scholarly journals Contributory negligence in the Court of Appeal: an empirical study

Legal Studies ◽  
2017 ◽  
Vol 37 (3) ◽  
pp. 437-467
Author(s):  
James Goudkamp ◽  
Donal Nolan
Keyword(s):  
Empirical Study ◽  
Common Law ◽  
England And Wales ◽  
High Court ◽  
Contributory Negligence ◽  
Court Of Appeal

In this paper we report the results of an empirical study of 112 appellate decisions on the contributory negligence doctrine in England and Wales between 2000 and 2015. It is the first study of its kind in any common law jurisdiction, and builds on earlier research in which we looked at the doctrine's operation in first instance courts. Our dataset comprised every appellate decision in which contributory negligence was an issue that was handed down during the study period and which we were able to access electronically. The most important findings include the fact that appeals succeed more frequently in relation to the existence of contributory negligence than with respect to apportionment; that the overall prospect of winning an appeal on contributory negligence does not depend on whether the first instance court is a county court or the High Court; that claimants are nearly twice as likely to win an appeal regarding the existence of contributory negligence as defendants; and that by far most common discount imposed following an appeal is 50%.

Inherent Jurisdiction and the Limits of Civil Procedure

2020 ◽  
pp. 269-290
Author(s):  
Stuart Sime
Keyword(s):  
Rule Of Law ◽  
Separation Of Powers ◽  
Common Law ◽  
Civil Procedure ◽  
England And Wales ◽  
High Court ◽  
The Rule Of Law ◽  
Procedural Law

This chapter considers the modern scope and limitations on the use of the court’s inherent jurisdiction in common law jurisdictions. It considers the underlying juridical basis for the jurisdiction, and the underlying theories, namely that residuary powers were vested in the High Court in England and Wales by the Judicature Acts, and that all courts have inherent powers to prevent abuse of process. It considers the ramifications of the distinction between inherent jurisdiction and inherent powers. Changes in the legal landscape since the seminal articles by Master Jacob and Professor Dockray, including the codification of civil procedure in many common law jurisdictions, and modern understanding of the rule of law and the separation of powers, are considered. It is argued that while existing applications of the inherent jurisdiction should be retained, it is no longer acceptable for the English High Court, and equivalent courts in other jurisdictions, to generate new procedural law by resorting to the inherent jurisdiction.

The Enduring Legacy of ‘Reckless Disregard’

2005 ◽  
Vol 34 (4) ◽  
pp. 316-335 ◽  
Author(s):  
David McArdle
Keyword(s):  
British Columbia ◽  
Common Law ◽  
Standard Of Care ◽  
Personal Injury ◽  
Duty Of Care ◽  
Canadian Province ◽  
England And Wales ◽  
Appeal Decision ◽  
The Impact ◽  
Court Of Appeal

Personal injury at common law has spawned many cases where sports participants have inflicted injury either upon other participants or upon spectators/bystanders. This paper is not an exhaustive analysis of those ‘sports torts' cases but focuses instead upon the impact of Wooldridge v Sumner, a Court of Appeal decision that was legally sound but based upon highly significant errors of fact, and which has subsequently been advanced before the courts in two jurisdictions as authority for untenable propositions that concern both the standard of care and the duty of care owed by sports participants. While a consideration of the authorities prior to Wooldridge illustrates that there was never a basis at common law for the argument that either the standard or the duty of care differed from that pertaining in non-sporting contexts, the case has been appropriated by counsel in order to argue along those lines even though Wooldridge is not authority for either proposition. On some occasions those arguments have actually received the support of the courts of England and Wales and of the Canadian Province of British Columbia. Despite the existence in both jurisdictions of more recent authorities that ought to have heralded the demise of both concepts, they have proved remarkably tenacious.

Presumption of Marriage in Uganda

2020 ◽  
Author(s):  
Jamil Ddamulira Mujuzi
Keyword(s):  
Supreme Court ◽  
International Law ◽  
Common Law ◽  
Case Law ◽  
African Countries ◽  
High Court ◽  
The Supreme Court ◽  
Living Together ◽  
Law And Legislation ◽  
Court Of Appeal

Abstract Case law, amongst other sources, shows that many people in Uganda are living together as husband and wife although they are not married. Unlike legislation in other African countries such as Tanzania and Malawi, in Uganda, the pieces of legislation governing marriages are silent on the issue of presumption of marriage. Likewise, unlike in Kenya and South Africa where legislation does not provide for presumption of marriage but courts have held that such a presumption exists based on long cohabitation, Ugandan courts, the High Court, and the Court of Appeal, have held that Ugandan law does not recognise marriage based on long cohabitation (marriage by repute). However, courts will presume the existence of a marriage where a marriage ceremony took place. Since 2003, attempts to enact legislation to provide for the presumption of marriage in Uganda have not been successful. In this article, the author argues that there is still room for the Supreme Court to hold, on the basis of common law, that Ugandan law recognises the principle of presumption of marriage. This recognition would also be in line with Uganda’s international law obligation as the Committee on the Elimination of Discrimination against Women has called upon States Parties to CEDAW to enact legislation giving effect to de facto unions. The author relies on case law and legislation from some African countries to suggest ways in which the Supreme Court could deal with the issue of presumption of marriage.

