scholarly journals Intragroup competition in public good games: The role of relative performance incentives and risk attitudes

2019 ◽  
Vol 21 (5) ◽  
pp. 847-865 ◽  
Author(s):  
Annarita Colasante ◽  
Aurora García‐Gallego ◽  
Nikolaos Georgantzis ◽  
Andrea Morone ◽  
Tiziana Temerario
Keyword(s):  
Public Good ◽  
Relative Performance ◽  
Risk Attitudes ◽  
Performance Incentives ◽  
Public Good Games ◽  
Intragroup Competition

scholarly journals The Role of the Ventromedial Prefrontal Cortex in Public Good and Public Bad Games: Evidence From a tDCS Study

2021 ◽  
Vol 15 ◽  
Author(s):  
Yuyou Chen ◽  
Xinbo Lu ◽  
Yuzhen Li ◽  
Lulu Zeng ◽  
Ping Yu ◽  
...  
Keyword(s):  
Prefrontal Cortex ◽  
Public Good ◽  
Cooperative Behavior ◽  
Brain Regions ◽  
Ventromedial Prefrontal Cortex ◽  
Decision Making Process ◽  
The Public ◽  
Gains And Losses ◽  
Public Good Games

Although humans constitute an exceptionally cooperative species that is able to collaborate on large scales for common benefits, cooperation remains a longstanding puzzle in biological and social science. Moreover, cooperation is not always related to resource allocation and gains but is often related to losses. Revealing the neurological mechanisms and brain regions related to cooperation is important for reinforcing cooperation-related gains and losses. Recent neuroscience studies have found that the decision-making process of cooperation is involved in the function of the ventromedial prefrontal cortex (VMPFC). In the present study, we aimed to investigate the causal role of the VMPFC in cooperative behavior concerning gains and losses through the application of transcranial direct current stimulation (tDCS). We integrated cooperation-related gains and losses into a unified paradigm. Based on the paradigm, we researched cooperation behaviors regarding gains in standard public good games and introduced public bad games to investigate cooperative behavior regarding losses. Our study revealed that the VMPFC plays different roles concerning gains and losses in situations requiring cooperation. Anodal stimulation over the VMPFC decreased cooperative behavior in public bad games, whereas stimulation over the VMPFC did not change cooperative behavior in public good games. Moreover, participants’ beliefs about others’ cooperation were changed in public bad games but not in public good games. Finally, participants’ cooperative attitudes were not influenced in the public good or public bad games under the three stimulation conditions.

Efficiency and Stability of Sampling Equilibrium in Public Good Games

2017 ◽  
Author(s):  
Cesar Mantilla ◽  
Rajiv Sethi ◽  
Juan-Camilo CCrdenas
Keyword(s):  
Public Good ◽  
Public Good Games

Do You Get What You Measure? Research Opportunities Based on the Veterans Health Administration Experience

2014 ◽  
Vol 28 (2) ◽  
pp. 385-413 ◽  
Author(s):  
Nicole Thibodeau ◽  
John Harry Evans ◽  
Nandu J. Nagarajan
Keyword(s):  
Healthcare Delivery ◽  
Veterans Health Administration ◽  
Veterans Health ◽  
Health Administration ◽  
Performance Incentives ◽  
Healthcare Network ◽  
Similar Patient ◽  
Private And Public ◽  
The U.S

SYNOPSIS Starting in 1995, the Veterans Health Administration (VHA) transformed a bureaucratic healthcare system into a performance-driven, patient-focused integrated healthcare network. The VHA's experience may offer lessons for private and public sector providers as the U.S. explores alternative healthcare delivery systems and payment methods. Similar patient-focused integrated systems are one of the hallmarks of the latest U.S. attempt to improve the quality and efficiency of healthcare delivery. The use of performance incentives to promote cooperation and innovation is also central to both the VHA and the U.S. reform. This study reviews the VHA's experience with an eye to identifying issues and potential research avenues for accounting researchers interested in the role of accounting information for control, coordination, and organizational change.

scholarly journals Fractional Punishment of Free Riders to Improve Cooperation in Optional Public Good Games

Games ◽  
2021 ◽  
Vol 12 (1) ◽  
pp. 17
Author(s):  
Rocio Botta ◽  
Gerardo Blanco ◽  
Christian E. Schaerer
Keyword(s):  
Equilibrium Point ◽  
Public Good ◽  
Phase Portrait ◽  
Game Model ◽  
Public Good Game ◽  
Group Project ◽  
Free Riders ◽  
State Evolution ◽  
Public Good Games ◽  
Full Cooperation

Improving and maintaining cooperation are fundamental issues for any project to be time-persistent, and sanctioning free riders may be the most applied method to achieve it. However, the application of sanctions differs from one group (project or institution) to another. We propose an optional, public good game model where a randomly selected set of the free riders is punished. To this end, we introduce a parameter that establishes the portion of free riders sanctioned with the purpose to control the population state evolution in the game. This parameter modifies the phase portrait of the system, and we show that, when the parameter surpasses a threshold, the full cooperation equilibrium point becomes a stable global attractor. Hence, we demonstrate that the fractional approach improves cooperation while reducing the sanctioning cost.

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