Confucianism, Rule‐Consequentialism, and the Demands of Filial Obligations

2019 ◽  
Vol 47 (2) ◽  
pp. 377-393 ◽  
Author(s):  
William Sin
Keyword(s):  
Rule Consequentialism ◽  
Filial Obligations

Is rule-consequentialism a rubber duck?

Analysis ◽  
1994 ◽  
Vol 54 (2) ◽  
pp. 92-97 ◽  
Author(s):  
B. Hooker
Keyword(s):  
Rule Consequentialism

Virtue Ethics vs. Rule-Consequentialism: A Reply to Brad Hooker

Utilitas ◽  
2002 ◽  
Vol 14 (1) ◽  
pp. 41-53 ◽  
Author(s):  
Rosalind Hursthouse
Keyword(s):  
Virtue Ethics ◽  
Character Trait ◽  
Human Species ◽  
Rule Consequentialism ◽  
Virtuous Character ◽  
My Criterion

In On Virtue Ethics I offered a criterion for a character trait's being a virtue according to which a virtuous character trait must conduce to, or at least not be inimical to, four ends, one of which is the continuance of the human species. I argue here that this does not commit me to homosexuality's being a vice, since homosexuality is not a character trait and hence not up for assessment as a virtue or a vice. Vegetarianism is not up for such assessment either, for the same reason, but, as a practice, may well be required by the virtue of compassion, and sacrificing one's life for an animal or alien may be required by courage. The clause about the continuance of the human species in my criterion does not specify a foundational value, because, following McDowell, I reject foundationalism.

Parfit’s Final Arguments in Normative Ethics

2021 ◽  
pp. 213-232
Author(s):  
Brad Hooker
Keyword(s):  
Reflective Equilibrium ◽  
Normative Ethics ◽  
Final Part ◽  
The Third ◽  
Rule Consequentialism ◽  
Final Volume ◽  
Act Consequentialism ◽  
What Matters

This paper starts by juxtaposing the normative ethics in the final part of Parfit’s final book, On What Matters, volume iii (2017), with the normative ethics in his earlier books, Reasons and Persons (1984) and On What Matters, volume i (2011). The paper then addresses three questions. The first is, where does the reflective-equilibrium methodology that Parfit endorsed in the first volume of On What Matters lead? The second is, is the Act-involving Act Consequentialism that Parfit considers in the final volume of On What Matters as plausible as Rossian deontology? The third is, how is the new argument that Parfit puts forward for Rule Consequentialism supposed to work?

Nonlegislative Justification

2021 ◽  
pp. 247-274
Author(s):  
Liam Murphy
Keyword(s):  
Legal Rules ◽  
Moral Principles ◽  
Rule Consequentialism ◽  
Positive Mode ◽  
Moral Theorizing ◽  
High Level ◽  
General Regulation ◽  
As If

If moral theorists who otherwise disagree, all approach moral theorizing as a search for a set of desirable moral principles for the general regulation of behavior, then there is a sense in which they are all, as Parfit says, climbing the same mountain. But it is the wrong mountain. Morality should not be understood as hypothetical legislation; it is a mistake to set about constructing morality as if we were making law. Real legislators evaluate possible legal rules by considering the effects they would have. They can do this because enforcement and acceptance of law ensure a high level of compliance. Moral legislators have no reason to assume any particular level of acceptance; the effects of counterfactual acceptance of a principle are not morally relevant. The argument targets rule consequentialism and Scanlon’s official version of contractualism. The paper begins in a positive mode by arguing that a nonlegislative version of Scanlon’s approach, that seeks justification for conduct of such-and-such a kind in such-and-such circumstances by comparing the reasons in favor and the reasons others have to object, is a very attractive way to think about what we owe to each other.

Two Kinds of Reasons

2019 ◽  
pp. 85-112
Author(s):  
Christopher Woodard
Keyword(s):  
Practical Significance ◽  
Rule Consequentialism ◽  
Good Outcome ◽  
Plausible Account ◽  
Good Pattern ◽  
Act Consequentialism ◽  
Reason For Action

One kind of reason for action is that the action would have a good outcome. According to Act Consequentialism all reasons are like this. However, these ‘act-based’ reasons may be contrasted with ‘pattern-based’ reasons, which flow from the fact that an action is part of some good pattern of action. This chapter argues that both kinds of reasons exist, and explores some of the issues facing any theory of pattern-based reasons. One such issue is whether they can exist in cases where the valuable pattern would not be realized because other agents are unwilling to play their parts. According to idealizing forms of Rule Consequentialism, they can. However, the chapter endorses an argument made by Alexander Dietz that this is incompatible with any plausible account of the strength of pattern-based reasons. It ends by explaining how pattern-based reasons may nevertheless retain their practical significance.

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