Accruals mispricing versus risk: Analyzing the influence of external monitoring in Brazil

2021 ◽  
Author(s):  
Vinícius Gomes Martins ◽  
Márcio André Veras Machado ◽  
Paulo Aguiar Monte
Keyword(s):  
External Monitoring ◽  
Versus Risk

Anti-craving biofeedback program in clinical course of pathological addictions

2017 ◽  
Vol 41 (S1) ◽  
pp. s879-s879
Author(s):  
I. Sosin ◽  
Y. Chuev ◽  
A. Volkov ◽  
O. Goncharova
Keyword(s):  
Individual Preference ◽  
Emotional States ◽  
Digital Information ◽  
External Monitoring ◽  
Computer Testing ◽  
Mode Of Life ◽  
Competing Interest ◽  
The Individual ◽  
Monitoring Module ◽  
And Control

IntroductionModern clinical narcology searches for anti-craving programs to overcome psychoactive substances (PAS) pathological addiction with bio-adaptive regulation of systems (BARS).Aims and objectivesTo develop computer modified biofeedback program integrated with Luscher test.MethodTwenty-two PAS addicts who were undergoing biofeedback modified psycho-training were examined. Computer rheoencephalogram (REG) was used as an external monitoring module.ResultsTechnologically novel biofeedback computer modification was developed with preceding Luscher computer testing for determination of the individual preference colour and the colour producing individual unpleasant associations in respondents. Consequently, biofeedback program was corrected differentially by changing standard colour templates for those personified on monitor. Cerebral hemodynamics condition transferred to individually designed for a particular respondent colour registers is used as a homeostatic parameter reflecting alcohol craving presence/absence: in case of the disordered REG parameters the signal reflects the respondent's unpleasant (negative) colour, and with no craving the screen is filled with positive, pleasant, favourite colour. During BARS auto-training the respondents’ skills to mediate present subjective clinical PAS craving manifestations with unpleasant colour and the experimental auto-training method have been mastered, and those psycho emotional states which displace PAS craving symbolic colour from the screen are selected, and it is substituted with favourite colour (symbol of healthy mode of life motivations).ConclusionsUsage of combined BARS biofeedback improved effectiveness of the training and allowed to objectivize and control the condition of the patient getting reliable visual and digital information about either regress or activation of PAS craving and potential relapse of addictive behaviour.Disclosure of interestThe authors have not supplied their declaration of competing interest.

Auditee Religiosity, External Monitoring, and the Pricing of Audit Services

2016 ◽  
Vol 152 (2) ◽  
pp. 409-436 ◽  
Author(s):  
Ferdinand A. Gul ◽  
Anthony C. Ng
Keyword(s):  
External Monitoring

The Use of Contract Adjustments to Lengthen the CEO Horizon in the Presence of Internal and External Monitoring

2013 ◽  
Vol 25 (1) ◽  
pp. 199-229 ◽  
Author(s):  
Shane S. Dikolli ◽  
Susan L. Kulp ◽  
Karen L. Sedatole
Keyword(s):  
Boards Of Directors ◽  
Data Availability ◽  
Shareholder Rights ◽  
Compensation Contracts ◽  
Job Change ◽  
External Monitoring ◽  
Increased Risk ◽  
Short Horizon ◽  
High Level ◽  
A Current

ABSTRACT We investigate whether boards of directors adjust compensation contracts to lengthen a CEO's decision horizon, and if the use of such contract adjustments depends on the levels of external (i.e., shareholder-based) and internal (i.e., board-based) CEO monitoring. Based on insights from the career-concerns literature, we identify short-horizon CEOs as those nearing retirement, at a firm with a current earnings decline or loss, and/or with an impending job change. We find that firms with a CEO identified as having a short-horizon place greater contract weight on forward-looking information. This horizon-lengthening contract adjustment is less pronounced when there is greater external monitoring (i.e., as proxied by a high level of shareholder rights), consistent with the intuition that increased shareholder rights mitigate CEO entrenchment, leading to less myopic decision making, independent of a contract adjustment. However, we also find that the horizon-lengthening contract adjustment is more pronounced when there is greater internal monitoring (i.e., as proxied by characteristics of the board), consistent with the intuition that increased employment risk from more intense internal monitoring itself creates a demand for increased incentive weights as a means of compensating the CEO for the increased risk. Data Availability: Data used for this study are derived from publicly available databases and proxy statements. JEL Classifications: M52; M41; J33.

scholarly journals Procedural justice versus risk factors for offending: Predicting recidivism in youth.

2014 ◽  
Vol 38 (3) ◽  
pp. 225-237 ◽  
Author(s):  
Erika K. Penner ◽  
Jodi L. Viljoen ◽  
Kevin S. Douglas ◽  
Ronald Roesch
Keyword(s):  
Risk Factors ◽  
Procedural Justice ◽  
Versus Risk

Family firms and debt: Risk aversion versus risk of losing control

2013 ◽  
Vol 66 (11) ◽  
pp. 2308-2320 ◽  
Author(s):  
Maximiliano González ◽  
Alexander Guzmán ◽  
Carlos Pombo ◽  
María-Andrea Trujillo
Keyword(s):  
Risk Aversion ◽  
Family Firms ◽  
Versus Risk
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