Interbank lending with benchmark rates: Pareto optima for a class of singular control games

This paper focuses on fast terminal sliding mode fault-tolerant control for a class of n-order nonlinear systems. Firstly, when the actuator fault occurs, the extended state observer (ESO) is used to estimate the lumped uncertainty and its derivative of the system, so that the fault boundary is not needed to know. The convergence of ESO is proved theoretically. Secondly, a new type of fast terminal sliding surface is designed to achieve global fast convergence, non-singular control law and chattering reduction, and the Lyapunov stability criterion is used to prove that the system states converge to the origin of the sliding mode surface in finite time, which ensures the stability of the closed-loop system. Finally, the effectiveness and superiority of the proposed algorithm are verified by two simulation experiments of different order systems.

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Ergodic control of diffusions with random intervention times

Journal of Applied Probability ◽

10.1017/jpr.2020.80 ◽

2021 ◽

Vol 58 (1) ◽

pp. 1-21

Author(s):

Harto Saarinen ◽

Jukka Lempa

Keyword(s):

Optimal Solution ◽

Singular Control ◽

Control Policy ◽

Control Problems ◽

Ergodic Control ◽

Linear Diffusion ◽

One Dimensional ◽

And Diffusion ◽

Independent Poisson Process ◽

Exact Amount

AbstractWe study an ergodic singular control problem with constraint of a regular one-dimensional linear diffusion. The constraint allows the agent to control the diffusion only at the jump times of an independent Poisson process. Under relatively weak assumptions, we characterize the optimal solution as an impulse-type control policy, where it is optimal to exert the exact amount of control needed to push the process to a unique threshold. Moreover, we discuss the connection of the present problem to ergodic singular control problems, and illustrate the results with different well-known cost and diffusion structures.

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Money creation, debt, and justice

Politics Philosophy & Economics ◽

10.1177/1470594x21999736 ◽

2021 ◽

pp. 1470594X2199973

Author(s):

Peter Dietsch

Keyword(s):

Commercial Banks ◽

Central Banks ◽

Private Bank ◽

Access To Credit ◽

Financial Architecture ◽

Theories Of Justice ◽

Money Creation ◽

The Creation ◽

Interbank Lending ◽

Alternative Designs

Theories of justice rely on a variety of criteria to determine what social arrangements should be considered just. For most theories, the distribution of financial resources matters. However, they take the existence of money as a given and tend to ignore the way in which the creation of money impacts distributive justice. Those with access to collateral are favoured in the creation of credit or debt, which represents the main form of money today. Appealing to the idea that access to credit confers freedom, and that inequalities in this freedom are morally arbitrary, this article shows how the advantage to those with collateral plays out in different ways in today’s economy. The article identifies several forms of bias inherent in money creation, and its subsequent destruction: loans from commercial banks to individuals and corporations, interbank lending, lending from central banks to commercial banks, and selective bail-outs by central banks. These are not mere inequalities: they are unjust since alternative designs of the financial architecture exist that would significantly reduce them. The paper focuses on one possible reform with the potential to address several of the types of bias identified, namely the separation of money creation from private bank credit.

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