scholarly journals The impact of the number of sellers on quantal response equilibrium predictions in Bertrand oligopolies

2019 ◽  
Vol 28 (4) ◽  
pp. 787-793
Author(s):  
Ralph‐C Bayer ◽  
Chaohua Dong ◽  
Hang Wu
Keyword(s):  
Quantal Response ◽  
Quantal Response Equilibrium ◽  
The Impact

Origins of heart rate variability: relationship of heart rate burst morphology to work duration and load

1999 ◽  
Vol 277 (4) ◽  
pp. H1491-H1497
Author(s):  
Daniel Roach ◽  
Robert Haennel ◽  
Mary Lou Koshman ◽  
Robert Sheldon
Keyword(s):  
Heart Rate ◽  
Burst Duration ◽  
Heart Period ◽  
Quantal Response ◽  
Ambulatory Ecg ◽  
Work Duration ◽  
Baroreceptor Activation ◽  
Relationship Of ◽  
Electrocardiogram Ecg ◽  
The Impact

We are developing a lexicon of specific heart period changes, or lexons, that recur frequently and whose physiological meaning can be read into ambulatory electrocardiogram (ECG). The transient, reversible “burst” of tachycardia induced by exercise initiation can also be seen on ambulatory ECG. We hypothesized that burst morphology depended on the work that preceded it and on baroreceptor activation. Ten subjects with mean age 38 yr (range 17–69 yr) underwent two protocols of semisupine cycling in which load and duration were varied. Burst duration increased with longer cycling times (median values of 18.0, 25.5, and 23.7 s with 1, 3, and 5 s of cycling, respectively; P= 0.033). Burst shape as assessed by heart period exponential decay constant and burst magnitude did not change. To assess the impact of workload, subjects cycled for 5 s at loads of 0, 25, 50, and 75 W. No significant differences were seen in burst duration, burst magnitude, or burst shape. Tachycardia preceded hypotension by 4.6 ± 2.2 s, which is inconsistent with baroreceptor involvement in the onset of burst tachycardia. Because burst morphology is a nearly quantal response to the initiation of exercise, the presence of a burst on an ambulatory ECG implies the onset of exercise.

Heterogeneity

2016 ◽  
Author(s):  
Jacob K. Goeree ◽  
Charles A. Holt ◽  
Thomas R. Palfrey
Keyword(s):  
Choice Behavior ◽  
Error Rates ◽  
The Other ◽  
Individual Heterogeneity ◽  
Response Functions ◽  
Quantal Response ◽  
Quantal Response Equilibrium ◽  
Skill Levels ◽  
Apparent Reason ◽  
Chess Players

Players have different skills, which has implications for the degree to which they make errors. Low-skill hitters in baseball often swing at bad pitches, beginning skiers frequently fall for no apparent reason, and children often lose at tic-tac-toe. At the other extreme, there are brilliant chess players, bargainers, and litigators who seem to know exactly what move to make or offer to decline. From a quantal response equilibrium (QRE) perspective, these skill levels can be modeled in terms of variation in error rates or in responsiveness of quantal response functions. This chapter explores issues related to individual heterogeneity with respect to player error rates. It also describes some extensions of QRE that relax the assumption that player expectations about the choice behavior of other players are correct. For example, in games that are played only once, players are not able to learn from others' prior decisions, and expectations must be based on introspection. The chapter develops the implications of noisy introspection embedded in a model of iterated thinking.

scholarly journals Cybersecurity Analysis of Smart Manufacturing System Using Game Theory Approach and Quantal Response Equilibrium

2018 ◽  
Vol 17 ◽  
pp. 1001-1008 ◽  
Author(s):  
Alireza Zarreh ◽  
Can Saygin ◽  
HungDa Wan ◽  
Yooneun Lee ◽  
Alejandro Bracho ◽  
...  
Keyword(s):  
Game Theory ◽  
Manufacturing System ◽  
Smart Manufacturing ◽  
Theory Approach ◽  
Quantal Response ◽  
Quantal Response Equilibrium

Applications to Political Science

2016 ◽  
Author(s):  
Jacob K. Goeree ◽  
Charles A. Holt ◽  
Thomas R. Palfrey
Keyword(s):  
Political Science ◽  
Threshold Level ◽  
Binary Choice ◽  
Quantal Response ◽  
Quantal Response Equilibrium ◽  
Legislative Bargaining ◽  
Crisis Bargaining ◽  
Volunteer’S Dilemma ◽  
Special Case

This chapter considers a set of closely related binary-choice games that have been applied to model questions in political science. It starts with an analysis of “participation games,” which are n-player games where each player has only two possible actions: to participate or not. The payoff for either decision depends on the number of other players who make that decision. In some cases, a threshold level of participation is required for the group benefit to be obtained. The first example is the “volunteer's dilemma,” which pertains to the special case where the threshold is 1, that is, only a single volunteer is needed. The chapter ends with an analysis of bargaining situations, including an application of agent quantal response equilibrium to bilateral “crisis bargaining” and of Markov QRE to the Baron–Ferejohn model of multilateral “legislative bargaining.”

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