Perceptual Variation and Structuralism

Noûs ◽  
2018 ◽  
Vol 54 (2) ◽  
pp. 290-326 ◽  
Author(s):  
John Morrison
Keyword(s):  
Perceptual Variation

Perceptual Variation and Relativism

2020 ◽  
pp. 13-47
Author(s):  
John Morrison
Keyword(s):  
Color Constancy ◽  
Secondary Qualities ◽  
Perceptual Variation

There is variation in how people perceive colors and other secondary qualities. The challenge of perceptual variation is to say whose perceptions are accurate. According to Sextus, Protagoras’ response is that all of our perceptions might be accurate. As this response is traditionally developed, it is difficult to explain color illusion and color constancy. This difficulty is due to a widespread assumption called perceptual atomism. This chapter argues that, if we want to develop Protagoras’ response, we need to give up perceptual atomism. It ends with a brief sketch of an alternative called perceptual structuralism.

Linguistic Philosophy and Perception

Philosophy ◽  
1953 ◽  
Vol 28 (107) ◽  
pp. 311-324
Author(s):  
Margaret MacDonald
Keyword(s):  
Moral Philosophy ◽  
Common Sense ◽  
External World ◽  
Physical World ◽  
Sense Experience ◽  
The Common ◽  
The Senses ◽  
Perceptual Variation ◽  
Linguistic Philosophy ◽  
As If

Philosophical theories of perception are generally admitted to be responses to certain problems or puzzles allied to the ancient dichotomy between Appearance and Reality. For they have been mainly provoked by the incompatibility of the common–sense assumption that an external, physical world exists and is revealed to the senses with the well–known facts of perceptual variation and error. If only what is real were perceived just as if only what is right were done it is possible that many of those questions would never have been asked which lead to moral philosophy and a metaphysics of the external world. But sense perceptions of the same object vary so that it appears to have contradictory qualities and are sometimes completely deceptive. Nor do illusory differ internally from veridical perceptions. Moreover, perceptual variation and error can be unmasked only by such procedures as looking more carefully, listening harder, trying to touch, asking others, in short by more sense experience. So the senses are, as it were, both accused and judge in these disputes and why should a venal judge be trusted more than the criminal he tries? Such “correction” of one experience by another of the same kind seems no more reliable than the original “error.” Philosophers have found all this very puzzling.

Cross-Cultural Studies of Illusions

2017 ◽  
Author(s):  
J. B. Deręgowski
Keyword(s):  
Cultural Studies ◽  
Cultural Background ◽  
Cross Cultural ◽  
Single Population ◽  
Lyer Illusion ◽  
Perceptual Variation ◽  
Cross Cultural Studies

Cross-cultural studies are of interest primarily because they demonstrate the extent of perceptual variation that would not be observable if the samples were derived from a single population. They are also of interest because they show how variation of factors such as age, gender, environment, cultural background, and genetics affects perception. Topics addressed include horizontal-vertical illusions, the Muller-Lyer illusion, and the Sander parallelogram. Perceptual processes are explored including perception of depth.

An Exploratory Analysis of the Nature and Extent of Individual Differences in Perception

1974 ◽  
Vol 11 (1) ◽  
pp. 41-49 ◽  
Author(s):  
J. R. Brent Ritchie
Keyword(s):  
Cluster Analysis ◽  
Individual Differences ◽  
Leisure Activities ◽  
Consumer Perceptions ◽  
Exploratory Analysis ◽  
Perceptual Differences ◽  
Perceptual Variation

Consumer perceptions of 12 leisure activities were examined to determine the extent of individual differences. The perceptual variation among respondents was substantially greater than expected by chance. Cluster analysis was used to classify the nature of the observed perceptual differences.

Words for Sensible Qualities and the Problem of Perceptual Variation

2019 ◽  
pp. 184-212
Author(s):  
Mario Gómez-Torrente
Keyword(s):  
Prima Facie ◽  
Secondary Quality ◽  
Primary Qualities ◽  
Normal People ◽  
Relevant Reference ◽  
Sensible Qualities ◽  
Perceptual Variation

This chapter proposes a picture of reference fixing for color adjectives and adjectives for other sensible qualities, according to which the relevant reference-fixing conventions allow those adjectives to be used with different intended standards in different contexts. It is argued that this explains the fact (used by secondary-quality theorists and eliminativists in “perceptual variation arguments”) that different equally normal people classify the same object by means of prima facie incompatible color adjectives, and that the explanation is perfectly compatible with the properties referred to by uses of these adjectives being primary qualities or objective properties. It is also argued that the picture satisfies a number of desiderata not satisfied by other objectivist theories in the literature.

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