Can a leopard change its spots? Strategic behavior versus professional role conception during Ukraine's 2014 court chair elections

Law & Policy ◽  
2020 ◽  
Vol 42 (4) ◽  
pp. 365-381
Author(s):  
Maria Popova
Keyword(s):  
Strategic Behavior ◽  
Professional Role ◽  
Role Conception

Role socialization of graduating student nurses: Impact of a nursing practicum on professional role conception

1994 ◽  
Vol 10 (6) ◽  
pp. 342-349 ◽  
Author(s):  
Nadine A. Coudret ◽  
Pennae L. Fuchs ◽  
Cynthia S. Roberts ◽  
Joy A. Suhrheinrich ◽  
Ann H. White
Keyword(s):  
Student Nurses ◽  
Professional Role ◽  
Role Socialization ◽  
Role Conception

The Internet is a Semicommons

2018 ◽  
Author(s):  
James Grimmelmann
Keyword(s):  
Open Field ◽  
Online Communities ◽  
Strategic Behavior ◽  
Private Property ◽  
The Internet ◽  
Field System ◽  
Technical Features ◽  
Dynamic Interplay ◽  
Enormous Success

78 Fordham Law Review 2799 (2010)The Internet is a semicommons. Private property in servers and network links coexists with a shared communications platform. This distinctive combination both explains the Internet's enormous success and illustrates some of its recurring problems.Building on Henry Smith's theory of the semicommons in the medieval open-field system, this essay explains how the dynamic interplay between private and common uses on the Internet enables it to facilitate worldwide sharing and collaboration without collapsing under the strain of misuse. It shows that key technical features of the Internet, such as its layering of protocols and the Web's division into distinct "sites," respond to the characteristic threats of strategic behavior in a semicommons. An extended case study of the Usenet distributed messaging system shows that not all semicommons on the Internet succeed; the continued success of the Internet depends on our ability to create strong online communities that can manage and defend the infrastructure on which they rely. Private and common both have essential roles to play in that task, a lesson recognized in David Post's and Jonathan Zittrain's recent books on the Internet.

Executive Veto Power and Constitutional Design

2019 ◽  
pp. 93-113
Author(s):  
Nicholas R. Miller
Keyword(s):  
Spatial Model ◽  
Strategic Behavior ◽  
Separation Of Powers ◽  
Strategic Interaction ◽  
Veto Power ◽  
Constitutional Design ◽  
One Dimensional ◽  
Executive Veto

A “separation of powers” system provides for an executive and legislature with independent powers. While only the legislature can pass bills, executive approval is commonly required for them to become law. The executive exercises veto power by withholding approval. Executive veto power is simple if the executive can only approve a bill or reject it in its entirety; it is constructive if he can amend a bill in certain ways. It is qualified if the legislature can override a veto; it is unqualified otherwise. Any such system creates a gamelike strategic interaction between the legislature and executive. The chapter provides an expository sketch of a variety of such veto games. The analysis is based on a one-dimensional spatial model given three different behavioral assumptions: sincere behavior by both the legislature and executive, strategic behavior by both, and strategic behavior coupled with the possibility of a credible veto threat by the executive. Several extensions and qualifications are briefly noted.

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