Majority Party Power and Procedural Motions in the U.S. Senate

2013 ◽  
Vol 38 (2) ◽  
pp. 205-236 ◽  
Author(s):  
Steven S. Smith ◽  
Ian Ostrander ◽  
Christopher M. Pope
Keyword(s):  
Majority Party ◽  
The U.S ◽  
Party Power

Introduction

2012 ◽  
Author(s):  
Jeffery A. Jenkins ◽  
Charles Stewart
Keyword(s):  
Nineteenth Century ◽  
Political Parties ◽  
House Of Representatives ◽  
Political System ◽  
Organizational Politics ◽  
Early Nineteenth Century ◽  
Majority Party ◽  
History Of ◽  
The U.S

This book investigates the history of organizational politics in the U.S. House of Representatives from 1789 to the present. It argues that the history of how speakership elections developed was driven by a desire to establish an organizational cartel in the House. It examines the centrality of the party caucus for the organization of the House, and more specifically how the majority party came to own the chief House officers, especially the Speaker. It also discusses two themes about Congress and its role in the American political system: the construction of mass political parties in the early nineteenth century and the role that political parties play in guiding the agenda of Congress today. This chapter provides an overview of the data and methods used by the book as well as the chapters that follow.

Divided government and U.S. trade policy: theory and evidence

1994 ◽  
Vol 48 (4) ◽  
pp. 595-632 ◽  
Author(s):  
Susanne Lohmann ◽  
Sharyn O'Halloran
Keyword(s):  
Trade Policy ◽  
The United States ◽  
Distributive Politics ◽  
Institutional Constraints ◽  
Divided Government ◽  
Constraint Forces ◽  
Majority Party ◽  
White House ◽  
Policy Theory ◽  
The U.S

If different parties control the U.S. Congress and White House, the United States may maintain higher import protection than otherwise. This proposition follows from a distributive politics model in which Congress can choose to delegate trade policymaking to the President. When the congressional majority party faces a President of the other party, the former has an incentive to delegate to but to constrain the President by requiring congressional approval of trade proposals by up-or-down vote. This constraint forces the President to provide higher protection in order to assemble a congressional majority. Evidence confirms that (1) the institutional constraints placed on the President's trade policymaking authority are strengthened in times of divided government and loosened under unified government and (2) U.S. trade policy was significantly more protectionist under divided than under unified government during the period 1949–90.

State Congressional Delegations and the Distribution of Federal Funds

2020 ◽  
pp. 106591292094079
Author(s):  
James M. Curry ◽  
Christopher P. Donnelly
Keyword(s):  
Distributive Politics ◽  
Federal System ◽  
Federal Funds ◽  
Majority Party ◽  
The U.S ◽  
State Delegations ◽  
Over Time

Most scholarship on U.S. distributive politics either focuses on the abilities of individual representatives and senators to bring home the bacon or highlights the role the president plays in influencing funding decisions. Little attention is paid to collective efforts in Congress involved in securing grants-in-aid to states. In this paper, we assess how characteristics of House and Senate state delegations affect the collective efforts of a state’s federal officeholders to secure statewide funds. In both the House and Senate, we find that partisan cohesion in a state delegation predicts more federal funds to states. In particular, states receive more funds when larger shares of their delegations are members of a chamber’s majority party. Moreover, we find that the importance of majority party status is increasing over time. These results have important implications for the U.S. federal system and distributive politics.

Sign in / Sign up

Export Citation Format

Share Document