Existence, uniqueness, and comparative statics of Nash equilibrium in a game of voluntary public good provision with two public goods

2022 ◽  
Author(s):  
Kenichi Suzuki ◽  
Tatsuyoshi Miyakoshi ◽  
Jun‐ichi Itaya ◽  
Akitomo Yamanashi
Keyword(s):  
Nash Equilibrium ◽  
Public Goods ◽  
Public Good ◽  
Comparative Statics ◽  
Public Good Provision ◽  
Good Provision

A Model of Inequality Aversion and Private Provision of Public Goods

2020 ◽  
Vol 20 (2) ◽  
Author(s):  
Hide-Fumi Yokoo
Keyword(s):  
Public Goods ◽  
Public Good ◽  
Theoretical Foundation ◽  
Inequality Aversion ◽  
Public Good Provision ◽  
Marginal Rate ◽  
Private Provision ◽  
Marginal Rate Of Substitution ◽  
Good Provision ◽  
Corner Solutions

AbstractI develop a model of inequality aversion and public goods that allows the marginal rate of substitution to be variable. As a theoretical foundation, utility function of the standard public goods model is nested in the Fehr-Schmidt model. An individual’s contribution function for a public good is derived by solving the problem of kinky preference and examining both interior and corner solutions. Results show that the derived contribution function is not monotonic with respect to the other individual’s provision. Thus, the model can be used to explain empirical evidence for the effect of social comparison on public-good provision.

scholarly journals Announcements of Support and Public Good Provision

2017 ◽  
Vol 107 (12) ◽  
pp. 3760-3787 ◽  
Author(s):  
Judd B. Kessler
Keyword(s):  
Public Goods ◽  
Field Experiment ◽  
Prosocial Behavior ◽  
Public Good ◽  
Large Scale ◽  
Laboratory Experiments ◽  
Public Good Provision ◽  
Scale Field ◽  
Large Scale Field ◽  
Good Provision

Providing information about contributions to public goods is known to generate further contributions. However, it is often impossible to provide verifiable information on contributions. Through a large-scale field experiment and a series of laboratory experiments, I show that nonbinding announcements of support for a public good encourage others to contribute, even when actual contributions might not or cannot be made. Providing a way to easily announce support for a charity increases donations by $865 per workplace fundraising campaign (or 16 percent of average giving). I discuss implications for understanding prosocial behavior and for organizations aiming to increase contributions to public goods. (JEL C93, D64, D83, H41, L31)

scholarly journals Gridlock: Ethnic Diversity in Government and the Provision of Public Goods

2017 ◽  
Vol 9 (1) ◽  
pp. 112-136 ◽  
Author(s):  
Brian Beach ◽  
Daniel B. Jones
Keyword(s):  
Public Goods ◽  
Public Good ◽  
Ethnic Diversity ◽  
Regression Discontinuity ◽  
Economic Inequality ◽  
City Council ◽  
Public Good Provision ◽  
Good Provision

How does ethnic diversity in government impact public good provision? We construct a novel dataset linking the ethnicity of California city council candidates to election outcomes and expenditure decisions. Using a regression discontinuity approach, we find that increased diversity on the council leads to less spending on public goods. This is especially true in cities with high segregation and economic inequality. Those serving on councils that experience an increase in diversity also receive fewer votes when they run for reelection. These results point towards disagreement within the council generating lower spending. (JEL D72, H41, H70, J15, R23, R51)

What resource curse? The null effect of remittances on public good provision

2018 ◽  
Vol 30 (4) ◽  
pp. 431-450 ◽  
Author(s):  
Desiree A Desierto
Keyword(s):  
Public Goods ◽  
Public Good ◽  
Political Competition ◽  
Resource Curse ◽  
Public Good Provision ◽  
Formal Models ◽  
Null Effect ◽  
The Government ◽  
Good Provision

Existing formal models show that remittances generate a resource curse by allowing the government to appropriate its revenues toward rents, rather than public good provision. Households spend their remittance income on public-good substitutes, thereby alleviating the pressure on the government to provide public goods. However, the process by which the government survives the implicit threat of political challengers remains unspecified. By explicitly modeling political competition, I show that there is actually no resource curse from remittances. When there are challengers who can threaten to replace the incumbent leader, the best that any challenger can do is to offer not to take advantage of households’ provision of public-good substitutes, which induces the incumbent to try to match the offer. In equilibrium, public good provision is independent of remittances. This result holds even when no challenger can credibly commit to maintaining her offer once she is in power.

