Street‐level Bureaucrats and Policy Entrepreneurship: When Implementers Challenge Policy Design

2021 ◽  
Author(s):  
Nissim Cohen ◽  
Neomi Frisch Aviram
Keyword(s):  
Policy Design ◽  
Policy Entrepreneurship ◽  
Street Level ◽  
Street Level Bureaucrats

The Role of Interorganizational Competition in Motivating Street-Level Bureaucrats to Adopt Policy Entrepreneurship Strategies: The Case of Israeli Rabbis in Government Hospitals

2020 ◽  
pp. 027507402098269
Author(s):  
Niva Golan-Nadir
Keyword(s):  
Public Management ◽  
New Public Management ◽  
Policy Entrepreneurship ◽  
Street Level ◽  
New Public ◽  
Government Hospitals ◽  
Street Level Bureaucrats ◽  
Depth Interviews ◽  
Do So

What is the role of interorganizational competition in motivating street-level bureaucrats to adopt policy entrepreneurship strategies? What are their main goals in adopting such strategies? We argue that in the wake of New Public Management, interorganizational competition encourages street-level bureaucrats to adopt policy entrepreneurship strategies. We further suggest that three competition-oriented elements motivate entrepreneurial initiatives at the street level: (a) personal, (b) organizational (interorganizational and intraorganizational), and (c) cultural demographic. In addition, we argue that the goal of street-level bureaucrats as policy entrepreneurs is to influence public policy results for their own benefit. They do so because they and their organizations are rewarded financially as their clients’ satisfaction with the services provided increases. Using in-depth interviews, online questionnaires, and textual analysis, we test these claims by analyzing the case of Israeli rabbis in government hospitals. We demonstrate how their goal in entrepreneurship is mainly to attract patients to their organization.

Policy Refiners and Street-Level Lesson Learners

2018 ◽  
Author(s):  
Alastair Stark
Keyword(s):  
Policy Evaluation ◽  
Central Government ◽  
Street Level ◽  
Street Level Bureaucrats ◽  
Central Level ◽  
Government Level ◽  
Inquiry Lesson

This chapter explores agents who are influential in terms of inquiry lesson-learning but have not been examined before in inquiry literature. The key argument is that two types of agent—policy refiners and street-level bureaucrats—are important when it comes to the effectiveness of post-crisis lesson-learning. As they travel down from the central government level, street-level actors champion, reinterpret, and reject inquiry lessons, often because those lessons do not consider local capacities. Policy refiners, however, operate at the central level in the form of taskforces, implementation reviews, and policy evaluation processes. These refiners examine potentially problematic inquiry lessons in greater detail in order to determine whether and how they should be implemented. In doing so, these ‘mini-inquiries’ can reformulate or even abandon inquiry recommendations.

Labour Input Logic of Street-Level Bureaucrats: Evidence from Chinese Market Supervision Commission

2021 ◽  
pp. 147892992110215
Author(s):  
Chunna Li ◽  
Jun Yang
Keyword(s):  
Organizational Climate ◽  
Time Allocation ◽  
Public Management ◽  
New Public Management ◽  
Strong Impact ◽  
Chinese Market ◽  
Frontline Staff ◽  
Street Level ◽  
Labour Input ◽  
Street Level Bureaucrats

The theory of street-level bureaucracy and its relevant data have proven the expected duties of the frontline staff of local government may be excessive but their time spent working remains quite low. Using data from participatory observations of street-level officials in a Chinese city, this study reveals the logic of this labour input paradox. Organizational climate incentive and promotional incentive jointly influence the time allocation of street-level bureaucrats. The organizational climate incentive reflects the weak incentive characteristic of the maintenance function of labour; promotional incentives have a strong impact on motivation, which is characteristic of the promotional function of labour. These findings reveal the costs of the New Public Management movement in an organization lacking an effective promotion mechanism and a positive organizational climate incentive. This is a snapshot of the dilemma faced by China’s public organization reforms, but it is also a problem other country must solve.

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