  
Legal Responses ◽  
Standards Of Proof ◽  
Humpty Dumpty

The precautionary principle is accepted in India as a fundamental tool to promote sustainable development and is employed within Indian environmental governance to promote better health and environmental decisions. Scientific uncertainty is at the core of the precautionary principle. The application of the precautionary principle is an open-ended issue. This article seeks to add to the limited empirical studies on the understanding, appreciation and application of the precautionary principle by key environmental actors, as differing legal responses and decisions may be irreversible before conclusive scientific knowledge and evidence become available. Building on researcher’s unique Indian data, and drawing on the theoretical insights developed by Charles Weiss, an explanatory environmental framework addresses the uncertainty of science by assembling a scale of legal standards arranged in a hierarchy of levels of increasing certainty familiar to lawyers and the judiciary. Reported Indian cases from the Supreme Court and the National Green Tribunal are selected to illustrate levels of scientific certainty or uncertainty and corresponding legal standards of proof constituting acceptable bases for legal decisions in practical context especially the precautionary principle. The article suggests India should develop a framework of guidelines that would provide an effective roadmap for decision-makers applying the precautionary principle.

Sign in / Sign up

Export Citation Format

Share Document