State Preferences and the Provision of Public Goods / Staatspräferenzen und die Bereitstellung öffentlicher Güter

2003 ◽  
Vol 223 (6) ◽  
Author(s):  
Xenia Matschke
Keyword(s):  
Public Goods ◽  
Public Good ◽  
State Parameter ◽  
Public Good Provision ◽  
Relative Importance ◽  
Private Provision ◽  
The Public ◽  
Good Provision ◽  
Parameter Measuring ◽  
State Preferences

SummaryCountries differ substantially in the emphasis on the public sector and the ratio between state consumption and provision of public goods. It seems that these differences are often not well explained by only assuming a heterogeneous population. In this paper, I take differing state preferences as given and investigate how changes in state preferences affect the provision of a public good. The provision of the public good is modelled as a two-stage game with the state and the citizens as players. I find that the Nash equilibrium provision of the public good is independent of a so-called "welfare state" parameter. In contrast, an increase in a parameter measuring the relative importance of public good provision vs. state consumption leads to an increase in the overall public good provision, while private provision declines.

Provision of Public Goods with the Presence of Inter-Class Conflicts

2012 ◽  
Vol 18 (1) ◽  
Author(s):  
Kannika Thampanishvong
Keyword(s):  
Public Goods ◽  
Public Good ◽  
Foreign Aid ◽  
Recipient Country ◽  
Optimal Level ◽  
The Self ◽  
Public Good Provision ◽  
General Welfare ◽  
Good Provision ◽  
Parameter Values

In the countries that experience the problem of inter-class conflict, the self-interested elite tend to pursue allocation policies that maximize their own welfare. In the absence of the binding revolutionary constraint, under some conditions, the amount of public goods provided is too low, relative to the optimal level of public good from the perspective of general welfare. With the revolutionary constraint, there exists a set of parameter values whereby the elite provide strictly positive amount of public goods. With unconditional foreign aid, there is no guarantee that the elite will use these additional resources to finance public good provision. For conditional foreign aid, the conditionality requirements depend on the degree of transparency of the recipient country.

A Public Choice Perspective on Cartels

2000 ◽  
Vol 18 (1) ◽  
pp. 3-22 ◽  
Author(s):  
Zane A. Spindler ◽  
Xavier de Vanssay
Keyword(s):  
Public Policy ◽  
Public Goods ◽  
Interest Groups ◽  
Public Choice ◽  
Public Good ◽  
Public Interest ◽  
Public Good Provision ◽  
Efficiency Gains ◽  
Public Choice Perspective ◽  
Good Provision

Abstract Like interest groups or clubs, cartels might be regarded as associations for voluntary provision of certain unique public goods. In some markets and some technological circumstances, such public good provision might provide a rationale for cartel survival where otherwise they might be expected to fail. There might even be circumstances in which cartels serve the ‘general’ or ‘public’ interest in the process of serving their own interest. In this case, anti-cartel public policy might be reassessed and based on distribution rather than efficiency grounds. The efficiency gains from cartels might then be dissipated by factional competition over distribution of such gains.

scholarly journals A Note on the Valuation of Collective Goods: Overlooked Input Market Free Riding for Non-Individually Incrementable Goods

2009 ◽  
Vol 9 (1) ◽  
Author(s):  
Philip E Graves
Keyword(s):  
Willingness To Pay ◽  
Public Goods ◽  
Public Good ◽  
Free Riding ◽  
Public Good Provision ◽  
Free Rider Problem ◽  
Marginal Willingness To Pay ◽  
Demand Revelation ◽  
Good Provision ◽  
Input Markets

Abstract For at least fifty years economists have argued that vertically-aggregated marginal willingness to pay, when set equal to marginal provision cost, will result in optimal public good provision levels. This methodological approach would be expected to yield an exact analog, in terms of optimal levels of public good provision, to efficient provision of private goods in a perfect market setting. There is, however, a potentially serious flaw in the approach as actually practiced, since initial incomes are implicitly–and wrongly–taken to be optimal. From a given income, the output demand revelation problem has long been recognized–that there will be difficulty inferring true demands for public goods at that income (the traditional `free rider' problem). But what has failed to receive widespread recognition among theoreticians, and especially among practitioners, is that there will also be a concomitant `input demand revelation' problem. In any situation where workers cannot individually increment a class of goods by increasing their income (e.g. public goods), they will have no incentive to generate the income that would have been devoted to that class of goods. They will only generate income that is optimal to pay the higher taxes or prices associated with whatever initial public goods levels are provided. As a consequence, the benefit-cost practitioner will, even if somehow able to accurately guess marginal willingness-to-pay out of current income, observe only one apparent optima. There are an infinite number of such optima, one for each level of free riding in input markets, where aggregated marginal willingness-to-pay will appear to equal marginal provision cost. The one true Samuelson `optimum optimorum' occurs when there is free riding in neither output nor input markets (that is, when the `full' demand revelation problem is solved). As a consequence, pure public goods, as well as other `non-incrementable' goods and goods for which non-use values are of importance will be undervalued, hence under-provided. Evidence is presented that the problem raised here might be of importance, undermining the practical significance of the Coase theorem vis-à-vis Pigouvian taxation.

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