Public Goods, Mutual Benefits, and Majority Rule

This chapter details the likely economic, democratic, and rights performance of a decentralized national legislature with representatives elected from geographically specified local districts. The national legislature is assigned responsibility for national public goods and services and national regulations. Decisions in the legislature are made by simple majority rule. Independent local governments continue to be responsible for important local services, perhaps provided concurrently with the national government. On the dimensions of democratic participation and the protection of rights and liberties, Democratic Federalism is likely to do well, provided all citizens are represented in the legislature. It is on the dimension of economic efficiency that legislature-only Democratic Federalism is most likely to fall short.

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When Does Majority Rule Supply Public Goods Efficiently?

Measurement in Public Choice ◽

10.1007/978-1-349-05090-1_6 ◽

1981 ◽

pp. 75-85

Author(s):

Ted C. Bergstrom

Keyword(s):

Public Goods ◽

Majority Rule

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Rethinking Federalism

The Journal of Economic Perspectives ◽

10.1257/jep.11.4.43 ◽

1997 ◽

Vol 11 (4) ◽

pp. 43-64 ◽

Cited By ~ 208

Author(s):

Robert P Inman ◽

Daniel L Rubinfeld

Keyword(s):

Political Participation ◽

Public Goods ◽

Majority Rule ◽

Central Government ◽

Policy Issue ◽

Cooperative Federalism ◽

Federal Structure

The appropriate federal structure of government is now a policy issue of major debate. This paper identifies three approaches and compares their strengths and weaknesses. Economic federalism recommends the use of competitive communities for the provision of congestible local goods and a strong central government for the provision of pure public goods and spillovers. Cooperative federalism recommends intercommunity agreements; democratic federalism prefers a majority-rule representative legislature. Efficiency will sometimes conflict with other constitutional objectives--political participation and the protection of rights--and compromises will often be required.

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Decision Costs and Welfare Effects of Democratic Voting Rules: an Experimental Analysis

World Political Science ◽

10.1515/wpsr-2012-0008 ◽

2012 ◽

Vol 8 (1) ◽

pp. 159-183

Author(s):

Ulrich Glassmann ◽

Jan Sauermann

Keyword(s):

Public Goods ◽

Experimental Analysis ◽

Majority Rule ◽

Welfare Effects ◽

Public Goods Game ◽

Voting Rules ◽

Unanimity Rule ◽

Theoretical Approaches ◽

Critical Revision ◽

Pareto Efficient

AbstractWhat impact do majority rule and unanimity rule have on welfare and decision costs? According to Buchanan and Tullock ([1962] 1999) the unanimity principle must be regarded as a democratic norm, because it guarantees Pareto-efficient welfare effects. We present experimental results from a public goods game, which demonstrate in contrast to this assumption that majority rule can produce greater welfare effects than unanimity rule. This result suggests a critical revision of theoretical approaches which narrow the legitimacy of majority rule in this respect.

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