scholarly journals Practical Identity, Obligation, and Sociality

2018 ◽  
Vol 49 (4) ◽  
pp. 610-625 ◽  
Author(s):  
Ana Marta González
Keyword(s):  
Practical Identity

Practical identity-based encryption in multiple private key generator (PKG) environments

2013 ◽  
Vol 8 (1) ◽  
pp. 43-50 ◽  
Author(s):  
Shengbao Wang ◽  
Zhenfu Cao ◽  
Qi Xie ◽  
Wenhao Liu
Keyword(s):  
Practical Identity ◽  
Private Key ◽  
Identity Based Encryption ◽  
Identity Based

Practical Identity, Contingency and Humanity

2022 ◽  
Vol 0 (0) ◽  
Author(s):  
Damiano Ranzenigo
Keyword(s):  
New York ◽  
Personal Identity ◽  
Human Beings ◽  
Specific Content ◽  
Cambridge University ◽  
Practical Identity ◽  
Oxford University ◽  
First Case ◽  
Natural Fact ◽  
Oxford University Press

Abstract Aim of this paper is to support the view that all human practical identities are contingent by arguing against the view that there is at least one necessary practical identity shared by all human beings, namely Humanity. The view that Humanity is a necessary practical identity is explicitly defended by Christine M. Korsgaard (Korsgaard, C. M. 1996. The Sources of Normativity, edited by O. O’Neill. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press; Korsgaard, C. M. 2009. Self-Constitution: Agency, Identity, and Integrity. New York: Oxford University Press) and indirectly by Marya Schechtman (Schechtman, M. 2014. Staying Alive: Personal Identity, Practical Concerns, and the Unity of a Life. New York: Oxford University Press). Korsgaard understands Humanity both in terms of pure self-legislation, and as deep sociality. In the first case, Humanity as self-legislation faces what I call ‘Existential dilemma’: either Humanity has specific content, typical of contingent practical identities, but stops being necessary for all human beings; or Humanity is emptied of its content and is conceived of as necessary self-legislation, but stops being a practical identity. In the second case, i.e., Humanity as deep sociality, Korsgaard confuses the necessary natural fact that human beings are social creatures, with contingent contexts of human socialization, which are the true sources of specifically human practical identities. I articulate this confusion in the guise of what I call ‘Nature/Nurture dilemma’, which also applies to the morally neutral account of human personhood advocated by Schechtman (Schechtman, M. 2014. Staying Alive: Personal Identity, Practical Concerns, and the Unity of a Life. Oxford University Press). In conclusion, I address the worry that without the necessary practical identity of Humanity we might not be able to extend our practical and moral concerns to distant fellow human beings by sketching an alternative path to extend such concerns.

Weakness of Will and Practical Identity

2020 ◽  
Vol 33 (4) ◽  
pp. 463-478
Author(s):  
Kevin Jung
Keyword(s):  
Weakness Of Will ◽  
Internal Resources ◽  
Practical Identity ◽  
Ultimate Source

In this article, I develop an Augustinian response to some contemporary philosophical proposals concerning the problem of weakness of will. I argue that many philosophers tend to cast the problem in terms of irrationality, focusing on psychological components such as judgment, desire, and resolution. In contrast, I contend that weakness of will has more to do with the absence of a coherent conception of practical identity and with a misleading conception of practical identity that overestimates the agent’s normative and motivational capacities. I claim that the irrationality of the weak-willed agent is at best a symptom, rather than the ultimate source, of weakness of will which cannot be properly understood without first addressing the deficiency of our internal resources relative to our willing and doing.

scholarly journals Guilt, Practical Identity, and Moral Staining

Philosophy ◽  
2017 ◽  
Vol 92 (4) ◽  
pp. 623-645
Author(s):  
Andrew Ingram
Keyword(s):  
Moral Obligations ◽  
Practical Identity ◽  
Moral Duties

AbstractThe guilt left by immoral actions is why moral duties are more pressing and serious than other reasons like prudential considerations. Religions talk of sin and karma; the secular still speak of spots or stains. I argue that a moral staining view of guilt is in fact the best model. It accounts for guilt's reflexive character and for anxious, scrupulous worries about whether one has transgressed. To understand moral staining, I borrow Christine Korsgaard's view that we construct our identities as agents through our actions. The contribution of immoral actions to self-constitution explains why moral obligations have priority and importance.

scholarly journals Refleksja jako źródło autorytetu. Podmiotowość moralna w świetle argumentu konstytutywizmu Korsgaard

2021 ◽  
Vol 10 (2) ◽  
pp. 373-392
Author(s):  
Adriana Warmbier
Keyword(s):  
Practical Reason ◽  
Moral Agency ◽  
Moral Agent ◽  
Ethical Question ◽  
Ethical Standards ◽  
Reasons For Action ◽  
Practical Identity ◽  
Normative Authority ◽  
Normative Relation ◽  
The Cost

The authority of reflection. Moral agency in the light of Korsgaard’s constitutive arguments: In this paper I address the question as to whether Christine Korsgaard’s account of normative relations between the moral agent and the ends of her actions which constitutes her practical identity avoids falling into the trap of being just another abstract theory in moral philosophy. Proponents of constitutive arguments for the normative authority of reasons for action offer a promising approach to this meta‐ethical question by arguing that the normative authority of reasons is found within the practice of reasoning itself (in agency itself). In two constitutive arguments for the normativity of rational requirements, Korsgaard attempts first to argue that “the normative question” does not consist in looking merely for an explanation of moral practices but in asking “What justifies the claims that morality makes on us?”, and secondly to establish that the reason why ethical standards make claims on us is that they represent commands which are constitutive of having a self (the cost of violating ethical standards is the loss of practical identity). Korsgaard deals with these two arguments using her own modified version of the reflective endorsement method. She claims that the reflective structure of human consciousness establishes the normative relation we have to ourselves and that this is a relation of authority (that is the source of obligation). I argue that Korsgaard’s account of action as self‐constitution (the constitution of a practical sense of identity) fails to arrive at establishing the authority of reflection. I draw on the discussed claim that reasoned authority for our actions comes from reflective scrutiny (the test of reflection). Viewing the Kantian model of practical reason which lies at the basis of Korsgaard’s approach, I suggest the possibility of applying the Aristotelian model of practical reason as an useful framework for the reflective endorsement strategy.

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