Vote Switching in Multiparty Presidential Systems: Evidence from the Argentine Chamber of Deputies

2021 ◽  
Author(s):  
Alejandro Bonvecchi ◽  
Paula Clerici
Keyword(s):  
Presidential Systems ◽  
Chamber Of Deputies

scholarly journals Who Gets what and how Does it Matter? Importance-Weighted Portfolio Allocation and Coalition Support in Brazil

2018 ◽  
Vol 10 (3) ◽  
pp. 99-134 ◽  
Author(s):  
Mariana Batista
Keyword(s):  
Positive Relationship ◽  
Portfolio Allocation ◽  
Weighted Portfolio ◽  
Dimension 2 ◽  
Legislative Support ◽  
Presidential Systems

Who gets what in portfolio allocation, and how does it matter to coalition partners’ legislative support in presidential systems? I propose that portfolios are not all alike, and that their allocation as well as the support for the president's agenda depends on the particular distribution of assets within the executive. The portfolio share allocated to coalition parties is weighted by a measure of importance based on the assets controlled by the ministry in question, such as policies, offices, and budgets. Once the weighted allocation of ministries has been identified, the results show that: 1) the president concentrates the most important ministries in their own party, mainly considering the policy dimension; 2) the positive relationship between portfolio allocation and legislative support remains, with the importance of specific dimensions being considered; and, 3) coalition partners do not respond differently in terms of legislative support in light of the different assets’ distribution within the portfolio allocation.

scholarly journals Decision Making in Political Systems: Veto Players in Presidentialism, Parliamentarism, Multicameralism and Multipartyism

1995 ◽  
Vol 25 (3) ◽  
pp. 289-325 ◽  
Author(s):  
George Tsebelis
Keyword(s):  
Policy Change ◽  
Comparative Politics ◽  
Party Systems ◽  
Veto Players ◽  
Political Systems ◽  
Policy Positions ◽  
Veto Player ◽  
Collective Actors ◽  
Parliamentary Systems ◽  
Presidential Systems

The article compares different political systems with respect to one property: their capacity to produce policy change. I define the basic concept of the article, the ‘veto player’: veto players are individual or collective actors whose agreement (by majority rule for collective actors) is required for a change of the status quo. Two categories of veto players are identified in the article: institutional and partisan. Institutional veto players (president, chambers) exist in presidential systems while partisan veto players (parties) exist at least in parliamentary systems. Westminster systems, dominant party systems and single-party minority governments have only one veto player, while coalitions in parliamentary systems, presidential or federal systems have multiple veto players. The potential for policy change decreases with the number of veto players, the lack of congruence (dissimilarity of policy positions among veto players) and the cohesion (similarity of policy positions among the constituent units of each veto player) of these players. The veto player framework produces results different from existing theories in comparative politics, but congruent with existing empirical studies. In addition, it permits comparisons across different political and party systems. Finally, the veto player framework enables predictions about government instability (in parliamentary systems) or regime instability (in presidential systems); these predictions are supported by available evidence.

Shaping Presidential Powers in Hungary: Convention, Tradition and Informal Constitutional Amendments

2021 ◽  
Vol 46 (3-4) ◽  
pp. 307-320
Author(s):  
Attila Vincze
Keyword(s):  
Constitutional Court ◽  
Constitutional Change ◽  
Exact Role ◽  
Present Contribution ◽  
Constitutional Amendments ◽  
Political Actors ◽  
Fundamental Law ◽  
Constitutional System ◽  
Presidential Systems ◽  
Judicial Interpretations

Abstract There was no tradition of a republican president in Hungary before the fall of communism, and the transitory constitution of 1989 was unclear about the exact role the President should play in the constitutional system of Hungary. Some provisions even resembled those of presidential or semi-presidential systems; some ambiguities were clarified during the first two decades after the transition. Conventions, however, were established to some extent and sometimes very quickly. This period gave rise to guidelines as to how the powers of the President should be exercised. Some other powers were concretized and interpreted foremost by the Constitutional Court. These conventions and judicial interpretations formed the character of the Presidency to the extent of informal constitutional change. Some of these elements have even been incorporated into and formalized by the new Fundamental Law of Hungary. The present contribution will point out how the originally broad competencies of the President have been narrowed in the practice, and what role the Constitutional Court and political actors played in this process.

Policy analysis in the Chamber of Deputies

2017 ◽  
Author(s):  
Rodrigo Velazquez Lopez Velarde
Keyword(s):  
Policy Analysis ◽  
Civil Service ◽  
Executive Branch ◽  
Main Function ◽  
Rubber Stamp ◽  
Lower Chamber ◽  
Legislative Policy ◽  
Mexican Congress ◽  
Chamber Of Deputies