3. The Civil Courts

2018 ◽  
Author(s):  
Stuart Sime
Keyword(s):  
Intellectual Property ◽  
Free Choice ◽  
Common Law ◽  
England And Wales ◽  
High Court ◽  
Family Division ◽  
Civil Courts

This chapter describes the civil courts in England and Wales. It covers the composition and administration of magistrates’s courts, County Court, and the High Court; jurisdiction; High Court Divisions (Queen’s Bench Division (QBD), Chancery Division (ChD), and Family Division), and specialist courts (Business and Property Courts, Technology and Construction Court, Commercial Court, Administrative Court, Companies Court, Patents Court, and Intellectual Property Enterprise Court). For most civil claims the claimant has a free choice between the High Court and the County Court. Common law claims are suitable for the Queen’s Bench Division, whereas equity claims are more suitable for the Chancery Division. The High Court should be used for the more important and complex claims.

scholarly journals The Safety of Convictions in the Court of Appeal: Fresh Evidence in the Criminal Division Through an Empirical Lens

2019 ◽  
Vol 83 (6) ◽  
pp. 433-449
Author(s):  
Paul Dargue
Keyword(s):  
Empirical Study ◽  
Empirical Evidence ◽  
Criminal Law ◽  
Empirical Studies ◽  
Empirical Support ◽  
England And Wales ◽  
Methodological Perspective ◽  
Court Of Appeal

An academic consensus exists that the England and Wales Court of Appeal (Criminal Division) determines appeals against conviction in a narrow or an unduly restrictive manner. This consensus has developed through observation and empirical study of the Court over several decades. It is said in particular that the Court adopts a narrow approach when considering appeals which raise primarily factual issues, especially fresh evidence or ‘lurking doubt’ appeals. This article discusses two new empirical studies of the Court, one of which is a replication of Roberts’s recent study which featured in the Journal of Criminal Law in 2017. The empirical evidence in support of the allegation of a restrictive approach is explored in this article from a theoretical and methodological perspective. It is argued that the question of the Court’s approach is difficult to study empirically, and so suggestions of empirical support for a restrictive approach overreach the limits of the methods employed. This is not to suggest that the Court of Appeal does not make mistakes, nor even is it to suggest that the Court is not narrow or unduly restrictive. Rather, it is suggested that the empirical findings offered as evidence of the restrictive approach, which gives rise to the consensus position, are weak and should be treated with caution, especially in the light of the author’s two new empirical studies of the Court.

Is the incompatibility of UK data retention law with EU law really a victory?

Legal Studies ◽  
2020 ◽  
pp. 1-26
Author(s):  
Matthew White
Keyword(s):  
Electronic Communication ◽  
Traffic Data ◽  
Eu Law ◽  
Data Retention ◽  
Member States ◽  
England And Wales ◽  
High Court ◽  
Prior Review ◽  
Serious Crime ◽  
Court Of Appeal

Abstract The Court of Justice of the European Union (ECJ) in 2014 ruled in Digital Rights Ireland that the Data Retention Directive was invalid for exceeding the limits of proportionality in light of Articles 7, 8 and 52(1) of the EU Charter of Fundamental Rights (Charter). Subsequently, preliminary references from the England and Wales Court of Appeal and the Swedish Administrative Court of Appeal sought clarification from the ECJ as to whether EU law permitted a general obligation to retain traffic data covering all persons, all means of electronic communication and all traffic data without any distinctions, limitations or exceptions for the purpose of combating crime. The ECJ in Tele2 and Watson ruled that in light of Articles 7, 8, 11 and 52(1) of the Charter, EU Member States were precluded from adopting national measures which provided general and indiscriminate retention of traffic and location data of all subscribers and registered users relating to all means of electronic communication. The ECJ also ruled that Member States were only permitted to adopt data retention measures for the purpose of fighting serious crime, and only when access to retained data was subject to prior review by a court or an independent administrative body. In 2018, the issue of the UK's data retention regime envisaged in Part 4 of the Investigatory Powers Act 2016 came before the England and Wales High Court. The High Court ruled that Part 4 was incompatible with EU law because access to retained communications data was not limited to the purpose of fighting serious crime, and it was not subject to prior review by a court or an independent administrative body. This judgment was regarded by the claimants, Liberty, as a ‘landmark victory for privacy rights’. However, this paper questions whether certain aspects of the High Court ruling are indeed a victory, by assessing its compatibility with EU law and the European Convention on Human Rights (ECHR).

