scholarly journals Explaining normative reasons

Noûs ◽  
2021 ◽  
Author(s):  
Daniel Fogal ◽  
Olle Risberg
Keyword(s):  
Normative Reasons

Evidence and Its Limits

2018 ◽  
Author(s):  
Clayton Littlejohn
Keyword(s):  
Epistemic Justification ◽  
Normative Reasons ◽  
Justified Belief ◽  
Evidential Support ◽  
Way Of Thinking

On a standard way of thinking about the relationships between evidence, reasons, and epistemic justification, a subject’s evidence consists of her potential reasons for her beliefs, these reasons constitute the normative reasons that bear on whether to believe, and justification is taken to result from relations between a subject’s potential reasons for her beliefs and those beliefs. This chapter argues that this view makes a number of mistakes about the rational roles of reasons and evidence and explores some parallels between practical and theoretical reasons. Just as justified action is unobjectionable action, justified belief is unobjectionable belief. Just as you cannot object to someone deciding to do something simply on the grounds that their reasons for acting didn’t give them strong reason to act, you cannot object to someone believing something simply on the grounds that they didn’t believe for reasons that gave their beliefs strong evidential support.

Parentheticalism and Requirements of Rationality

2018 ◽  
Author(s):  
Tim Henning
Keyword(s):  
Point Of View ◽  
Normative Reasons ◽  
Wide Scope ◽  
Structural Requirements

It is suggested that parentheticalism obviates the need to think of rationality as a distinct normative category, different from the category of support by normative reasons. So-called structural requirements are discussed as a potential obstacle to this proposal. It is shown that a parentheticalist account of the antecedents of rationality conditionals can explain away the impression that there are structural requirements of rationality. This account also solves the bootstrapping problem without introducing wide-scope oughts or the like. A notion of pseudo-detachment is introduced to describe the inferential behavior of the relevant conditionals. It is also explained how parentheticalism can capture the elusive idea of taking the subject’s point of view.

scholarly journals Epistemic Blame and the Normativity of Evidence

Erkenntnis ◽  
2021 ◽  
Author(s):  
Sebastian Schmidt
Keyword(s):  
Conclusive Evidence ◽  
Normative Reasons ◽  
Epistemic Reasons ◽  
Epistemic Norms ◽  
Plausible Assumption ◽  
Reasons For Belief ◽  
Normative Force ◽  
Epistemic Trust ◽  
Conceptual Connection ◽  
Epistemic Blame

AbstractThe normative force of evidence can seem puzzling. It seems that having conclusive evidence for a proposition does not, by itself, make it true that one ought to believe the proposition. But spelling out the condition that evidence must meet in order to provide us with genuine normative reasons for belief seems to lead us into a dilemma: the condition either fails to explain the normative significance of epistemic reasons or it renders the content of epistemic norms practical. The first aim of this paper is to spell out this challenge for the normativity of evidence. I argue that the challenge rests on a plausible assumption about the conceptual connection between normative reasons and blameworthiness. The second aim of the paper is to show how we can meet the challenge by spelling out a concept of epistemic blameworthiness. Drawing on recent accounts of doxastic responsibility and epistemic blame, I suggest that the normativity of evidence is revealed in our practice of suspending epistemic trust in response to impaired epistemic relationships. Recognizing suspension of trust as a form of epistemic blame allows us to make sense of a purely epistemic kind of normativity the existence of which has recently been called into doubt by certain versions of pragmatism and instrumentalism.

scholarly journals IQ and digital inequality: An empirical investigation

2021 ◽  
pp. 146144482110240
Author(s):  
Alexander JAM van Deursen ◽  
Jan AGM van Dijk
Keyword(s):  
Intelligence Quotient ◽  
Online Survey ◽  
Empirical Investigation ◽  
Internet Access ◽  
Normative Reasons ◽  
Cultural Resources ◽  
Digital Inequality ◽  
Cognitive Intelligence ◽  
Positive Effects ◽  
Current Contribution

Cognitive intelligence is rarely discussed in the context of digital inequality for practical and normative reasons: substantial difficulties around measurements and the fact that it cannot (easily) be changed. In the current contribution, cognitive intelligence is studied in relation to resources and appropriation theory which explains digital inequality as a process of four successive phases of Internet access: motivational, material, skills, and usage. For the measurement of cognitive intelligence, we build on considerable efforts devoted to developing alternatives to cumbersome intelligence quotient (IQ) tests of intelligence. We conducted a two-wave online survey in the Netherlands, resulting in a sample of 1733 respondents. The importance of IQ was confirmed with direct positive effects on education, economic, social, and cultural resources, and on Internet attitude and skills. The results reveal several details that can enhance our understanding of the specific mechanisms through which IQ and education operate in digital inequalities.

scholarly journals Normative Reasons and the Agent-Neutral/Relative Dichotomy

Philosophia ◽  
2008 ◽  
Vol 37 (2) ◽  
pp. 227-243 ◽  
Author(s):  
Toni Rønnow-Rasmussen
Keyword(s):  
Normative Reasons

scholarly journals Normative Reasons without (Good) Reasoning

Ethics ◽  
2020 ◽  
Vol 130 (2) ◽  
pp. 208-210
Author(s):  
Artūrs Logins
Keyword(s):  
Normative Reasons ◽  
Good Reasoning

scholarly journals Reasons, Evidence, and Explanations

2018 ◽  
Author(s):  
John Brunero
Keyword(s):  
Normative Reasons ◽  
Normative Concept ◽  
The Many

This chapter assesses analyses of normative reasons that appeal to the concepts of evidence or explanation along with some other normative concept. One influential analysis holds that some fact is a reason for an agent to ϕ if and only if that fact is evidence she ought to ϕ. I argue that, despite the many advantages of this proposal, there are cases of facts which are reasons to ϕ but aren’t evidence one ought to ϕ, and cases of facts which are evidence one ought to ϕ but aren’t reasons to ϕ. Others have analyzed reasons in terms of explanations: perhaps a reason for an agent to ϕ is a fact which explains why she ought to ϕ, or a fact which figures in a “weighing explanation,” or a fact which explains why her ϕ-ing would be good in some respect. There are difficulties facing all three of these proposals.

Fitting Love and Reasons for Loving

2019 ◽  
pp. 116-137
Author(s):  
Christopher Howard
Keyword(s):  
Normative Reasons

The “quality view” claims that what makes love fitting are the lovable qualities of the beloved. Although natural, this view seems to face a battery of embarrassing difficulties. It predicts, for example, that if someone is more lovable than your beloved, then it’s fitting for you to love that person more than, or instead of, your beloved (the problem of trading up); and that if your beloved loses his lovable qualities, it would no longer be fitting to love him (the problem of inconstancy). Chapter 6 offers a new defense of the quality view. It argues that, by supplementing the view with a plausible pluralism about normative reasons for love, quality theorists can easily answer all of the problems that putatively plague them.

Against Internalism-Parity

2019 ◽  
pp. 57-78
Author(s):  
Christopher Cowie
Keyword(s):  
Normative Reasons ◽  
Epistemic Norms ◽  
Moral Judgements ◽  
The Law

It is argued that the first version of the parity premise—internalism-parity—is false. It is false because epistemic judgements are committed to the existence of ‘merely institutional’ reasons. Moral judgements, by contrast, are committed to the existence of genuinely normative reasons. This claim is defended by appeal to the basic rationale that epistemic judgements are normative or evaluative only in the sense of normative or evaluative judgements within ‘institutions’ such as sports and games, etiquette, fashion, and the law, but moral judgements are not. It is argued that this does not render epistemic norms merely conventional in an objectionable sense.

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