Until the 1990s, the Mexican Congress functioned as a rubber-stamp institution whose main function was the approval of the presidents’ bills. The subordination of Congress to the executive branch produced, among other effects, the hindering of legislative policy analysis. Since government agencies had control over the policy process, it was not necessary for legislators neither to become policy specialists nor to invest resources and time in the development of professional staffs that could carry out policy analysis on diverse areas. However, as the process of democratization advanced, legislators started to create research centers and established civil service systems in order to professionalize the staff that supports legislative work. This chapter provides an assessment of the congressional policy analysis carried out in Mexico by focusing on the lower chamber (Chamber of Deputies) of the federal Congress. It argues that research centres and legislative committees perform three types of policy analysis. The limited functioning of the civil service system, the politicization of legislative staff, and low salaries are the main factors that undermine the quality of policy analysis in the Chamber of Deputies.

scholarly journals Electoral rules, forms of government, and political budget cycles in transition countries

2008 ◽  
Vol 55 (2) ◽  
pp. 185-218 ◽  
Author(s):  
Marko Klasnja
Keyword(s):  
Transition Process ◽  
Transition Countries ◽  
Policy Outcomes ◽  
Political Systems ◽  
Checks And Balances ◽  
Political Budget Cycles ◽  
Context Sensitive ◽  
Optimal Outcomes ◽  
Parliamentary Systems ◽  
Presidential Systems

Recent studies have suggested the existence of 'election-year economics' in fiscal policy in transition countries. This study asks whether such electoral cycles in aggregate measures (overall expenditures, revenues and balance) and spending composition (broad vs. targeted outlays) differ among countries with different political systems. This question is motivated by a sharp division between majoritarian presidential systems in Central Asia and Eastern Europe, and proportional-parliamentary systems in the Baltic's, Central and Southeastern Europe. Further, in the absence of context-sensitive theories, the paper asks whether observed outcomes in the transition process conform to the theoretical priors developed for conditions in stable democracies. Finally, the paper attempts to normatively establish whether either of the alternative combinations yields more optimal policy outcomes. The results suggest that the differences indeed exist, primarily on the revenue side and in the composition of expenditures. These results differ markedly from those for stable democracies, especially in the case of composition of spending. Normatively, presidential yields sub optimal outcomes in comparison to parliamentarians, likely due to inefficient system of constitutionally intended checks and balances. .

scholarly journals Transferencias de recursos y partidos políticos. Estudio de los municipios mexicanos

2017 ◽  
Vol 10 (19) ◽  
Author(s):  
Silverio Tamez Garza ◽  
Adriana Verónica Hinojosa Cruz ◽  
Carlos Augusto Jiménez Zárate
Keyword(s):  
Political Parties ◽  
House Of Representatives ◽  
Political Party ◽  
Positive Impact ◽  
The Political ◽  
Allocation Of Resources ◽  
Partido Revolucionario Institucional ◽  
Chamber Of Deputies

Abstract. In this paper we analyze how much influence the political party with the largest nationwide (Partido Revolucionario Institucional: PRI) in the Congress, specifically the House of Representatives, in the distribution of the Funds of Branch 23: Paving Fund and Sports Spaces for Municipalities, for the year 2010 which is when this fund was created and for the year 2011. The results of our analysis were that there is a positive impact in the influence ofthe political party with the largest presence in the Chamber of Deputies in the allocation of resources to those municipalities that are governed by mayors from the PRI.Keywords: municipalities, paving and spaces fund goods, political parties, populationResumen. En el presente artículo se analiza la influencia que puede presentar laconfiguración de la Cámara de Diputados con una mayoría por partido en la asignación de recursos hacia las entidades federativas y municipios. Se tomó el caso del Fondo de Pavimentación y Espacios Deportivos para Municipios comparando la distribución en el año de su creación (2010) cuando no se emitieron reglas para su acceso con el siguiente año (2011) tomando en cuenta nuevos criterios. El resultado que nos arroja nuestro análisis es que existe una incidencia positiva en cuanto a la influencia política que se ejerce cuando unexiste mayoría en la representación partidista en la Cámara de Diputados.Palabras clave: fondo de pavimentación y espacios deportivos, municipios, partidos políticos, población

scholarly journals DA GÊNESE AO FUNCIONAMENTO DE UMA COMISSÃO PERMANENTE NA CÂMARA DOS DEPUTADOS (FROM THE GENESIS TO THE OPERATION OF A PERMANENT COMMITTEE ON THE CHAMBER OF DEPUTIES)

2015 ◽  
Vol 18 (18) ◽  
pp. 101-119
Author(s):  
Thais Teixeira Santos
Keyword(s):  
Chamber Of Deputies

Este artigo visa estudar a formação de uma Comissão Permanente no âmbito da Câmara dos Deputados. Avalia-se desde a criação, incluindo motivações políticas e institucionais, até o efetivo funcionamento deliberativo da Comissão de Defesa dos Direitos da Pessoa com Deficiência na Câmara dos Deputados, além da estrutura organizacional necessária para isso. Apresentam-se aspectos como o sistema brasileiro de comissões permanentes e a ação de atores legislativos neste contexto. Por fim, pondera-se a resposta dada pela Câmara dos Deputados a uma demanda crescente detectada na sociedade, qual seja, a promoção dos direitos da pessoa com deficiência, com observação sobre a conexão entre os atores envolvidos e o processo decisório. 

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