Figure 4.14: the two issues as set out by Lord Bridge—issue 2 As can be seen, a number of matters needing to be clarified arise from the mere identification of two issues. Note that Bridge gives the two issues a short-hand label: (1) the common law issue; and (2) the statutory issue. However, students often read and re-read without appreciating how to move from lack of understanding towards understanding. They do not notice how words can be clarified by an appreciation of the intertextual links and which words or phrases could be clarified by recourse to textbooks in the area. Again the two issues are found in a paragraph of Lord Bridge’s judgment. Reading carefully paragraphs in the immediate vicinity can assist in understanding. The responsibility of the reader is to read with understanding, therefore stopping to clarify points along the way. It is useful here to ensure that the procedural history of this case is understood. This will enable the student to obtain an appreciation of the differences in opinion by the various judges who have considered the case before its arrival in the House of Lords. Lord Bridge discusses the procedural history and it is set out in the headnote. The case was won by the plaintiffs (the buyers) in the trial court (the High Court) and the defendants (the sellers) appealed to the Court of Appeal, where

2012 ◽  
pp. 99-99
Keyword(s):  
Common Law ◽  
Trial Court ◽  
High Court ◽  
House Of Lords ◽  
History Of ◽  
The Common ◽  
Short Hand ◽  
Court Of Appeal ◽  
The Way

2. Sources of employment law and institutions

2019 ◽  
pp. 24-45
Author(s):  
Stephen Taylor ◽  
Astra Emir
Keyword(s):  
Human Rights ◽  
Common Law ◽  
Health And Safety ◽  
Employment Law ◽  
European Court Of Justice ◽  
High Court ◽  
European Court ◽  
The Supreme Court ◽  
The Common ◽  
Court Of Appeal

This chapter discusses the sources of UK employment law and relevant institutions, and looks at court structure. The main source is statutes—Acts of Parliament, regulations and EU law. The common law is judge-made and has evolved over centuries as cases are brought to court and appealed up through the court hierarchy. The laws of contract, trust and tort all play a part in employment regulation. Most cases relating to common law matters are brought to the County Court or the High Court. Employment tribunal cases can be appealed to the Employment Appeals Tribunal (EAT) and then the Court of Appeal, the Supreme Court and, if concerning an EU matter, to the European Court of Justice. Other important institutions in the employment law include the Advisory, Conciliation and Arbitration Service (ACAS), the Equality and Human Rights Commission (EHRC) and the Health and Safety Executive (HSE).

New Zealand

2015 ◽  
Author(s):  
Adrian Ward ◽  
Gledhill Kris
Keyword(s):  
New Zealand ◽  
Common Law ◽  
Family Court ◽  
District Court ◽  
District Courts ◽  
Appellate Courts ◽  
High Court ◽  
The Supreme Court ◽  
Court Of First Instance ◽  
Court Of Appeal

New Zealand is a common law country. The judicial structure is the Supreme Court and the Court of Appeal, which are appellate courts only; the High Court, which hears appeals from District Courts in some situations but is also a court of first instance; the District Court, which is principally a court of first instance but also hears appeals from some Tribunals; and various Tribunals. There is also a Family Court, in which warranted District Court judges sit, and which—along with the High Court—deals with adult protection matters.

The Citation Practices of the High Court of Australia, 1905–2015

2019 ◽  
Vol 47 (4) ◽  
pp. 655-695
Author(s):  
Russell Smyth ◽  
Ingrid Nielsen
Keyword(s):  
Empirical Study ◽  
Common Law ◽  
Case Law ◽  
Diverse Range ◽  
High Court ◽  
Secondary Sources ◽  
Citation Practices ◽  
The Individual ◽  
High Court Of Australia ◽  
Over Time

We provide an empirical study of the High Court’s citation to case law and secondary sources at decade intervals between 1905 and 2015. We document trends in the number and type of citations over time, both for the Court as a whole and for the individual Justices. We find that in each of the sample years between 1905 and 1975, the Court cited relatively few authorities and for most of this period the majority of citations were to the Court’s own previous decisions or to decisions of the English courts. However, over the last four sample years—1985, 1995, 2005 and 2015—the Court cited more authority. The Court cited an increasing proportion of its own previous decisions over this period as well as a higher proportion of authority from a more diverse range of sources, including secondary sources, largely at the expense of citations to English cases. We conclude that this reflects the emergence of a distinct Australian common law with the High Court as its final arbitrator.

Sign in / Sign up

Export Citation Format

Share Document