Why are you talking to yourself? The epistemic role of inner speech in reasoning

Noûs ◽  
2021 ◽  
Author(s):  
Wade Munroe
Keyword(s):  
2018 ◽  
Vol 5 (1) ◽  
pp. 1449485 ◽  
Author(s):  
Shota Mitsuhashi ◽  
Shogo Hirata ◽  
Hideyuki Okuzumi ◽  
Peter Walla
Keyword(s):  

2018 ◽  
Vol 2018 ◽  
pp. 1-7
Author(s):  
Shota Mitsuhashi ◽  
Shogo Hirata ◽  
Hideyuki Okuzumi

This study was conducted to investigate the relation between the effect of articulatory suppression on the serial recall and severity of social impairments among children with autism spectrum disorders (ASD). The Luria hand test (LHT) was administered to evaluate the capacity for serial recall in 13 children with ASD. The LHT was administered under three conditions: control, under articulatory suppression, and under spatial suppression. Performance on the LHT of children with ASD was significantly lower in terms of both articulatory suppression and the spatial suppression condition. Moreover, the severity of social impairment in children with ASD was related to individual differences of effects of articulatory suppression on the LHT, but not with effects of spatial suppression. These results support the notion that dialogic inner speech which mediates complex cognitive abilities has inherently social origins.


Philosophy ◽  
2001 ◽  
Vol 76 (4) ◽  
pp. 585-604 ◽  
Author(s):  
Jeremy Randel Koons

Many authors have argued that emotions serve an epistemic role in our moral practice. Some argue that this epistemic connection is so strong that creatures who do not share our affective nature will be unable to grasp our moral concepts. I argue that even if this sort of incommensurability does result from the role of affect in morality, incommensurability does not in itself entail relativism. In any case, there is no reason to suppose that one must share our emotions and concerns to be able to apply our moral concept successfully. Finally, I briefly investigate whether the moral realist can seek aid and comfort from Davidsonian arguments to the effect that incommensurability in ethics is in principle impossible, and decide that these arguments are not successful. I conclude that the epistemic role our emotions play in moral discourse does not relativize morality.


2021 ◽  
pp. 174702182110536
Author(s):  
Chiara Fini ◽  
Gian Daniele Zannino ◽  
Matteo Orsoni ◽  
Giovanni Augusto Carlesimo ◽  
Mariagrazia Benassi ◽  
...  

Compared to concrete concepts, like “book”, abstract concepts expressed by words like “justice” are more detached from sensorial experiences, even though they are also grounded in sensorial modalities. Abstract concepts lack a single object as referent and are characterized by higher variability both within and across participants. According to the Word as Social Tool (WAT) proposal, owing to their complexity, abstract concepts need to be processed with the help of inner language. Inner language can namely help participants to re-explain to themselves the meaning of the word, to keep information active in working memory, and to prepare themselves to ask information from more competent people. While previous studies have demonstrated that the mouth is involved during abstract concepts’ processing, both the functional role and the mechanisms underlying this involvement still need to be clarified. We report an experiment in which participants were required to evaluate whether 78 words were abstract or concrete by pressing two different pedals. During the judgment task, they were submitted, in different blocks, to a baseline, an articulatory suppression, and a manipulation condition. In the last two conditions, they had to repeat a syllable continually and to manipulate a softball with their dominant hand. Results showed that articulatory suppression slowed down the processing of abstract more than that of concrete words. Overall results confirm the WAT proposal’s hypothesis that abstract concepts processing involves the mouth motor system and specifically inner speech. We discuss the implications for current theories of conceptual representation.


2019 ◽  
Vol 41 (1) ◽  
pp. 43-79 ◽  
Author(s):  
Susanne Prediger ◽  
Dilan Şahin-Gür

AbstractThe syntactic dimension of academic language has often been studied with respect to students’ difficulties with syntactic features in mathematical textbooks and test items, and these studies have contributed to understanding the communicative role of language. In contrast, the epistemic role of students’ language use has mainly been explored in lexical and discourse dimensions. This research has shown that higher order cognitive demands require more elaborate language means. The aim of this article is to contribute to theorizing the epistemic role of syntactic language complexity by means of a topic-specific investigation using the mathematical topic of qualitative calculus, i.e., the informal meanings of amount and change. In order to do this, the learning process study presented in this article investigates 18 eleventh graders’ conceptual pathways while dealing with challenging tasks on amount and change. The identification of different syntactic complexities in students’ utterances provides an overview of the variance of possible phrase structures. Further, it shows that successive conceptual conciseness requires either increasing syntactic complexity or conceptual condensation. So increasing elaborateness in the lexical and syntactic dimensions seem to compensate each other.


Author(s):  
Beth Preston

Technical functions of artifacts are commonly distinguished from their social functions and from biological functions of organisms. Schemes for classifying functions often encounter what the author calls the continuum problem—the imperceptible merger of function kinds. This is a special case of a debate about natural kinds in philosophy of science, which has resulted in a turn to an epistemological construal of kinds, in contrast to the traditional, purely ontological construal. The author argues for an epistemic analysis of function kinds along the lines of John Dupré’s (1993) “promiscuous realism.” This provides leverage for asking new and important questions about the epistemic purposes served by our various schemes for classifying artifact functions, and about the epistemic role of technical functions in particular. The author argues that the common classification into technical, social, and biological functions has more disadvantages than it has advantages.


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