scholarly journals Transparency and the KK Principle

Noûs ◽  
2016 ◽  
Vol 52 (1) ◽  
pp. 3-23 ◽  
Author(s):  
Nilanjan Das ◽  
Bernhard Salow
Keyword(s):  
Kk Principle

scholarly journals Knowing How One Knows

2019 ◽  
Vol 10 (2) ◽  
pp. 195-205
Author(s):  
Giovanni Rolla ◽  
Keyword(s):  
Actual World ◽  
Possible Worlds ◽  
Practical Knowledge ◽  
Propositional Knowledge ◽  
Knowing How ◽  
Know How ◽  
First Order ◽  
Kk Principle

In this paper, I argue that knowledge is dimly luminous. That is: if a person knows that p, she knows how she knows that p. The argument depends on a safety-based account of propositional knowledge, which is salient in Williamson’s critique of the ‘KK’ principle. I combine that account with non-intellectualism about knowledge-how – according to which, if a person knows how to φ, then in nearly all (if not all) nearby possible worlds in which she φes in the same way as in the actual world, she only φes successfully. Thus, the possession of first-order propositional knowledge implies secondorder practical knowledge, and this can be iterated. Because of the assumed nonintellectualism about know-how, dim luminosity does not imply bright luminosity about knowledge, which is expressed by the traditional KK principle. I conclude by considering some potential counterexamples to the view that knowledge is dimly luminous.

The KK-Principle, Margins for Error, and Safety

Erkenntnis ◽  
2011 ◽  
Vol 76 (1) ◽  
pp. 121-136 ◽  
Author(s):  
Murali Ramachandran
Keyword(s):  
Kk Principle

The Defect in Effective Skeptical Scenarios

2013 ◽  
Vol 3 (4) ◽  
pp. 271-281 ◽  
Author(s):  
Peter Murphy
Keyword(s):  
False Belief ◽  
Skeptical Argument ◽  
Kk Principle ◽  
Underdetermination Argument

What epistemic defect needs to show up in a skeptical scenario if it is to effectively target some belief? According to the false belief account, the targeted belief must be false in the skeptical scenario. According to the competing ignorance account, the targeted belief must fall short of being knowledge in the skeptical scenario. This paper argues for two claims. The first is that, contrary to what is often assumed, the ignorance account is superior to the false belief account. The second is that the ignorance account ultimately hobbles the skeptic. It does so for two reasons. First, when this account is joined with either a closure-based skeptical argument or a skeptical underdetermination argument, the best the skeptic can do is show that we don’t know that we know. And second, the ignorance account directly implies the maligned KK principle.

scholarly journals Williamson On the Margins of Knowledge: A Criticism

2020 ◽  
Author(s):  
Ciro De Florio ◽  
Vincenzo Fano
Keyword(s):  
Experimental Error ◽  
Quantitative Measurement ◽  
Buffer Zone ◽  
Scientific Context ◽  
Kk Principle

AbstractIn this paper, we argue that Williamson’s arguments against luminosity and the KK principle do not work, at least in a scientific context. Both of these arguments are based on the presence of a so-called “buffer zone” between situations in which one is in a position to know p and situations in which one is in a position to know ¬p. In those positions belonging to the buffer zone ¬p holds, but one is not in a position to know ¬p. The presence of this buffer zone triggers two types of sorites arguments. We show that this kind of argument does not hold in a scientific context, where the buffer zone is controlled by a quantitative measurement of the experimental error.

scholarly journals On a flawed argument against the KK principle

Analysis ◽  
2012 ◽  
Vol 73 (1) ◽  
pp. 80-86 ◽  
Author(s):  
S. Okasha
Keyword(s):  
Kk Principle

scholarly journals Explicating a Standard Externalist Argument Against the KK Principle

2013 ◽  
Vol 4 (4) ◽  
pp. 399-406
Author(s):  
Simon D'Alfonso ◽  
Keyword(s):  
Kk Principle

Self-knowledge and the KK principle

Synthese ◽  
2008 ◽  
Vol 173 (3) ◽  
pp. 231-257 ◽  
Author(s):  
Conor McHugh
Keyword(s):  
Self Knowledge ◽  
Kk Principle

Effective Skeptical Arguments

2015 ◽  
Vol 5 (1) ◽  
pp. 55-60 ◽  
Author(s):  
Christopher T. Buford ◽  
Anthony Brueckner
Keyword(s):  
Prima Facie ◽  
False Belief ◽  
Skeptical Argument ◽  
The Subject ◽  
Kk Principle

Peter Murphy has argued that effective skeptical scenarios (those that can power a prima facie compelling skeptical argument) all have the following feature: the subject involved in the scenario does not know that some ordinary proposition is true, even if the proposition is true in the scenario. So the standard “false belief” conception of skeptical scenarios is wrong, since the belief of the targeted proposition need not be mistaken in the scenario. Murphy then argues that this observation engenders a problem for skeptical arguments: they require the KK principle. We respond to this criticism on behalf of the skeptic in our paper.

(Un)knowability and knowledge iteration

Analysis ◽  
2020 ◽  
Vol 80 (3) ◽  
pp. 474-486
Author(s):  
Sebastian Liu
Keyword(s):  
Knowing That ◽  
Kk Principle ◽  
Generalized Knowledge

Abstract The KK principle states that knowing entails knowing that one knows. This historically popular principle has fallen out of favour among many contemporary philosophers in light of putative counterexamples. Recently, some have defended more palatable versions of KK by weakening the principle. These revisions remain faithful to their predecessor in spirit while escaping crucial objections. This paper examines the prospects of such a strategy. It is argued that revisions of the original principle can be captured by a generalized knowledge iteration principle, Weak-KK, which states that knowing entails the possibility of knowing that one knows. But Weak-KK is vulnerable to an unknowability result and therefore must be rejected. The arguments here suggest that retreating to weaker iteration principles is not an option for the KK enthusiast.

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